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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyzes the transformation of noncitizen detention policy in the United 
States over the twentieth century. For much of that time, official policy remained 
disconnected from the reality of experiences for those subjected to the detention regime. 
However, once detention policy changed into its current form, disparities between policy 
and reality virtually disappeared. This work argues that since its inception in the late 
nineteenth century to its present manifestations, noncitizen detention policy transformed 
from a form of exclusion to a method of state-sponsored violence. A new periodization 
based on detention policy refocuses immigration enforcement into three eras: exclusion, 
humane, and violent. When official policy became state violence, the regime 
synchronized with noncitizen experiences in detention marked by pain, suffering, 
isolation, hopelessness, and death. This violent policy followed the era of humane 
detentions. From 1954 to 1981, during a time of supposedly benevolent national policies 
premised on a narrative against de facto detentions, Arizona, and the broader Southwest, 
continued to detain noncitizens while collecting revenue for housing such federal 
prisoners. Over time increasing detentions contributed to overcrowding. Those 
incarcerated naturally reacted against such conditions, where federal, state, and local 
prisoners coalesced to demand their humanity. Yet, when taxpayers ignored these pleas, 
an eclectic group of sheriffs, state and local politicians, and prison officials negotiated 
with federal prisoners, commodifying them for federal revenue. Officials then used 
federal money to revamp existing facilities and build new ones. Receiving money for 
federal prisoners was so deeply embedded within the Southwest carceral landscape that it 
allowed for private prison companies to casually take over these relationships previously 
 ii 
held by state actors. When official policy changed in 1981, general detentions were used 
as deterrence to break the will of asylum seekers. With this change, policy and reality 
melded. No longer needing the pretext of exclusionary rationales nor the fiction of 
humane policies, the unencumbered state consolidated its official detention policy with a 
rationale of deterrence. In other words, violence. Analyzing the devolution of noncitizen 
detention policy provides key insights to understanding its historical antecedents, how 
this violent detention regime came to be within the modern carceral state, and its 
implications for the mass incarceration crisis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 It is not prison. It is not punishment.  
Policy said so.  
Reality disagreed. 
 Thirteen-year-old Benjamin Choy was detained for two weeks in 1930. Decades 
later, Choy reflected on that experience: “I don’t know how to describe it. Just a place of 
confinement, that’s all. Because I was away over there, only two weeks. You just sleep, 
and eat, and play. That’s all, there’s nothing else.”1 Stefan Weissing, 21 years old at the 
time, was detained in 1953. He later echoed a similar sentiment, “When we looked out of 
the window, we couldn’t go outside. You know, they were at the machine, the gun towers 
there still. They had the electric fence there still… there were searchlights all night going 
around. That I remember. Like in prison, you were in prison.”2 About his prolonged 
confinement in the late 1990s, Marlon Rajigah recalled, “Like you want to get out of 
there. You have anxiety attacks. You just try to lay down and sleep and pretend that 
you’re somewhere else most of the time…The world seems so small. And you want to 
walk. You can’t even walk around.”3 In 2015, when Juan Miguel Cornejo spoke out 
against inadequate medical care where he was detained, officials placed him in solitary 
                                               
1 Benjamin Choy, interview with Caitlin Fischer (December 2, 2004), Oral History Project, Angel 
Island, Pacific Regional Humanities Institute, available at 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/323175bz. 
 
2 Stefan Weissing, interview with Janet Levine (July 30, 1994), Ellis Island Oral History Project, 
available at https://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/oral-history-library. 
 
3 Quoted in Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), 194. 
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confinement.4 Cornejo later stated, “Three days they [locked us up]… they didn’t give us 
food, they would give us raw eggs, rotten eggs… In the hole, I had times where I did not 
sleep because I was thinking that they would enter and hit me because they practice 
torture….”5  
As noncitizens, each of the above individuals experienced a form of 
administrative caging across the United States over the course of the twentieth century. 
Choy was recounting Angel Island in San Francisco. Weissing was describing Ellis 
Island in New York. Rajigah was held at Pine Prairie Detention Center in Louisiana. 
Cornejo was detained at Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. While their experiences with 
noncitizen detention may bear parallels, their detentions operated under different 
immigration enforcement policy regimes that evolved – or, more accurately devolved – 
over the course of the twentieth century.6 For Choy and Weissing, their detentions took 
place within various regimes of race-based, class-based, profession-based, or public 
health-based exclusionary policies. Such exclusionary detentions lasted until a change of 
                                               
4 Daniel González, “ICE accused of punishing Eloy immigration detainee,” The Arizona 
Republic, August 28, 2015, available at 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2015/09/04/ice-accused-punishing-
detainee-spoke-media/71367100/. 
 
5 Juan Miguel Cornejo, interview with Leah Sarat, September 26, 2016, transcript, Stories of 
Immigrant Detention, transcriptions by Stacey Gama and Berenice Pelayo, translated by Berenice 
Pelayo. The “hole” refers to solitary confinement. 
 
6 I am using “noncitizen detention” here rather than “immigrant detention” based on current law 
where any person without formal United States citizenship could face the possibility of detention 
and/or deportation. As scholar Daniel Kanstroom argues, “Any noncitizen… may be deported for 
a wide variety of reasons, some quite clear, others mind-numbingly technical.” Kanstroom, 
Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2007), 3. 
Moreover, in immigration law, there are distinctions made between such terms as “immigrant,” 
“nonimmigrant,” and “arriving alien” so “noncitizen” seems more encompassing and less 
confusing. However, “immigrant detention” or “immigration detention” remain when the phrase 
is part of a direct quote. 
 3 
detention policy in 1954. That year, Ellis Island, the nation’s first federal detention 
center, closed after public pressure against arbitrary and indefinite confinement of those 
not convicted of a crime. A purported new era, operating within a Cold War rhetorical 
framework, began with a detention policy favoring parole. After decades of detaining 
noncitizens at Ellis Island, Angel Island (from 1910 to 1940), and other facilities across 
the country, most noncitizens were to be paroled instead of detained during the course of 
their administrative proceedings. Only those deemed “likely to abscond” or “inimical to 
national security” would be held in detention. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) claimed it had “put into effect, and found workable, a humane detention 
program while maintaining positive safeguards and security measures.”7  
However, the reality of detention experiences on the ground directly contradicted 
this policy as detentions expanded, in particular across the U.S. Southwest, within 
overcrowded facilities. From 1954 to 1981, during an era of national “humane” detention 
policies premised on a narrative against de facto detentions of the past, Arizona, along 
with the broader U.S. Southwest, continued to detain noncitizens in dismal conditions 
within antiquated county jails. For federal immigration officials, “humane” meant most 
noncitizens would be paroled instead of detained turning away from arbitrarily subjecting 
noncitizens awaiting the resolution of their civil cases to confinement. In this way, 
officials maintained that only a few people, namely those who were deemed flight risks 
or security threats, would be held in physical detention. Yet, a few detainees turned into 
thousands and eventually hundreds of thousands throughout the 1960s and 1970s.8 While 
                                               
7 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 
1955 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 6. 
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directly contradicting the official narrative, these detentions were further compounded by 
severely inhumane conditions of confinement. In Arizona, increasing detentions stressed 
the aging infrastructure of county jails and led to massive overcrowding. Those 
experiencing such overcrowding naturally reacted against it, where federal, state, and 
local prisoners coalesced to demand their humanity. As Heather Ann Thompson argues, 
“America’s incarcerated people have never stopped struggling against this country’s 
worst and most punitive practices.”9 In doing so amidst their shared plight, they 
collectively challenged the very core of the “humane” detention narrative. 
As groups of prisoners protested the conditions of their confinement, the ‘right 
hand’ came back with a vengeance as armed police and tear gas quieted riots, but echoing 
nineteenth-century prison building predecessors, also disguised as benevolent reform.10 
When taxpayers continually ignored these dismal jail conditions, local municipalities 
turned to the federal government for funding to alleviate overcrowding and avoid powder 
keg scenarios.11 An eclectic group of zealous sheriffs, state and local politicians, and 
prison officials negotiated with the lives of federal prisoners in their care, commodifying 
                                               
8 “INS Detentions in Service and Non-Service Facilities, 1962-79,” entries compiled from U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), table 1. 
 
9 Thompson, Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its Legacy (New York, 
NY: Pantheon Books, 2016), 571. 
 
10 For the ‘right hand’ metaphor see Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery 
and the Making of American Capitalism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2016). For nineteenth 
century prison reform see Caleb Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2014). 
 
11 This extends Gerald Nash’s argument that the “federal government created a federal landscape 
in the West” to federally-funded prison building. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic 
History of the Twentieth-Century West (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1999), x. 
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their very existence.12 In this commodification, federal prisoners were both vilified as 
harmful drug offenders deserving their fate and pitied as harmless immigration violators 
undeservingly trapped behind bars. On one level, such distinctions seemed to 
differentiate criminality and immigration. Yet, on another level, the general 
commodification by officials of all federal prisoners through collective per diem rates 
remained indiscriminate. Officials then used the money received per prisoner, regardless 
of their alleged offense, to revamp existing facilities and build new ones throughout the 
latter part of the twentieth century. While official policy maintained that detentions were 
no longer a de facto part of immigration enforcement, the era of “humane” detention 
nevertheless saw not only continued and expanded detentions of noncitizens in Arizona, 
and all along the Southwest, but also the growth of multi-jurisdictional economic 
agreements between local, state, and federal entities within an expanding carceral 
landscape. Ultimately, the era of “humane” detention was a contestation of the very 
definition of what humanity meant for those held on immigration charges and 
commodified behind aging cages, a struggle that would have devastating consequences. 
Those consequences took shape with the official end of the era of “humane” 
detentions in 1981. Months after President Carter signed the Refugee Act of 1980 to 
account for mass asylum movements, President Reagan’s attorney general implemented a 
policy of detaining asylum seekers as “necessary to discourage people like the Haitians 
from setting sail in the first place.”13 With this change, detention policy became premised 
                                               
12 In a striking example of this commodification, federal prisoners in Florence, Arizona are listed 
by name under “Articles or Services.” “Public Voucher for Purchases and Services Other Than 
Personal,” U.S. Department of Justice, prepared at Tucson, Arizona to Pinal County Board of 
Supervisors, Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, Phoenix, Arizona. 
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on deterrence. The state’s nearly unchecked power against noncitizen detainees came to 
actively involve violence as general detentions were used as deterrence to break the will 
of asylum seekers in the 1980s and 1990s. Expanding detentions filled centers and 
contract facilities beyond capacity as this trend continued into the twenty-first century. 
Today, in an enforcement regime particularly rooted in post-9/11 ‘security’ policy and 
combined with the ever-present influence of a conglomeration of publicly and privately-
operated jails and prisons within the carceral landscape, noncitizen detention remains a 
growing industry in the mass incarceration crisis. For Rajigah and Cornejo, then, their 
detentions tested their will to withstand administrative caging, within what Mark Dow 
calls the archipelago of the American Gulag. Detention policy became linked to a process 
that sought to break the will of noncitizens to keep fighting their removal cases outside of 
theoretical due process protections afforded to criminal defendants. The capacity of the 
United States to engage in this process of deterrence through breaking within the 
demarcations of the law constitutes a significant measure of the expansion of unfettered 
state power. Noncitizen detention policy that was once premised on exclusion had 
become state-sponsored violence.  
When official policy turned into state violence, the detention regime synchronized 
to the way in which noncitizens had always experienced it. Immigration enforcement 
strategies including detentions and deportations, an often-too-common outcome of 
detentions, have always been and are violent processes for those being subjected to them. 
For instance, pointing to the deportations of Imperial Valley residents in the 1940s, 
                                               
13 Stuart Taylor Jr., “Smith Sees Immigration Plan as a Means to Avert Boatlifts,” New York 
Times, October 23, 1981. 
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historian Natalia Molina writes, “To then deport them ten, even twenty years after they 
have established their lives in the United States might be best described as a kind of 
violence.”14 Immigration enforcement also leads to death. Enforcement strategies that 
built fences and pushed migrants into more desolate, harsher conditions starting in the 
1940s “muddied the authorship of state violence” because “no one could be named in the 
death of the migrants.” As historian Kelly Lyle Hernández argues, such enforcement 
methods purportedly strengthening border security “structured a system of violence 
without perpetrators.”15 This system of violence marked and continues to mark the 
personal experiences of those who encounter it. However, for much of the twentieth 
century, there was a disparity between official policy and the reality of experiences for 
those who were subjected to the detention regime. Once the official policy changed, such 
disparities disappeared. No longer needing the pretext of exclusionary rationales nor the 
fiction of “humane” detention policies, the unencumbered state could consolidate its 
official policy with a simple rationale of deterrence. Or, even more simply, violence. 
Understanding the historical devolution of immigration policy and detention 
practices is the central objective of this story. This work argues that since its beginnings 
in the late nineteenth century to its current manifestations today, noncitizen detention 
policy in the United States transformed from a form of exclusion to a method of state-
sponsored violence. The heart of this transformation took place in the middle of the 
twentieth century, in the era of “humane” detentions, when official policy directly 
                                               
14 Natalia Molina, How Race Is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical 
Power of Racial Scripts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 110. 
 
15 Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2010), 132. 
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contradicted reality and set the stage for the violence that followed. The violence of 
detention policy can best be understood as a form of death. As noncitizen detention 
evolved over the twentieth century, exclusionary strategies fused with criminalization to 
become a brutal regime of literal and figurative death. While confined within subpar 
conditions of detention centers and subjected to lesser rights, noncitizens experience 
arbitrary forms of state violence that can literally end their lives either while detained or 
post-deportation. Since 2003, there have been more than 170 recorded deaths of 
noncitizens in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.16 The literal 
destruction of human life bears witness to the unadulterated state violence of detention 
policy. Simply put, detention policy kills. But no one is held accountable for the killing. 
After all, as Charles Bowden once noted, “We can still believe that destroying another 
human life is an extreme act. Unless of course, the slaughter is done by governments.”17 
Noncitizens languish inside detention centers that are essentially prisons, fighting their 
cases in adversarial procedures similar to criminal cases, yet not covered under criminal 
law. Since immigration cases fall under administrative law, criminal law protections such 
as a right to legal counsel at the state’s expense do not apply. The result seems 
                                               
16 For recent articles people facing death after deportation, see Sibylla Brodzinsky and Ed 
Pilkington, “US government deporting Central American migrants to their deaths,” The 
Guardian, October 12, 2015, available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-america. See also Choe Sang-Hun, 
“Deportation a ‘Death Sentence’ to Adoptees After a Lifetime in the U.S.,” The New York Times, 
July 2, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/02/world/asia/south-korea-
adoptions-phillip-clay-adam-crapser.html.  
 
17 Charles Bowden, Murder City: Ciudad Juárez and the Global Economy’s New Killing Fields 
(New York: Nation Books, 2010), xi. Marc Lamont Hill’s framework of being “nobody” was also 
influential here. As Hill writes, “To be Nobody is to be vulnerable… To be Nobody is to be 
subject to State violence.” Marc Lamont Hill, Nobody: Casualties of America’s War on the 
Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), xvii, 
xviii. 
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predictable. As scholar Lisa Marie Cacho argues, “For all legally uncertain populations, 
the law punishes but does not protect, disciplines but does not defend.”18 For noncitizen 
detainees, therefore, the punitive effect of law is the primary reality of their incarceration. 
Those who manage to stay alive while detained, face a different form of death. The 
thousands who are compelled to ‘choose’ voluntary departure do so under the threat of 
prolonged detention and a lack of legal options, including access to counsel.19 Still others 
decide to remain in detention, desperately exhausting the few legal avenues – and very 
time-consuming appeals20 – left available to noncitizens, hoping for compassion within a 
rhetoric of due process discourse.21 This hope is, for most, ultimately an illusion. When 
the state denies all relief, noncitizens face deportation. Deprived of hope and all of the 
time lost inside administrative cages, noncitizens who manage to live still experience a 
                                               
18 Lisa Marie Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the 
Unprotected (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 8. 
 
19 Because deportation proceedings are considered civil, rather than criminal, courts have held 
that the right to counsel is derived from the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment due process clause 
rather than the Sixth Amendment. Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986). 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that in criminal proceedings, the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel requires an attorney representing a 
noncitizen to warn their client about possible immigration consequences that may result from a 
guilty plea. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). While possibly helpful for some noncitizen 
criminal defendants, there is still no right to counsel at the state’s expense in deportation 
proceedings. 
 
20 As one recent work points out, “For people who decide not to sign the removal order and who 
fight their cases, immigration detention can last for excessive periods, even years, because of a 
backlog in the system.” Jeremy Slack, et. al, “In Harm’s Way: Family Separation, Immigration 
Enforcement Programs, and Security on the U.S.-Mexico Border,” in The Shadow of the Wall: 
Violence and Migration on the U.S.-Mexico Border, edited by Jeremy Slack, Daniel E. Martínez, 
and Scott Whiteford (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2018), 81. 
 
21 This hope for compassion is similar to what scholar Lisa Marie Cacho explains as a “demand 
for humanity” which she argues is “ultimately disempowering because they can be interpreted 
only as asking to be given something sacred in return for nothing at all.” Cacho, Social Death, 7. 
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form of figurative death characterized by pain, suffering, isolation, unfairness, and 
ultimately, injustice.22 Violence is not just a part of noncitizen detention policy. Now it is 
the policy.23 
In order to understand the devolution in immigration policy and detention 
practices that ultimately became state-sponsored violence, noncitizen detention will be 
analyzed as a unique aspect of the immigration enforcement mechanism. Detention is 
distinctive among other immigration enforcement mechanisms for three main reasons. 
First, noncitizen detention involves state action which bears unique and significant 
jurisprudential implications. For instance, rights within the Bill of Rights or the 
Fourteenth Amendment are generally implicated when a state actor, and in turn, state 
action, is involved.24 Second, despite being placed in federal custody, noncitizen 
                                               
22 This concept parallels the idea of “legal violence” proposed by sociologists Cecilia Menjívar 
and Leisy Abrego. According to the authors, legal violence refers to the harmful effects produced 
in light of the “complex manner in which the law exerts its influence and control” which can 
“potentially obstruct and derail immigrants’ paths of incorporation.” Menjívar and Abrego, 
“Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants,” American 
Journal of Sociology 117, no. 5 (2012), 1383.   
 
23 Here I echo Charles Bowden who wrote, “Violence is now woven into the very fabric of the 
community and has no single cause and no single motive and no on-off button. Violence is not a 
part of life, now it is life.” Bowden, Murder City, 105. This work also recognizes the 
contributions of scholars who have discussed violence generally in the formation of the nation 
and American life. For instance, Richard Maxwell Brown argues, “Apart from its role in the 
formation and preservation of the nation, violence has been a determinant of both the form and 
the substance of American life. The threat to the structure of society mounted by the criminal and 
the disorderly has been met energetically by the official and unofficial violence of the forces of 
law and order… Whether employed legally or extralegally, it has been used to support the 
cohesive, three-tiered structure of the American community with its upper, middle, and lower 
classes and its underlying social values of law and order and the sanctity of property.” Richard 
Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 4. 
 
24 As pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases 
that “until some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has 
been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such 
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detention involves the jurisdictional overlap between federal, state, local, and private 
entities which creates tensions and complications within the immigration enforcement 
regime.25 Third, unlike other aspects of immigration enforcement, noncitizen detention 
involves revenue generation for both state and local entities as well as private prison 
companies (since the 1980s that built upon previous carceral relationships between 
federal and local officials). These relationships involved negotiations for housing 
noncitizens, who were federal prisoners, within their jurisdictions in exchange for federal 
money.26 Such features emphasize the singularity of noncitizen detention. While scholars 
have tended to treat detention and deportations concomitantly, this work argues 
                                               
legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State 
laws and acts done under State authority. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883). For a recent 
discussion on the state action doctrine see, “Developments in the Law: State Action and the 
Public/Private Distinction,” Harvard Law Review 123 (2010): 1248-1314. 
 
25 One recent work has noted another consequence: “Citizens and noncitizens confined in these 
prison belts are held on criminal and administrative grounds by multiple state authorities (federal, 
state, county), and their agents (public and private). The resulting interjurisdictional patchwork 
underscores the tight connections between migration and criminal-justice practices.” Jenna M. 
Loyd and Alison Mountz, Boats, Borders, and Bases: Race, the Cold War, and the Rise of 
Migration Detention in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 27. 
Also, private prisons have come to involve one of the “most widespread privatization of 
immigration enforcement.” Hiroshi Motomura argues, “Private detention comes into play only 
after unauthorized migrants are apprehended, so it may not seem to delegate federal authority in 
the same way as letting state and local police decide who comes into contact with federal 
immigration agencies, or letting employers fire unauthorized workers. But decisions by private 
prison companies raise concerns similar to those associated with employers and state and local 
governments. Something as basic as keeping detainees in solitary confinement for violation of 
prison rules can hamper the ability of unauthorized migrants to assert their rights when the 
government tries to deport them.” Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 142-43. 
 
26 Increasingly, alternatives to detention like paying bonds and/or having ankle monitors have 
also become a booming business. See, Steve Fisher, “Getting Immigrants Out of Detention Is 
Very Profitable,” Mother Jones (September/October 2016), available at 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/immigration-detainees-bond-ankle-monitors-
libre/. 
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noncitizen detention requires a specialized lens of analysis in order to better understand 
the devolution of immigration enforcement. 
When the history of U.S. immigration enforcement is viewed through the lens of 
noncitizen detention policy, a new periodization emerges. This new periodization 
refocuses immigration enforcement into three regimes over the course of the twentieth 
century: exclusion, “humane,” and violent. What begins with sovereignty-based 
exclusionary justifications in the late nineteenth century exacerbates into a form of state-
sponsored violence by the late twentieth century. Each regime sets the stage for the next. 
In this way, detentions provide a defining marker for understanding the nature of 
immigration enforcement at each of the three formative time periods. For instance, during 
exclusionary detentions, policy dictated that those who were deemed undesirable be kept 
out and thus people were detained to access their admissibility. However, during violent 
detentions, policy dictates that detention is meant as deterrence to break the will of 
people to keep fighting against their removal. In the meantime, while policy changes, the 
experiences of those subjected to detention bear parallels through commonality of 
sentiments such as pain, suffering, isolation, and death. Rather than simply being a 
feature, then detention can be a denotation of immigration law enforcement priorities, 
where the nature and extent of noncitizen detentions characterizes the intersection of 
immigration policy and the reality of enforcement. Ultimately, a lens of noncitizen 
detention policy reveals both immigration enforcement priorities as well as the 
discrepancies between the implementation of policy and the experiences of those 
subjected to it. 
 13 
This new periodization of immigration enforcement complements recent 
scholarship pertaining to the mass incarceration crisis, where immigration control has 
become the “leading cause of incarceration in the United States” today. Torrie Hester 
continues,  
Since the 1880s, in the name of immigration control, the federal government has 
deported more than 50 million people…. In the 1980s policy makers added mass 
incarceration to their strategy of mass deportation of low-status, low-wage 
workers…. Deportability’s role in the carceral state also reaches beyond federal 
prisons. Since the 1980s hundreds of thousands of noncitizens have been deported 
after serving state and local criminal sentences.27  
 
As noncitizen detentions were filling jails and prisons in the late twentieth century, 
however, punitive drug laws were spearheading the overcrowding. As Robert T. Chase 
argues,  
During the 1970s and early 1980s prisons experienced unprecedented levels of 
overcrowding due to drug laws and the punitive turn in sentencing. Overcrowding 
worsened prison conditions…. To ameliorate these worsening conditions, the 
prisoners’ rights movement developed a two-prong strategy, using mass protest 
tactics alongside civil rights cases and class-action lawsuits to demand public 
visibility…. Prisoners of the 1970s and 1980s understood the dangers of mass 
incarceration before many on the outside did.28  
 
Chase responds to Heather Ann Thompson’s call for historians to “critically inquire into 
how mass incarceration contributed to the declension narratives of the mid-to-late 
twentieth century.”29 Thompson has argued in her own work analyzing the Attica 
uprising that “even the most marginalized citizens will never stop fighting to be treated as 
                                               
27 Torrie Hester, “Deportability and the Carceral State,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 
102, Issue 1 (June 2015), 141, 146, 147. 
 
28 Robert T. Chase, “We Are Not Slaves: Rethinking the Rise of Carceral States through the Lens 
of the Prisoners’ Rights Movement,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 102, Issue 1 (June 
2015), 75. 
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human beings. It testifies to this irrepressible demand for justice.”30 Noncitizens, too, 
joined in this struggle as mass incarceration and overcrowded jail cells engulfed citizens 
and noncitizens indiscriminately. Noncitizen detainees, who were incarcerated alongside 
other federal prisoners, would play an important role in such protest tactics throughout 
the 1970s into the 1990s. As such, this work contributes to this scholarship by relaying 
stories of noncitizen detainees who witnessed and experienced incarceration amidst the 
punitive War on Drugs. 
Recent scholarship has also increasingly analyzed the intersection of immigration 
and criminal justice systems in the late twentieth century during what this work calls the 
era of violent detentions. In order to relieve prison overcrowding during the 1980s, for 
instance, there was a push toward removing noncitizens from jails and prisons and 
deporting them through the Criminal Alien Program. As Patrisia Macías-Rojas argues, 
“new enforcement priorities under the Criminal Alien Program fundamentally 
transformed detention and deportation in ways that merged the immigration and criminal 
justice systems.”31 Macías-Rojas argues that in order to fully implement CAP, Congress 
passed the punitive 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) which “expanded criminal enforcement priorities, enacted retroactive 
deportation for immigrants with criminal records, instituted mandatory detention, and 
appropriated the critical funding for information and technology and detention beds 
                                               
30 Heather Ann Thompson, Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its 
Legacy (New York: Pantheon Books, 2016), 571. 
 
31 Patrisia Macías-Rojas, From Deportation to Prison: The Politics of Immigration Enforcement 
in Post-Civil Rights America (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 9. 
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necessary to make the entire program workable.”32 With mandatory detention, the 
number of noncitizens detained increased “dramatically in local jails, federal 
penitentiaries, and privately run detention facilities.”33 Ultimately, CAP was a turning 
point in the criminalization of immigration enforcement and remains influential in 
driving enforcement priorities today. As Macias-Rojas explains, “What began as a 
program to purge criminals from jails and prisons, which was CAP’s original mission, 
has become one of the chief mechanisms driving federal criminal prosecution and 
imprisonment for immigration offenses.”34 The passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA) was a further “pivotal point in the criminalization of migrants, 
setting the stage for increases in deportation and detention, as well as the abuses that 
immigrants endure once detained.”35 Moreover, the collision of immigration and criminal 
justice serves to make vulnerable those caught within both systems. As Tanya Maria 
Golash-Boza argues, “Criminal aliens, similar to felons, have become expendable and 
serve as an example to others who may consider transgressing the law.”36 This 
                                               
32 Macías-Rojas, From Deportation to Prison, 9. 
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constructed law and its purported transgressors ultimately highlight the global hierarchy 
of labor mobility. According to Golash-Boza, “mass deportation reinforces the limited 
mobility and enhanced vulnerability of black and brown labor.”37 When those who live in 
places where opportunities are severely curtailed are forced to migrate to find work to 
support themselves and their families, the increased criminalization of crossing borders 
particularly impacts the most vulnerable because their lack of financial resources leaves 
them no other alternative. Deemed violators of the law, they are held in cages in a futile 
attempt to dissuade others who are similarly situated from following suit. 
Scholars of the modern carceral state have also pointed to the importance of 
analyzing the U.S.-Mexico borderlands as a “hot spot for policing and confinement.” As 
several scholars note, “No U.S. police practice is as racially concentrated as immigration 
law enforcement in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, nor is any other sector of policing and 
confinement growing as rapidly. Immigrant detention – that is, the process of forcibly 
confining immigrants during deportation proceedings – is now the largest system of 
human caging operated by the U.S. government.”38 In her most recent work, Deborah 
Kang traces how immigration officials in the Southwest “made the nation’s immigration 
laws” by devising “a wide array of policies pertaining to admissions, deportation, 
enforcement, and even immigrant rights.” Kang argues that in the Southwest, the “INS 
                                               
transgressors in check and willing to work in dead-end, low-wage jobs that barely ensure their 
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relied heavily on its administrative discretion, interpreting the nation’s immigration laws 
in the broadest terms possible so as to maximize their restrictive impact.”39 While 
highlighting the “role of the INS in state-building on the border,” Kang also “exposes the 
fractures in the federal immigration power. While in theory the federal government 
possesses the exclusive authority to regulate immigration, in practice local and global 
forces continually impinged upon that power.”40 This work builds on Kang’s emphasis on 
understanding immigration enforcement through the development of noncitizen detention 
policy in practice at the local and state level in the Southwest. 
In the era of violent detentions, immigration enforcement and policing has not 
remained confined to the borderlands. As part of IIRIRA, Congress granted power to 
state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce civil and criminal immigration laws 
directly. Codified as section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), what 
came to be known as the 287(g) program approved three types of federal-local policing 
partnerships: the task force model, the jail model, and the hybrid model. Yet, the program 
was largely unused until after September 11, 2001. The newly formed Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) poured money into immigration enforcement while 
encouraging the enlistment of police and sheriffs as part of the immigration enforcement 
apparatus.41 At its height, about 70 agencies participated in the program.42 While ICE 
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announced it was phasing out the 287(g) program in 2012, another program would soon 
take its place. The Secure Communities program mandates local law enforcement 
participation in immigration enforcement. Under the program, law enforcement officials 
must run a person’s fingerprints in Federal Bureau of Investigation databases to check for 
outstanding warrants and other details after an arrest. Information uncovered in this 
manner then allows them to hold the person for up to seventy-two hours for 
transportation to a detention facility where the individual could be deported. Begun in 
fourteen communities in 2008, the Secure Communities program was then adopted across 
the country.43 The program has had dire consequences. As Kevin Johnson points out 
“many noncitizens charged with but not necessarily convicted of relatively minor 
criminal offenses – and thus who cannot reasonably be said to pose a serious risk to 
public safety – were removed from the country under the auspices of Secure 
Communities.”44  
Arizona, in particular, has a unique role. Stealing the national spotlight in its 
punitive measures, the state has modeled itself a leader of purported immigration 
enforcement strategies for others to follow.45 This has come with the rise of state laws, 
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like SB1070, which introduced provisions that allowed local law enforcement to ask for 
evidence of legal status, and enforcement of federal programs. One significant example in 
the era of violent detentions is the state’s role in implementing the 287(g) program. As 
the authors of Policing Immigrants argue, the “most egregious example of over-
aggressive enforcement practice” of the program was in Maricopa County, Arizona 
where then sheriff Joe Arpaio  
embraced the 287(g) program with gusto, engaging the maximum 160 deputies in 
the effort–far more than in any jurisdiction nationwide. Deputies conducted traffic 
stops focused on Latino-looking drivers, raids of places that employ large 
numbers of immigrants, and crime-suppression sweeps in neighborhoods, many 
of which have large Latino populations.46  
 
Yet, such twenty-first century punitive developments bear a long history in the state. In 
her study of Arizona’s role in the Jim Crow Southwest, Kristina Campbell argues that 
“Arizona’s modern anti-immigrant laws and policies are merely the newest incarnation of 
the State’s long history of discriminatory laws against racial and ethnic minorities, 
particularly Latinos and American Indians.”47 Campbell further notes, “The argument 
that Arizona’s immigration laws are really race-based exclusion laws in disguise finds 
support in the fact that the enforcement of laws attempting to regulate noncitizens in 
Arizona has led to well-documented instances of racial profiling against people of 
color.”48 State laws and implementation of federal immigration policies in Arizona have 
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created a unique blend of criminal justice and immigration systems in the Southwest that 
proves a defining feature of the modern carceral state. Thus, this work will focus on the 
historical devolution of the carceral state as well as the concurrent developments in 
immigration enforcement in Arizona. 
The story begins with exclusion. Excluding those deemed unfit, undesirable, or 
unworthy has been the cornerstone of United States immigration policy since at least the 
nineteenth century. Exclusion based on race, class, health, or profession barred specific 
groups from entry and targeted the same or other groups for incarceration and 
deportation. Starting in the late nineteenth century, immigration authority was deemed to 
lie exclusively with the federal government and not the states. This was justified under 
plenary power, the cornerstone of sovereignty, the supposedly inherent and essentially 
unlimited power of nations to protect their borders, control the in-migration of 
newcomers, and enforce the removal of noncitizens deemed to be undesirable.49 This 
power also justifies distinctions between ‘citizen’ and ‘noncitizen’ rights, where 
‘noncitizens’ are subject to separate laws purportedly because they lack official 
membership in the nation-state, i.e. citizenship. As legal scholar Linda Bosniak argues, 
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“That outsider status, which the law calls alienage, shapes their experience and identity 
within the community in profound ways. Among other disabilities, aliens are denied the 
vote and most significant welfare benefits, and, notwithstanding the ties they may have 
developed in and with the community, they are always potentially subject to deportation 
by the state.”50 Cloaking immigration policy within such discriminatory rights-based 
models perpetuates a discourse of due process and equal protection for ‘citizens’ while 
simultaneously justifying wide-ranging levels of immigration restriction regimes for 
‘noncitizens’ subject to arbitrary state enforcement.51  
These experiences are part of the broader history of the origins of the carceral 
state in the United States. As legal scholar Kunal Parker has pointed out, from British 
North America to the Early Republic and beyond, people have continually been made 
foreign in significant ways that challenge our understanding of exclusionary impulses 
predominantly impacting those coming from outside borders. Part of this involved the 
sheer multitude of legal statuses from the very early days of British North America, 
which included: “British subject, naturalized subject, denizen, alien, servant, 
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redemptioner, convict, married woman, pauper, slave, free white, free black, Indian.”52 
At the same time, many already within the nation’s borders were rendered foreign with 
strategies “deployed along axes of race, gender, class, and political opinion… to 
suppress, exploit, reject, exclude, expel, and refuse responsibility for portions of the 
domestic population.”53 Such exclusions and expulsions also operated under a regime of 
captivity and confinement for populations increasingly on the move. From the Early 
Republic onwards into the nineteenth century, certain groups were targeted for captivity 
and confinement, evidenced by the simultaneous developments of prisons, asylums, 
reservations, while plantation slavery increased in brutality. Long before any federal 
immigration bureaucracy developed in the early 1890s to enforce the country’s 
immigration laws, African Americans, Native Americans, and the poor had been targeted 
for exclusionary measures – they had been required to carry papers, live in designated 
areas, or had been warned to leave towns.54 The development of exclusionary suspicions 
directed at people of a wide variety of legal statuses in the nineteenth century was an 
important stepping stone in building the modern carceral state in the United States. 
Such measures targeting various communities laid the groundwork for 
immigration enforcement. When the Geary Act, which extended the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882, introduced the mandate for all persons of Chinese descent to carry papers to 
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prove their legal status in 1892, it built on a legacy of suspicion directed at African 
Americans to prove their free status both in northern and southern states before the end of 
slavery.55 As Anna Pegler-Gordon has argued, “The unstated conclusion of Geary’s logic 
was that, as a result of their shared behavior, all Chinese were tainted by the presence of 
illegal immigrants among them and all were potential frauds… The very presence of the 
Chinese in America was assumed to be not only economically, morally, and racially 
dangerous but also criminal.”56 Moreover, the Geary Act coincided with the simultaneous 
“repeal of Reconstruction-era laws protecting the African American franchise, which was 
part of a larger national project aimed at excluding African Americans from politics.”57 
Arguably, the exclusionary legacy continues today, as those suspected of being an 
“illegal immigrant” bearing striking resemblances to the singularity of those who were 
suspected of being a “fugitive slave” in the early Republic and antebellum eras.58 When 
“likely to become a public charge”59 was codified and implemented as an immigration 
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restriction (functioning as what law professor Daniel Kanstroom calls extended border 
control and post-entry social control60), it built upon long established legacies of poor 
laws and warning out indigents from colonial towns that had British origins. As Hidetaka 
Hirota argues,  
the British poor law became the foundation of American immigration law. The 
story of early American immigration control, therefore, is about how British laws 
for regulating the movement of the poor were transformed into laws to restrict the 
admission of particular foreigners and deport them, and economic considerations 
for immigrants’ poverty were paramount in this transformation.61  
 
Such historical antecedents laid the groundwork for immigration enforcement 
through the targeting of various communities, in particular, communities of color. 
Particularly useful then is the intersection of critical race theory and immigration. 
However, only recently since the 1990s, has immigration scholarship applied critical race 
theory approaches, which has emphasized the “voices of outsiders by employing the 
narrative form and by focusing on interrelationships of race, gender, and other identity 
characteristics.”62 By recognizing that personal narratives and unconventional approaches 
must inform contemporary scholarship to “confront issues of racism and other forms of 
discrimination in modern American society,”63 critical race theory offers a crucial avenue 
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of analysis for immigration scholarship. Immigration critical race theory “examines the 
way that the immigrant persona is racialized, which allows us to observe the dynamics 
and fluidity in socially constructing racial meanings.”64 Such an approach demonstrates 
how noncitizen experiences are fundamentally informed by racialization and uncovers 
ways to understand the violence perpetrated against communities of color in particular. 
As critical race theory pioneer Derrick Bell notes, “the harsh treatment of noncitizens of 
color reveals terrifying lessons about how society views citizens of color.”65 Following 
Ian Haney-Lopez’s example in White by Law, scholars from many fields have thus 
increasingly expanded the analytical framework of immigration studies to include critical 
race theory approaches.66  
Much of the recent noncitizen detention scholarship focuses on transnational or 
global trends. One work looking at detention in a global context notes, “Before the turn 
of the century, immigration detention was used by few states. Today, nearly every state 
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around the world has adopted immigration detention policy and practice in some form.” 
The editors further point out, “Immigration detention is simultaneously a practice and a 
policy, an enforcement priority and a legislative by-product, and a site of tension between 
extreme sovereign power and people claiming universal rights in the face of that 
display.”67 In their global approach, the editors hope to provide an overview of the spread 
of noncitizen detention. In his recent study, Tom Wong looks at the nature and conditions 
of detention in the United States and Europe.68 To illustrate what he calls “the 
labyrinthine processes of immigration detention,” Wong differentiates between “front-
end detention, which is detention upon entering a country, and back-end detention, which 
is detention pending deportation. Though seemingly benign, these distinctions can have 
serious implications for the length of detention, as well as for the legal recourse available 
to immigrant detainees.”69 Yet, there is little discussion of the way in which the nature of 
detention itself evolved and changed over time. While important to study the global 
regime of detention, there has yet to be a systematic study of the history of noncitizen 
detention in the United States. This work attempts to fill that gap. 
Part of the efforts in challenging the system of noncitizen detention may have to 
be directed towards a more holistic approach as some recent scholarship has pointed out. 
In one interdisciplinary study, the editors attempt to provide “a forum for the 
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interdisciplinary exploration of strategies and analyses that are aimed at contesting the 
logic and growth of immigration detention.” The editors note that “to challenge damaging 
detention policies and practices would require a sophisticated, multi-faceted approach, 
one that is capable of critically assessing the many dimensions of this phenomenon.” 
Moreover, the editors write, “The very nature of immigration-related detention 
necessitates such an approach. Detention occurs at borders, across borders and sometimes 
between border…”70 This work attempts to add to this current growing trend by 
historicizing detention itself within the broader framework of immigration enforcement in 
the United States.71 
A holistic approach could especially be helpful in light of the tendency of scholars 
to blindly apply equal protection and due process discourses in their work. Such 
frameworks should be seen as increasingly problematic particularly within contexts of 
immigration enforcement and the carceral state more broadly. For instance, consider the 
Equal Protection Clause, which states that no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”72 Under equal protection discourses, “equal 
laws” are “qualified as requiring not that all persons be classified, judged, or treated 
alike, but merely that relevantly similar persons, or persons in relevantly similar 
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circumstances, be treated alike.”73 Yet, that is hardly an acceptable framework because of 
the ambiguities at play. As one scholar notes, “It simply requires the production of some 
reason for treating any group less favorably than any other group, with no further 
guidance as to what should count as a sufficient reason for any form or degree of 
inequality.”74 The historical devolution of noncitizen detention and the rise of the carceral 
state highlight the consequences of what happens when such ambiguities are left to be 
exploited with laws that can be justified as fulfilling purported equal protection 
requirements. 
Moreover, consider the Due Process Clause, which is referenced in both the Fifth 
Amendment (as applied to the federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (as 
applied to the states), that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.”75 The detention system has adversarial proceedings that could last 
years, on matters of incredible legal complexity with respondents who may or may not 
speak English, which eventually lead to their deportation, without a statutory right to 
counsel. When such proceedings are held within detention centers housed in remote 
areas, those detained are even less likely to find access to any sort of legal assistance or 
support networks. In addition, the proceedings themselves are akin to a kangaroo court. 
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Despite being part of federal law, the federal rules of evidence do not apply in 
immigration court because it is considered administrative law. This means generally 
objectionable evidence like hearsay as well as all of the respondent’s previous criminal 
history can be admissible. Despite a translator being physically present (although not 
always), they are not mandated to translate everything that is said during the proceedings. 
To no one’s surprise, the vast majority of those detained today face such proceedings 
without an attorney. Sometimes, the detained facing this system alone are children who 
are subjected to questioning by immigration judges and ICE attorneys in a language they 
may or may not speak. It is difficult to argue that such a system even has a remote 
possibility of upholding any constitutional definition of due process by any stretch of the 
imagination. 
Yet, immigration scholarship continues to produce a fragmented view of the 
carceral state precisely because contemporary works on noncitizen detention still operate 
within such frameworks of equal protection and due process discourses. For instance, one 
scholar writes, “The immigrant detention system in the United States is plagued with 
problems due to the large number of immigrants and the lack of facility space to house 
immigrants in detention.”76 Instead of questioning the fairness of incarcerating 
noncitizens who are awaiting administrative–not criminal–proceedings, the author links 
the problems of the system to overcrowded, inhumane conditions, missing the point 
entirely. Another scholar insists that to frame noncitizen detention as a civil matter rather 
than criminal, we should “recreate immigration detention in such a way that it can be 
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described only as civil confinement” because in a “truly civil detention system, detention 
is the exception.”77 This still assumes that detention would be needed even for a few 
individuals, where the need for reform still operates within a framework of confinement. 
In a law review article meant to “explain how practitioners and advocates can ensure that 
private prisons provide cost-effective services of sufficient quality” since preserving 
“human rights in prison is valuable,” the author argues, “Reform may be particularly 
pressing for immigration detainees; some of the most egregious abuses and violations 
within the realm of private prisons have affected incarcerated immigrants.”78 The author 
further notes, “If nothing else, available evidence indicates that existing forms of private 
prison oversight have been ineffective in many instances to ensure fair treatment and 
contract compliance.”79 Despite the “egregious abuses and violations” coupled with 
ineffective oversight, it is recommended that reform is the best option. Moreover, a recent 
work argues, “Even if the detention is for civil deportation, the holding itself becomes 
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inhumane if certain conditions exist.”80 Again, the qualifier that the “holding” can 
become “inhumane” only under certain conditions rather than as an absolute requires 
further reflection. Considering that many, if not most, noncitizen detainees are asylum 
seekers in some capacity and that the modern noncitizen detention system is 
fundamentally unfair and racist should lead scholars to begin their analysis with the idea 
that “the most fitting course of action for bona fide asylum seekers would be not to detain 
them at all.”81 As such my research aims to question still prevailing assumptions in 
contemporary scholarship about noncitizen detention. 
There still remains much work to be done by immigration scholars to incorporate 
the stories of those who have first-hand experience of noncitizen detention and 
immigration proceedings.82 These voices are often silenced through legal formalities 
where immigration proceedings are often excluded from the public record.83 As author 
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Arundhati Roy so eloquently notes, “There’s really no such thing as the “voiceless.” 
There are only the deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard.”84 This research 
pursues the question of how noncitizens experience such a fundamentally unfair and 
racist regime by attempting to give those voices, both legally silenced and “preferably 
unheard,” a medium of expression. This approach intends to further research done by 
other scholars by analyzing the “intimate economies of immigration detention – that is, 
the complex systems of micro and macro relationships that enmesh in the realisation of 
detention and lived experiences of being detained.”85 Adopting critical race theory’s 
primary narrative modes of agony tales and counterstories, the oral history project, 
Stories of Immigrant Detention, seeks to tell the stories of noncitizens recalling their 
detention experiences. The objective is to detail the inherent racism that penetrates nearly 
every aspect of the modern immigration law enforcement mechanism and bring to light 
hidden aspects of this noncitizen reality.86 Noncitizen oral histories can describe 
chronically subpar detention conditions, extreme variations and arbitrariness of overtly 
race-based bond determinations, and fundamentally problematic legal procedures that 
distribute unpredictable outcomes in asylum cases.87  
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Agony tales revealed through oral histories also guide this project. While the 
agony tale can be thought of as a “first-person account, usually of some outrage the 
author suffered,”88 it can also “encompass experiences related by legal writers on behalf 
of third parties.”89 Such avenues of legal storytelling have the potential to allow those 
whose voices may have been silenced to “hurl rocks over walls of social complacency 
that obscure the view out from the citadel.”90 Such stories can describe instances that 
stray from what is considered acceptable and may even “elicit disapproval, if not outright 
anger.”91 Oral histories highlight agony tales of those who have been ripped away from 
their loved ones, denied actual due process, and made to endure the consequences of their 
lesser or non-existent legal status for time periods lasting anywhere from days, weeks, 
months, or years. Thus, stories of those who have spent time in noncitizen detention serve 
as public testimonies to chronic abuses, document the physical, emotional, and 
psychological toll, and provide a record of lived experience about the inherent racism 
embedded within the system. Additionally, counterstories of those who have experienced 
noncitizen detention can “directly confront the status quo”92 by showing how injustice is 
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systematically performed on noncitizens under the veil of due process formality. 
Moreover, counterstories “challenge the received wisdom” and “can open new windows 
into reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life other than the ones we live.”93 
Specifically, this work uses counterstories to serve what Richard Delgado calls a 
“destructive function,” where stories and counterstories “can show that what we believe 
is ridiculous, self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of 
unjustified exclusion.”94 
Understanding the nature and extent of the devolution of noncitizen detention 
raises important questions about the modern carceral state as it pertains to the very core 
of the state’s ability to exercise near-absolute power over populations made vulnerable 
through the law. Kelly Lytle Hernández notes, “As the number of deportations escalated 
during the twentieth century and then surged into the twenty-first century, immigrant 
detention, that is, ‘not imprisonment in a legal sense,’ emerged as one of the most 
dynamic sectors of human caging in the United States.”95 As “one of the most dynamic 
sectors of human caging,” noncitizen detention should compel us to reevaluate the entire 
prison project altogether and question the notion of putting people in cages at all. This, of 
course, is no easy task. As Angela Davis points out, “Prison abolitionists are dismissed as 
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utopians and idealists whose ideas are at best unrealistic and impracticable, and, at worst, 
mystifying and foolish.”96 However, as Davis argues,  
if we are willing to take seriously the consequences of a racist and class-biased 
justice system, we will reach the conclusion that enormous numbers of people are 
in prison simply because they are, for example, black, Chicano, Vietnamese, 
Native American or poor, regardless of their ethnic background. They are sent to 
prison, not so much because of the crimes they may have indeed committed, but 
largely because their communities have been criminalized.97  
 
Here, the stories of those who have experienced detention, and incarceration more 
broadly, bears the most promise in this reevaluation. In his work, scholar Caleb Smith 
notes that “works of the American carceral imagination compose a gothic alternative to 
the sentimental language of reform.” Smith further states that  
their gothic imagination confronts humanity with the monstrousness it creates, not 
through exclusion but through the most profound, and most mortifying, burial 
within itself. They represent the ghosted inhumanity whose ruins the sovereign 
subject of humanity has not quite transcended – the presence of the other that the 
self continuously bears. Their secret is that it is not enough to expand humanity, if 
the promise of humanity claims the power of mortification; we must also unmake 
and recompose our concept of the human to divest it of its dehumanizing power. 
In the end, it is not the inmate but the prison, with its harrowing forms of 
resurrection, that must be sacrificed in order to be redeemed.98  
 
The devolution of the noncitizen detention regime in the United States should compel us 
to reevaluate the entire prison project in the hope that by divesting the state of its ability 
to indiscriminately exercise the power of life over both citizens and noncitizens, there can 
be a better way forward in a post-carceral world. Thus, understanding the history is 
critical. The history of noncitizen detention demonstrates that the eventual melding of 
                                               
96 Angela Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2011), 9-10. 
 
97 Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, 113. 
 
98 Caleb Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009), 209. 
 36 
immigration and criminalization at the precise moment when policy and reality also 
melded had its roots from the beginning of the U.S. imperial project, in particular in the 
nineteenth century, a century defined by captivity and confinement on a national scale. 
 
A Century of Captivity and Confinement 
The origins of noncitizen detention operated by the federal government in the 
United States can be traced to the early 1890s, culminating a century defined by captivity 
and confinement. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the modern prison, asylums, 
plantation slavery, Indian reservations, and noncitizen detention all played pivotal roles 
in transforming the United States. Much of this captive legacy is seen today. David 
Rothman contends that the rise of the prison in the 1820s and 1830s, an era when 
“democratic principles were receiving their most enthusiastic endorsement,” confronts 
what “appears to be an extraordinary paradox.” According to Rothman, when “common 
people” were “participating fully in politics and electing Andrew Jackson their president, 
incarceration became the central feature of criminal justice.”99 Criminal justice in 
colonial society had involved the regulation of a wide range of conduct from so-called 
sinful actions such as idolatry, blasphemy, and witchcraft to social transgressions such as 
theft, arson, and murder. Seen through the lens of being part of the human condition and 
its failings, such conduct carried a wide range of punishments such as fines, whippings, 
the stock and public cage, punishment, and the gallows. Local jails were used for those 
awaiting trial, debtors, as well as by enslavers and masters of servants as punishment. As 
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Rothman argues, “criminal justice in the colonial period had a tenuous and haphazard 
character. To an exceptional degree, the efficacy of the punishment depended on the 
active compliance of the offender; the agencies of law enforcement were so weak and 
underdeveloped that the punitive and coercive aspects of the law bore an unusually heavy 
burden.” When punishment did not deter offences, colonial society had only one 
recourse: execute the offender. As Rothman notes, “In effect, capital punishment had to 
compensate for all the weaknesses in the criminal justice system, which is why capital 
crimes were defined so very broadly.”100  
Scholars have argued that the American Revolution played a decisive role in 
notions surrounding crime and punishment.101 For one, the Revolution brought capital 
punishment to the forefront of debate. As Benjamin Rush argued in 1792, “Capital 
punishments are the natural offspring of monarchical governments… Kings consider their 
subjects as their property; no wonder, therefore, they shed their blood with as little 
emotion as men shed the blood of their sheep or cattle. But the principles of republican 
governments speak a very different language… An execution in a republic is like a 
human sacrifice in religion.”102 Religious reformers would offer a solution. Reformative 
incarceration, where an offender served a long prison term, appeared as the post-
Revolution, anti-monarchical solution. Protestant reformers argued that the prison’s 
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primary purpose was the reformation and redemption of inmates.103 Jennifer Graber 
notes, “In order to secure a place in the prison experiment, Protestants articulated a united 
front about religion’s contribution to reformative incarceration.”104 However, as Graber 
argues, inside the prison, negotiations took place when state officials and prisoners 
resisted ideas of Protestant piety. While Protestant reformers made concessions to both 
stay in the prisons and be politically relevant, they considered their prison efforts a 
failure. Regardless, these negotiations and concessions show “the contested place of 
religion in American public life” through the primary site of the antebellum prison.105  
As states increasingly reduced their lists of capital crimes, the death penalty was 
essentially replaced by the modern prison system. Here, Rothman’s contention of the 
prison as an “extraordinary paradox” should be evaluated through a wider lens of 
captivity and confinement broadly encompassing early colonial society. The prison was 
established on the heels of a revolution that would force those in power to reclassify 
hierarchical order in the new republic against the backdrop of Revolutionary rhetoric and 
promises. Such promises eluded fulfillment. Scholar Jen Manion argues, “But the 
Revolutionary promises – life, liberty, happiness – were quickly foreclosed by a revised 
penal system that disguised its violence under the rubric of humanitarianism, replaced 
slavery as the disciplinary authority in African American lives, and prized the property 
rights of the few over the human rights of the many.”106 The penitentiary had wide 
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support not only from religious reformers. Manion notes, “A diverse class of white men, 
from ruling elites to middling artisans, cast their lot with the penitentiary system, hoping 
it would make them better men, bring back the gender roles of old, cultivate industrious 
habits, contain the threat of free blacks and immigrants, and regulate illicit sex.”107 The 
common jail began by confining everyone together regardless of offense. One 
Philadelphia politician described, “young and old, black and white, men and women, 
boys and girls were congregated indiscriminately in custody, for misconduct, 
misdemeanor, and felony, either before trial, after conviction, or for want of bail for 
surety of the peace. It was a moral pest house.”108 Experiments in convicting prisoners to 
hard labor eventually gave way to punishment as a means of reformation with 
construction of jails with separate cells.  
By the early nineteenth century, people were advocating against the solitary 
confinement-based Pennsylvania system109 in a time when plantation slavery was about 
to hit its stride within the double-headed hydra of efficiency and brutality. Reformers 
contended the purportedly benign post-Revolution prison system had become 
problematic. Costs ran high for the building of one cell per prisoner. Moreover, following 
the first wave of prison building in the Early Republic, the early nineteenth century saw a 
system designed to civilly kill a convict and resurrect him as a law-abiding citizen 
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undermined by riots and escapes from newly-built or refashioned human cages.110 As 
Rebecca M. McLennan notes, “Everywhere, in the early republican period, the prisoners 
made a habit of “mutiny” (as the early republican press put it), and local authorities found 
themselves having to repeatedly call out the militia to restore order.” Moreover, one 
rebellion would sometimes trigger uprisings in other institutions.111 These prison riots 
took place amidst an urban landscape that was also increasingly violent and turbulent. As 
Joel Olson argues, “Riots, lynch mobs, insurrections, and other disturbances swept the 
urban landscape like a panic. In 1835 alone, seventy-one people died in 147 riots across 
the country. Between 1830 and 1865 over seventy percent of all cities with a population 
of 20,000 or more experienced some kind of major civil disorder.”112 
In response to the rising costs and chaos, reformers advocated the adoption of the 
more cost-effective and labor-based Auburn system. The prevalence of the Auburn 
system did not mean the idea of prisoner isolation had disappeared. Rather, as one scholar 
notes, “running a penitentiary on the Auburn system was a difficult task requiring 
constant watchfulness and attention to small details… Even though all inmates were now 
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allowed to work together in a state of close physical proximity, their separation was to be 
as complete as if each were surrounded by an invisible wall.”113 Yet, as states adopted the 
Auburn system it became the “new standard in American prison discipline.” This set the 
stage for the century of confinement and captivity. As Caleb Smith argues, “By the 1820s 
and 1830s, the cruelties and pain of captivity had been built into the foundations of the 
American social order.”114 At the same time, as scholar Ira Berlin has persuasively 
demonstrated, plantation slavery was transforming into previously unparalleled 
brutality.115 This brutal regime was becoming increasingly efficient through the pushing 
system, which according to scholar Edward Baptist, was the right-handed power’s 
comeback against left-handed slave resistance.116 Moreover, after the Indian Removal 
Act of 1830, reservations would begin dotting the expanding carceral landscape in the 
West.117 As Smith persuasively argues, “Alongside the penitentiary and the plantation, 
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the reservation was emerging as a third major zone of enclosure, divestment of rights, and 
identity transformation on the American scene.”118  
The institution of the asylum too could be added here. While before 1810, only a 
few states had private institutions for the mentally ill, “in the course of the next few 
decades, in a dramatic transformation, state after state constructed asylums… by 1860, 
twenty-eight of the thirty-three states had public institutions for the insane. Although not 
all of the mentally ill found a place within a hospital, and a good number among the aged 
and chronic poor remained in almshouses and jails, the institutionalization of the insane 
became the standard procedure of the society during these years. A cult of asylum swept 
the country.”119 As Philip R. Popple argues, “Just as the criminal justice system began to 
revolve around the prison, the institution became the center of the mental health 
system.”120  
Moreover, as westward expansion engulfed the nation in the post-Civil War years, 
the penitentiary too moved West. As Anne Butler argues, “prisons flowered within the 
context of the social, economic, and political forces that so rapidly changed the American 
landscape of the nineteenth century. Huge demographic shifts, escalated by the end of 
slavery and the flood of immigration, coupled with the rise of America’s industrial 
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power, placed new demands on a prison system run more by expedience than policy. Left 
largely to administer itself, the American prison, despite professional efforts by some of 
its employees and the interest of reformers, followed a predictable route and emerged as a 
fearsome institution.”121 Amongst these national carceral developments, noncitizen 
detention then would be another major zone of confinement that evolved over the course 
of the nineteenth century galvanized and propelled by decades of post-Civil War 
exclusionary impulses. 
Immigration enforcement saw remarkable expansion and change over the course 
of the twentieth century. The late nineteenth century set the stage. In Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, the United States Supreme Court held,  
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging 
to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the 
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be 
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.122  
 
Along with the federalization of immigration with the Immigration Act of 1891, the 
Supreme Court held that deportation was based on sovereignty and part of federal power. 
In Fong Yue Ting, the court reasoned,  
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime… It is but a method of 
enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the 
conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting 
within its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments, has 
determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.123 
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Torrie Hester notes that the majority “upheld deportation, defining it as something as 
protective of national sovereignty, rooted in the government’s power of immigrant 
exclusion.”124 By the 1950s, the Court was holding that the “power to expel or exclude 
aliens” had been “long recognized” and was a “fundamental sovereign attribute by the 
Government’s departments largely immune from judicial control.”125  
The Court expanded the implications of Fong Yue Ting to noncitizen detention in 
Wong Wing. The Court held,  
We think it clear that detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means 
necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, 
would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused 
could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and 
while arrangements were being made for their deportation. Detention is a usual 
feature in every case of arrest on a criminal charge, even when an innocent person 
is wrongfully accused, but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense.126  
 
The practice of noncitizen detention expanded and increasingly became the site of 
unchecked state power against ‘the other.’ Kelly Lytle Hernández notes the 
consequences,  
these few sentences dropped in the belly of Wong Wing invented immigrant 
detention as a veiled but valid practice of human caging in the United States. U.S. 
immigration authorities immediately applied the decision to all deportees, 
regardless of national origins. Ever since, immigrants subject to forced removal 
from the United States have been caged in county jails, federal prisons, and 
immigration stations – also in warehouses, boats, parks, sheds, and even private 
homes ‘fitted with barred windows’ – but, according to Wong Wing, their passage 
                                               
124 Torrie Hester, Deportation: The Origins of U.S. Policy (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 16. Hester further notes, “The minority thought deportation should be 
classified as punishment; they worried about the expansions in plenary power and the seeming 
violations of constitutional protections.” Id. 
 
125 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). 
 
126 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896). 
 45 
through the nation’s carceral landscape was ‘not imprisonment in a legal 
sense.’127 
 
Sovereignty, Plenary Power, and Noncitizen Detention 
Noncitizen detention is often justified through notions of sovereignty and plenary 
power. Scholar Galina Cornelisse argues, “Immigration detention is the ultimate example 
of how national states can freely resort to their hitherto unrestrained territorial powers in 
order to validate sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside from the outside.”128 Such 
claims have been articulated within various frameworks about how the state treats ‘the 
other.’ Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception formulation, for instance, contends that 
certain subjects are left “outside the boundaries of the polis and hence beyond the 
protection of, or recourse to, the law” by the sovereign. Scholars have applied this 
framework to detention camps as “manifestations of nation-states’ sovereign power to 
suspend the normal or national Rule of Law through the state of exception and to 
abandon those detained in a juridical void.”129 Moreover, A. Naomi Paik’s recent work 
applies a rightlessness framework to U.S. prison camps in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Paik argues, “the United States has created a peculiar place with an ambiguous 
relationship to the law – the camp – and has created a peculiar kind of person to be 
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imprisoned there – the rightless.”130 Rightlessness, Paik argues, is a “condition that 
emerges when efforts to protect the rights of some depend on disregarding the rights of 
others.” As Paik notes, “The rightful – as worthy, deserving subjects – enjoy the 
protection of rights only because other, rightless subjects are so devalued that they are 
excluded from those protections.”131 In her analysis, Paik points out that the U.S. state 
“depends on the rightless to establish its authority,” as such camps mark the “congruent 
rise of rights discourses and of the United States as global hegemon.”132 Such scholarship 
plays an important role in understanding the ways mobility is constricted in increasingly 
restrictive and punitive ways amidst globalization. 
However, detention and prison camps are not the primary focus of this work. It is 
the contention here that analyses pertaining to such camps cannot be generally applied to 
detention centers. In the U.S., those detained in administrative cages are not outside the 
bounds of the law nor in a juridical void. What the historical devolution of the modern 
noncitizen detention regime demonstrates is that unchecked state power to distinguish the 
inside from the outside is grounded both in principles of sovereignty and law. For 
instance, when noncitizen detainees are compelled to fight their cases in courtrooms 
inside detention centers, they are subjected to adversarial proceedings that resemble 
criminal trials and yet by deeming these cases as administrative they are left outside 
theoretical criminal law protections. Rather than “a peculiar place with an ambiguous 
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relationship to the law,” to use Paik’s description of prison camps, detention centers lie 
firmly within legal jurisprudence. While these detention centers may sometimes function 
as “a space set apart, as marked by its barbed-wire perimeter, its armed guards, and its 
physical segregation,” these centers are not in fact “removed, in law, from the political 
communities that could provide the precondition for rights recognition.”133 Because 
fundamentally, rights recognition have shown to be irrelevant when facing the magnitude 
of state power that is directed at noncitizen detention and immigration enforcement more 
broadly. Rather than being rightless, those subject to detention are afforded thinly veiled 
theoretical protections in what can perhaps be seen as a cavalier nod to international 
human rights rhetoric and customary law.  
By justifying deportation proceedings as civil rather than criminal, the state 
through the law is able to impose unfettered punishments. These punishments, never 
recognized by the law as such, nevertheless culminate in state violence against 
“disposable populations” highlighted by the power of the state to kill. As Ronald Judy 
articulates, “The occurrence of violence associated with disposable populations is 
symptomatic of the irrelevance of the entire discourse of sovereignty to the current 
arrangements of power, except when it operates as a means of ‘effecting control over 
mortality’ and as ‘a way of exercising the right to kill.’”134 After all, as Achille Mbembe 
has noted, “the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power 
and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die. Hence, to kill or to allow to live 
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constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes.”135 In his formulation of 
necropower, Mbembe argues that “sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters 
and who does not, who is disposable and who is not.”136 In fact, according to Mbembe, in 
this new moment of global mobility the exercise of the right to kill is “no longer the sole 
monopoly of states… Instead, a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights to rule 
emerges, inextricably superimposed and tangled, in which different de facto juridical 
instances are geographically interwoven and plural allegiances, asymmetrical 
suzerainties, and enclaves abound.”137 Here, then we can see how the jurisdictional 
overlap that abounds in the modern noncitizen detention regime plays out among those 
deemed disposable. Rather than a state of exception framework, Alexander Weheliye 
argues that these disposable populations “often racialized–are suspended in a perpetual 
state of emergency in which legal rituals stain dysselected individuals and groups with 
the hieroglyphics of the flesh.”138 This killing and staining is seen clearly in the modern 
noncitizen detention regime.  
While scholars have focused on regimes of exclusionary immigration laws and 
deportations, few have focused narrowly on the history of noncitizen detention itself. 
Even fewer have explored transformative developments within noncitizen detention in 
the U.S. Southwest that laid the foundation for the modern regime. Cornelisse notes that 
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“detention in particular is unique among other tools of a restrictive immigration 
policy.”139 The uniqueness of noncitizen detention must be further explored and 
understood through a historical lens in order to grapple with the current crisis. This seems 
significant particularly as recent scholarship has explored the origins and rise of mass 
incarceration and where noncitizen detention remains an ever-growing component within 
the carceral state.  
Cornelisse argues that “immigration detention is a form of state violence that has 
become so deeply embedded within the dominant understanding of the sovereign state 
and the global territorial structure of states that it has remained insulated against the usual 
forms of legal correction and political control.”140 Yet questions remain: Had detention 
always been a form of state violence? If so, is the modern regime simply a continuation 
of its historical antecedents? If not, when did it become a form of violence? The 
argument here is that noncitizen detention in the United States transformed from a 
method of exclusion to a form of state-sponsored violence over the course of the 
twentieth century. Since its inception with the Immigration Act of 1891 until 1954, 
noncitizen detention was primarily driven by exclusionary motivations. For instance, in 
her analysis of immigration restrictions aimed at Mexicans, historian Natalia Molina 
notes that even after 1924, such restrictions “marked a shift to new mechanisms of 
exclusion.”141 Her use of the word exclusion is a significant indicator of the impulses 
driving immigration enforcement. From 1954 to 1980, federal detention policy 
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introduced a “humane” detention era until 1981 when the policy changed to detain 
asylum seekers overwhelming immigration authorities. Essentially, the era of “humane” 
detentions melded notions of immigration law violations with criminality and saw the 
expansion of carceral infrastructure across the country, which was followed by mass 
asylum movements that saw detention become the de facto course of action in the next 
era of violent detentions. By this point, detention was no longer premised on the notion of 
exclusion but rather on the idea of exerting the power of the state to break. Insulated from 
constitutional protections theoretically afforded to criminal defendants, noncitizens 
languished inside camps and detention centers from the 1980s onward. Their detentions 
were premised on breaking their will to contest and appeal their cases. In shifting from 
exclusionary motives to a violent form of deterrence, the state’s previously unchecked 
power against noncitizens now involve destruction and death. 
 
Detentions in the U.S. Southwest 
In order to tell this story of transformation, this work will look at the U.S. 
Southwest, which played a particularly unique role in immigration enforcement over the 
course of the twentieth century. The wartime move of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in 1940 was 
followed by a reallocation of resources from the northern to the southern border. 
Immigration enforcement operations followed a parallel development as Border Patrol 
hired more officers and placed a majority of the new hires at the southern border by 1943 
in response to wartime fears. After 1943, the U.S-Mexico border became the “center of 
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operations” for the U.S. Border Patrol.142 A decade later, Mexican migration officials 
established a full-time Mexican Border Patrol to man the South Texas area. As Lytle 
Hernández notes, this allowed enforcement entities “new opportunities for cross-border 
cooperation” in the Southwest.143 When then INS Commissioner Joseph Swing divided 
the Service into four regions in 1956, the decades-long allocation of more resources to 
the Southwest meant that the regions created were unequal in terms of significant 
resources. Lytle Hernández argues, “Regionalization… gave the institution sticky feet in 
the U.S.-Mexico border region, where more officers, more resources, and more facilities 
were located.”144 Ultimately, this regionalization generated problems for immigration 
authorities that were “particular” to the Southwest. As Lytle Hernández argues,  
the racialization of U.S. migration control was carried into the post-wetback era 
by the combination of the officers’ mind-set that illegal immigrants were persons 
of Mexican origin with instructions to find the false claimants of Mexican origin 
and demands to supply the ongoing systems of deportation into the interior of 
Mexico. At the same time, however, enforcement officials warned Border Patrol 
officers against apprehending too many unsanctioned Mexican women and 
children, who could easily swell the ranks of deportees and end the impression of 
victory along the U.S.-Mexico border.145  
 
This impression of victory carefully shielded the reality of immigration 
enforcement in the borderlands of the Southwest, particularly when it came to noncitizen 
detention. Under the guise of national “humane” and purportedly liberal detention 
policies, the Southwest continued to expand detention facilities after the 1950s but often 
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without affecting federal detention numbers because “wetbacks” and those held 
temporarily in “staging areas” were sometimes excluded from being counted. There is a 
more systematic accounting of noncitizen detainees in the 1960s and 1970s, which 
directly contradicted policy guidelines established by the Attorney General. Such 
noncitizen detentions often overwhelmed state and local carceral resources, which led to 
those jurisdictions recruiting federal money for expanded facilities. This work uses the 
example of Arizona counties to show how this took place. Under “humane” detention 
policy, the Southwest built the infrastructure necessary to not only house increasing 
numbers of noncitizens but also revamped and updated their aging carceral institutions. 
In Arizona, federal, state, and local officials coalesced in their attempts to achieve various 
agendas that may have once appeared to be in contestation with each other. However, the 
various levels and players involved ultimately led to a similar end result: the use of 
detained noncitizen bodies to expand the carceral landscape. Moreover, for much of the 
twentieth century, counties had relied on federal money coming in for housing 
noncitizens. With the advent of the private prison system in the 1980s, the receiving of 
federal money for housing noncitizen bodies was deeply embedded within the Southwest 
carceral landscape and allow for private companies to build on relationships previously 
held exclusively by state actors. 
When 1980 came, facilities were again overwhelmed by mass asylum movements 
but this time, officials were better prepared. Their preparation laid the groundwork for the 
punitive transformation of detention policy. Official institutions (such as Ellis and Angel) 
had closed by this time, but the carceral landscape expanded dramatically, as detentions 
increased through unofficial channels and overcrowded jails. Sometimes immigration 
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officials claimed that detentions had decreased by reporting numbers that excluded 
Mexican laborers who were awaiting deportation in “staging areas” of the southwest. In 
actuality, thousands of noncitizens, primarily Mexican laborers, languished in 
southwestern jails, away from public gaze and scrutiny. In the era of “humane” 
detentions, the state laid the groundwork for the violent detentions that would follow.  
 This work traces the history of noncitizen detention policy and reality in three 
parts. Chapter Two focuses on the establishment of the federal immigration bureaucracy 
in the early 1890s, traces the devolution of various places and conditions of detention 
both nationally and locally in Arizona, and culminates in the change of detention policy 
in 1954. In this era, it is argued that detention was motivated primarily by exclusionary 
impulses directed toward various groups. Chapter Three focuses on the period between 
the official change of policy in 1954 until the reversal of that policy in 1981 highlighting 
the ways in which the detention apparatus expanded throughout the U.S. Southwest. This 
part will focus particularly on Arizona where actors from federal, state, and local entities 
engaged in fierce negotiations for noncitizen bodies to fill their jails, sought revenue to 
increase beds when jails became overcrowded, and then sought more bodies to fill the 
increased carceral spaces. In this era, while detention was portrayed in official records as 
“humane,” in whatever connotations that appears, those experiencing incarceration in 
Arizona had a much different story to tell. Chapter Four focuses on the period after 1981 
until the present day. In this era, detention was formally premised on breaking the will of 
noncitizens and thus, detention was motivated primarily by state violence. Analyzing the 
devolution of noncitizen detention in this manner provides key insights to not only 
understanding its historical antecedents but also the ways in which the modern detention 
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regime came to be. Chapter Five concludes by summarizing the main arguments of the 
work and offers a few considerations about the way forward. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXCLUSIONARY DETENTIONS, 1891-1954 
 
Introduction 
The era of exclusionary detentions begins and ends with Ellis Island. After the 
federal government officially took over immigration processing and enforcement in 1891, 
Ellis Island along with other institutions, were established as processing centers. With 
increasing waves of immigration and the rise of exclusionary immigration laws in the late 
nineteenth century, federal institutions became the primary means of enforcing those 
laws. These laws took shape within the context of westward expansion and 
accompanying social, political, economic, and penal changes. After the end of the Civil 
War, immigrants from Europe and Asia as well as easterners both black and white turned 
to the promise of the West. As historian Anne Butler writes, “Their descent upon the 
West and the people who lived therein – Native Americans and Hispanics – unleashed a 
cyclone of societal forces… During this time period, the penitentiary mirrored much of 
the social, economic, and political struggle that accompanied western change.”146 As the 
nation headed into the twentieth century, immigration enforcement operated both along 
the coasts as well as along the southern border. This chapter follows the opening and later 
developments of Ellis and Angel Islands, the two primary coastal institutions, while 
simultaneously weaving in carceral developments in the Southwest, particularly in 
Arizona. As federal officials sought to enforce exclusionary laws, such strategies bore out 
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in violent experiences for those subjected, demonstrated through dismal detention 
conditions, deportations, and suicides. Understanding the way in which both immigration 
enforcement and criminal justice developed in parallel in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries helps lay the groundwork for considering the consequences of these 
systems colliding in the late twentieth century. 
Early on, immigration laws and enforcement were primarily motivated by 
exclusionary impulses. Whether excluding groups like “prostitutes” after the Page Act of 
1875 or other groups like Chinese laborers after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 
immigration enforcement, and with it, detentions and deportations, were driven by a 
desire to keep out those deemed undesirable.147 Federal detention centers processing 
immigrants were established to enforce these exclusionary laws with the most well-
known being Ellis Island and Angel Island. In their recent work, historians Erika Lee and 
Judy Yung argue however, that the two were “very different.” While Ellis was mainly a 
processing center for European immigrants and “enforced American immigration laws 
that restricted, but did not exclude, European immigrants,” Angel Island was 
“characterized by American immigration policies that excluded Asians and barred them 
from becoming naturalized citizens.” According to Lee and Yung, while most European 
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immigrants spent “only a few hours or at most a few days” at Ellis, processing times at 
Angel Island were tracked in “days and weeks.”148 More than a decade before Lee and 
Yung’s work, historian Roger Daniels seems to have expressed a similar sentiment. 
Daniels wrote that Ellis Island was an icon “of welcome, of acceptance” while Angel 
Island was an icon “of suspicion, of rejection.”149 
Despite this, when noncitizen detention is looked at from the point of view of the 
detained themselves, these distinctions might seem less clear. In her study of photography 
and the development of U.S. immigration law, historian Anna Pegler-Gordon notes, 
“both Ellis Island and the photographic medium wield enormous power to present 
themselves as the opposite of what they are: the institution is operating not as a medium 
for Americanization but as a means of exclusion….”150 People were detained at both 
places because of exclusionary impulses dictating that they were not desirable 
immigrants for one reason or another. Some of these reasons were explicitly racist and 
nativist, while others bore purported law and order, economic, or religious motivations. 
For those detained, however, the reasons for their detention perhaps remained less 
significant than other factors such as anxieties and fears. Their anxieties and fears ran 
deep and bear parallels across time and place: fear of prolonged detention, sense of 
isolation, homesickness, and sometimes hopelessness. As historian Hidetaka Hirota 
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notes, “Many newcomers found their experience of temporary detention and medical 
inspection at Ellis Island and Angel Island severely traumatic and depressing.”151 While 
individual experiences were obviously complex, understanding detentions on either coast 
and throughout the country through a common exclusionary lens provides insight into the 
ways in which noncitizen detention began and how it transformed over the course of the 
twentieth century. 
Before the federalization of immigration control in 1891, immigration 
enforcement was part of state police powers. In fact, Hirota argues that it was state-level 
immigration enforcement in New York and Massachusetts, in particular, that laid the 
groundwork for what later became federal immigration policy.152 Notably, Hirota 
contends that state-level practices in detention and removal set national policy. In 1885, 
for instance, the Treasury Department “formalized the practice of immigrant detention 
exercised by the New York Commissioners of Emigration, officially authorizing them to 
detain all excludable foreigners ‘either on shipboard or elsewher’” until shipping 
companies brought them back to their places of departure. The department later extended 
this power to other states.”153 Moreover, the federal government subsidized states to 
operate various landing stations. For instance, New York received federal funding to 
operate the center at Castle Garden from 1855 to 1890, where people were detained and 
excluded by state officials.154 As Hirota has pointed out, “Prior to 1882 the New York 
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commissioners routinely detained pauper and criminal passengers at Castle Garden to 
expedite their exclusion.”155 Many officials from Castle Garden would go on to serve at 
Ellis Island.156 
Following the Immigration Act of 1891, immigration authorities established the 
first federal processing center at Ellis Island. As Hirota notes, “The act placed issues of 
immigration under the control of the federal superintendent of immigration in the 
Treasury Department and appointed federal commissioners of immigration at major 
ports, replacing state enforcers with federal employees.”157 Opening in 1892, Ellis Island 
would mark the experiences of millions of noncitizens attempting to gain entry into the 
country. According to one estimate of the 12 million noncitizens who passed through 
Ellis between 1892 and 1924, about 80 percent went through “in a matter of hours.”158 
While the process for most seemed relatively quick, those who could not pass the initial 
inspections would be detained at Ellis Island while their cases were pending. Legal 
scholar Daniel Wilsher notes in his analysis of admission numbers at Ellis Island that “the 
detention process was linked very clearly to the separation of migrants into admissible 
and inadmissible categories.”159 Such categories demarked who would be admitted and 
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who would be excluded. While awaiting a determination, those detained would sleep, 
cook, and eat at Ellis Island where facilities were “usually grossly overcrowded.”160 The 
ill were housed in the hospital or in isolation wards for those thought to have contagious 
diseases. Many were detained for such purported medical reasons or because they were 
deemed likely to become a public charge.161 Detentions premised on public health 
rationales carried racialized presumptions about “troublesome diseases” believed to be 
found in arriving noncitizen bodies.162 As scholar David Manuel Hernández argues, “In 
many ways, fear of disease served as the ideal ideological justification for the exclusion 
or segregation of non- and lesser-white migrants who Americans feared would 
contaminate the slowly consolidating sense of whiteness of the nation.”163  
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While detained for such exclusionary purposes, noncitizens would have to fight 
their cases through the Board of Special Inquiry.164 They would then either be admitted 
or sent back to their countries of origin. Detention at Ellis Island, however temporary or 
brief, marked the experiences of a significant number of people as evidenced by 
contemporary news articles. Five years after it opened, Ellis Island was destroyed by a 
fire in 1897. As one article noted, the fire had started at the end of the building where the 
“detention pen” was housed, a place “in which there are always a considerable number of 
immigrants being held for investigation.”165 Although there were “scenes of terror,” no 
one was killed in the fire.166 Despite intrusive medical inspections and brief detentions, 
most immigrants gained entry through Ellis Island.167 After all, as Roger Daniels 
concludes, “Ellis Island was, all things considered, a relatively benign institution.”168 
 Two years before the fire at Ellis Island, there was a trial in the Arizona Territory. 
In 1895, five Pima Indians were indicted by a grand jury for grand larceny in the 
territorial district court of Pinal County. They were accused of stealing six horses, 3 
geldings, and 15 mares listed as the “personal property” of other Pima Indians. Three 
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Pima Indians and two Apache Indians served as witnesses to the grand jury.169 One of the 
Pimas indicted was We Paps. Represented by attorneys Sniffen & Freund, We Paps, a 
husband and father, demurred by alleging that the indictment did not substantially 
conform to the Revised Statutes of the Territory of Arizona.170 Regardless of such legal 
efforts, We Paps was found guilty and sentenced to one year in the territorial prison in 
Yuma. He explained his motive as follows: “Until the past few years we have always had 
plenty of water to irrigate our farms, and we never knew what want was… The 
Government refuses to give us food and we do not ask for it; we only ask for water, for 
we prefer to earn our own living if we can. I am no thief, and I will not beg, but my wife 
and children were hungry, and I must either steal or they must starve.”171 
 One of the reasons We Paps, his family, and other Pimas were on the edge of 
starvation by the 1890s was the establishment of Florence. The town of Florence, one of 
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the oldest in Arizona, was founded by Pima Agent Levi Ruggles in May 1866 eight miles 
above the Pima Reservation. Using the proximity to the reservation as security against 
Apaches, settlers ambitiously irrigated Indian land while Ruggles became the largest 
private landowner in the central Arizona Territory.172 As settlers moved in, they 
appropriated increasing amounts of the waters off the Gila River for their lands to the 
detriment of the Pima and Maricopa communities. Three years after the town was 
founded, settlers in Florence “wasted ‘large quantities’ of water in order to deprive the 
Pima.” For two years “settlers above the reservation had ‘opened large acequias for the 
purpose of irrigation. Instead of [the water] being returned to the river after it has served 
its purpose, it is allowed to run waste, thereby greatly diminishing the volume of water 
before it reaches the Pima.’” As historian David DeJong notes, such incidents 
“demonstrated that the settlers saw the Pima as economic competitors.”173  
 Commanding the Gila River naturally favored the settlers in this supposed 
economic competition. By the end of the 1860s, Ruggles and another Indian Agent Ammi 
White had “cornered the Pima wheat market and speculated in land above the 
reservation.” The Homestead Act brought settlers to the Gila River valley without 
protecting Pima water rights. As settlers appropriated more and more water, Pima fields 
were left dry.174 The Pima open resistance to settler encroachments in 1869 was met with 
a detachment of troops from Camp McDowell.175 Eventually, removal was on the 
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horizon. Meanwhile, Florence became the county seat of Pinal County in 1875. The 
discovery of silver led to the opening of the Silver King Mine in 1877 and an economic 
boom for the town.176 After the mine closed in the late 1880s, Florence struggled but not 
all hope was lost. Copper would anticipate another “big mining boom” for Florence 
which anticipated “a period of prosperity far beyond the expectations of the oldest 
inhabitant.”177 While Florence boomed, nearby Pima, those who had remained on their 
lands, starved. 
 As extraction industries brought prominence and economic opportunities to 
settlers, Florence would soon embrace another type of industry. That story starts with a 
river, a bridge, and a prison and spans more than a century. Westward expansion in the 
middle of the nineteenth century saw not only Indian removal but also the embryonic 
carceral state where jails and penitentiaries started dotting the landscape. Responding to 
travelers heading to California chasing dreams for gold, the Territory of Arizona decided 
to include itself in the growing but still rudimentary carceral landscape. Arizona’s 
territorial prison opened in Yuma in 1876, a former army post converted into a jail. It was 
here where We Paps served his time two decades later and was discharged in March 1896 
at the end of his sentence.178 By the late 1890s, the territorial prison had become the 
“most expensive state institution” and lawmakers were looking to cut costs.179 One way 
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was to experiment with convict labor (an experiment that eventually failed). As Paul 
Knepper notes, “The convict-lease system was the natural product of the drive for 
profitable prison labor. Territorial officials, anxious to make the Yuma penitentiary self-
supporting, entertained a wide range of plans before their faltering attempt to hire out 
inmates. The brief history of the canal project, however, represented more than failed 
prison policy. It also showed that prison practices were not always formulated in response 
to criminal behavior. Party politics and judicial decision-making, rather than the beliefs 
of governors and legislators concerning the proper treatment of criminals, determined the 
contours of Arizona’s convict-lease system.”180 Another option was to move the Yuma 
prison elsewhere. In 1897, there were discussions about moving the territorial prison to 
Prescott.181 Ten years later, however, plans were put into place to build a new prison on 
the banks of the Gila River in Florence. As one newspaper noted, the Yuma prison was 
“nothing more than an adobe-built stockade, in which the prisoners are herded under the 
muzzle of rifles, borne by warders who pace the walls. It is intended that the new prison 
shall be modern in all respects.”182 
 Yet, safely crossing the Gila would be a prerequisite before the state’s carceral 
institution could be moved east to central Arizona. Over the course of several decades, 
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attempts were made to build and maintain a bridge into Florence that was once hailed as 
the “only safe crossing of the Gila.” When floods destroyed part of the bridge in 1891, 
efforts were made to “speedily” erect a new structure to withstand future currents.183 
After plans for the new prison were in place, the bridge was linked to both the prison and 
a possible railroad spur line through town. A bridge that carried the possibility of running 
a railroad track on it could link the railroad to the town and the new prison site. As one 
newspaper noted, “Florence needs a railroad spur from the depot on this side of the river, 
almost as bad as she needs a bridge and it is not unlikely now that with the proper 
cooperation she can get both at the same time.”184 After all, in the development of the 
greater Casa Grande valley, Florence was and remained “the metropolis.”185  
After much planning and calls for bids, bridge construction began in early 
1910.186 By May 1910, work on both the territorial road and the Florence bridge were 
moving along as planned.187 Meanwhile, prison building was also under way in Florence. 
Prisoners from Yuma were brought to construct the new prison while materials were 
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“being hauled across the Gila as rapidly as possible, but owing to a great amount of 
quicksand, the hauling is more tedious as smaller loads have to be taken.”188 Prisoners 
were offered commutations of their sentence of one day for each day worked on the new 
prison and the bridge and some gained their freedom this way.189 By the end of 1910, the 
bridge, the territorial road, and the prison were completed. As one newspaper noted, “the 
Gila river crossing… is now almost completed work. A good road has been built by the 
convicts from the river to the prison and the bridge will be finished in a few days.” The 
bridge was anticipated to be “a great public institution for dwellers in those parts, serving 
Florence as a sort of an information bureau, almost a city hall and board of trade 
combined.” Florence made plans for a formal opening of the bridge with a “gala 
occasion, getting up a celebration and inviting the world to attend.”190  
Officially opened in 1910, the new territorial prison in Florence soon made 
national headlines. Describing Florence as a “little adobe Mexican town on the Gila 
River,” the New York Times wrote that the prison was “set down in a treeless desert near 
the ruins of some prehistoric race, whose broken pottery one’s feet tosses up from the 
sand. The prison is a walled inclosure [sic] of steel and cement… It has nothing of the 
frowning exterior one is accustomed to see.” Driving the article was the then-governor’s 
approach to incarceration. Governor George W.P. Hunt had firm beliefs when it came to 
prison policy: 
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There are only three reasons for a penitentiary–revenge, punishment, and 
protection to society. The first two have had their day. The third holds. Society 
must be protected against the criminal. But when you have shut him up that duty 
is done. What remains is the man himself. Shall we go on making penitentiaries 
schools of crime, or make an effort to build up the man’s character, restore his 
self-respect, strengthen his weakness, and cultivate in him a proper appreciation 
of his relation to others, and to society in general?191  
 
As a first task, Hunt traded in the stripes for a “neat gray uniform.”192 As political 
scientist David Berman argues, “Hunt felt that many prisoners, especially first offenders, 
could be restored through humane prison policies to a status of self-respect and become 
better people and good citizens.”193 To show this, Governor Hunt would often release 
prisoners to visit their families showing trust in “his prison family.” In addition to a 
“convict baseball team,” those held inside the state prison also engaged in public works 
projects such as cutting mesquite, building sewers and bridges. When people in Florence 
expressed concerns that “unguarded convicts” were out in public during a sewer project, 
the offended “convicts” refused to return to work until Florence made amends. The New 
York Times noted all this as an “amusing situation.”194  
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Detentions at Ellis and Angel Islands 
Nationally, conditions of confinement were far less amusing, especially for 
noncitizen detainees for whom exclusionary laws played out with a violent reality. After 
the fire had destroyed Ellis Island in 1897, the new buildings constructed were deemed 
“generally defective.” However, there was little recognition of the seriousness of these 
conditions from official channels. H.A. Taylor, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
Department (which housed the Bureau of Immigration), stated in 1901 that the “interior 
brick work was not finished… [and] was frequently left rough. Certain broken stones 
were used which had to be patched up and various other defects were found, none of 
which was of so serious a character as to affect the general stability of the buildings.” 
Despite this, Taylor maintained that the “buildings at Ellis Island are well put up and in 
splendid condition.” While Taylor admitted it was “true that we found water seeping into 
the basement of the hospital, but that is not due to imperfect construction. The hospital is 
located on made ground and some water has found its way into the basement.”195 At a 
meeting discussing conditions at Ellis in front of a president-appointed board to 
investigate the Bureau of Immigration, a pastor replied to the question, “Did you ever 
observe any vermin in the rooms?” bluntly by stating, “Yes, there are lots of bugs there. 
They come off the steamers with the other immigrants. We got them too, sometimes. I 
tell you our work over there is more dangerous than missionary work in Africa.”196 
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Curiously, one recent work states that after the 1897 fire, “Ellis Island buildings 
reappeared better than before.”197  
Physical conditions at Ellis Island were compounded by staff-driven abuses. A 
news article in 1902 reported that “immigrants were subjected to many abuses; that 
immigrants were detained unnecessarily and made to work for the personal gain of those 
interested, and that they were subjected to many extortions.” The then Commissioner of 
Immigration Thomas S. Fitchie was not held responsible for the abuses, was soon let go 
from the post, and all his assistants were fired.198 Nearly a decade later, the abuses were 
left unresolved. In 1911, the Brooklyn League of the National German-American 
Alliance, representing 15,000 German-Americans, appealed to President Taft and 
Congress about the conditions and abuses at Ellis Island seeking to remove then 
Commissioner of Immigration William Williams.199 The next month, Williams 
maintained that the allegations of abuses were entirely false but admitted that it was 
“impossible to apply the law with the requisite thoroughness on days when we are 
compelled to receive 4,000 to 5,000 people.” While insisting that immigration officials 
are doing the best they can despite inadequacies, the “conditions are not nearly as bad as 
depicted.”200 Commissioner Williams shared nativist sentiments of “backward races” and 
in order to keep out “low grade immigrants” had imposed a requirement that all new 
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immigrants have at least $25 and a ticket to their final destination, which led to many 
Jewish immigrants being excluded and deported.201 Four years later, Ellis Island began 
offering English classes to children who have been ordered deported but could not be 
physically returned to their countries of origin until wars in those countries had ended.202 
In 1916, charges of “immorality and mismanagement” at Ellis were investigated by 
congressional representatives.203 Despite such circumstances, enforcing exclusionary 
laws kept Ellis Island open and operational. 
Exclusionary impulses drove detentions not only in Ellis Island but starting in 
1910 at Angel Island as well. For the next thirty years, Angel Island operated as the 
primary port of entry for Asian immigrants into the United States, processing over one 
million people, as officials sought to enforce anti-Asian immigration policies.204 
Described by Roger Daniels as “primarily a detention facility for Asian immigrants,”205 
there were problems from the start. In 1910, the year it opened, the Chinese League of 
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Justice of America related “intolerable conditions” at Angel Island.206 Daniels notes a 
report by the Public Health Service Surgeon at the same time, which detailed the 
contaminated water supply, fly and cockroach infested kitchen facilities, and “gross 
overcrowding.”207 H.M. Lai has pointed out that the sanitary conditions in the 
dormitories, for example, were “barely adequate… janitorial services were limited. Ten 
months after the station’s opening, the acting commissioner was already criticizing the 
filthy conditions of the facilities.” In the 1920s, the Chinese Benevolent Association 
protested unhealthy conditions to President Coolidge and Secretary of Labor J.J. Davis 
which had “allegedly caused several detainees to sicken and die.” In the 1930s, the Angel 
Island Liberty Association was compelled to negotiate with officials to provide soap and 
toilet tissue for those detained.208 The problems remained as Angel Island continued 
operating. 
Chinese community leaders also continually protested overcrowding and harsh 
enforcement procedures.209 Harsh procedures included invasive medical examinations 
and prolonged lengths of detention. Recent scholarship has attempted to uncover the 
systematic nature of these lengths of detention at Angel Island with one study indicating 
there is “great variability” in this regard.210 Regardless of average detention times, many 
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noncitizens who were detained would later refer to the notorious West Coast detention 
center using the language of incarceration. After all, as H.M. Lai notes, it was those who 
experienced detention first-hand who “sampled the full flavor and effect” of the anti-
Asian exclusion laws.211 For instance, Benjamin Choy, who was detained at Angel Island, 
later recalled the place as “a place of confinement… I was away over there, only two 
weeks. You just sleep, and eat, and play. That’s all, there’s nothing else.”212 Bennie 
Woon Yep, who was detained for one month, later stated in an oral history interview that 
Angel Island was “just like a jail… you sleep on a metal bed… they have a big building, 
all the Chinese sleep in the building. No families, just like going to jail…” When asked 
about who was detained, Bennie Woon Yep replied, “All Chinese… mostly young 
people… all poor people.”213  
Exclusionary impulses highlighted by detentions and deportations took heavy 
tolls nationwide highlighting the violent reality for those subjected to them. According to 
one report published in 1986, in its first forty years of operation, there were 3,000 
suicides at Ellis Island.214 A New York Times article from 1985 links the suicides to those 
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rejected from admission into the country by noting that the “implications for the rejected 
were dreadful. For some, there was nothing to go back to, or there was certain death; for 
others, who left as adventurers, to return would be to adopt in local member the fool’s 
role, and the failure’s. No wonder that the island’s history includes reports of 3,000 
suicides.”215 However, one author notes in his work that while “more than 3,500 
immigrants died [at Ellis Island], including 1,400 children,” there were “also three known 
suicides.”216 Suicides seem to have begun even before arrival at Ellis Island. Molly 
Mendelsohn noted of her passage to New York: “They stopped at night. Then at one 
point, the boat suddenly turned back and everybody was terribly worried. We thought we 
couldn’t go to America. And the story was that a purser had committed suicide. He had 
jumped off the boat, and they had to go back and search for him, even though there was 
no hope.”217 Regina Rogatta later reflected, “We were lucky. There were many that were 
sent back. And my sister said some of them were jumping off the boats because they 
were told to go back, and they were committing suicide. Just the thought of that voyage 
going back and not being able to stay in this country. We were the lucky ones.”218 While 
on board the liner Olympic near New York, Thomas Brassington, a native of England, 
left a note that he was afraid of detention at Ellis Island, said goodbye to his fiancé, and 
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jumped overboard.219 News stories detailed suicides at the Island as well. When Marie 
Gorda, an immigrant from Germany, found out her little daughter, Anna, had died of 
measles in the Ellis Island hospital, she threw herself into the bay in grief. Her body was 
later recovered floating in the ferry slip beside the hospital.220 When Carl. C. Morgensen, 
a native of Denmark, was found deportable by the Board of Special Inquiry for an “act of 
moral turpitude,” he went into the next room and shot himself.221 Historian Ronald Bayor 
argues, “Immigrants put into detention for further mental observation sometimes became 
so distraught that they committed suicide, indicating actual mental problems or 
desperation after the long journey.”222 After being detained for four days and eventually 
granted admission after friends and family vouched for her, Martha Marshall allegedly 
jumped from the upper balcony of the main hall. No motive was assigned and her death 
was ruled a suicide.223 Two days after Christmas 1929, Theresa Papp, a native of 
Hungary, died after jumping into the harbor from the window of the marine hospital on 
Ellis Island. Despite having lived in the U.S. for 21 years, she was barred from re-entry 
for having a contagious disease.224  
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Suicides at Angel Island also point to the despair and desperation noncitizens 
grappled with while they remained in detention. Days into being detained in 1919, Fong 
Fook hanged himself with a towel tied to a gas fixture. Lester Tom Lee and Gerald Won 
recalled separate suicides in 1931 and 1936. An interpreter told the story of a Chinese 
woman who was “so distraught about being deported back to China that ‘she sharpened a 
chopstick and stuck it in her brain through the ear and died.’”225 Those who managed to 
survive detention, later recalled the experience marked by stories of suicides. For 
instance, David Chan Leong, who was held at Angel Island later described his 
experience, “going to the latrine at night was kinda scary because they say ghosts… 
People there hung themselves and all that stuff. That was scary. I was afraid to get out of 
bed at night.”226 Dick Jeong, formerly detained at Angel Island, later stated, “Some 
people suicided there. Yeah because some people stay a long time. You know some 
people, some of the older people especially.”227 Myron Ning Wong, who was also 
detained later recalled, “People hung themselves over there, people killed themselves, 
which is true, so we were kind of scared, you know… I didn’t see it, but people did that 
because they interrogate them, they couldn’t come up. They’d lose face in China and, you 
know, they would kill themselves.”228 A fire in August 1940 eventually destroyed the 
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administration building at Angel Island, along with many of the records. A few months 
later, the last of those detained – 125 Chinese men, 19 Chinese women, a few Filipinos, 
and 35 Central European refugees – were transported to the mainland and Angel Island 
closed down.229  
Like Angel Island during its operation, detention conditions at Ellis Island 
remained problematic throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. In 1921, 
government officials, health inspectors, and volunteers were embattled in “open warfare.” 
The New York health commissioner noted Ellis Island was “disease-ridden, a plague-
hatchery and a dangerous menace.” Volunteers from welfare organizations cited 
“instances of ill treatment, neglect, filth, inadequate accommodations and incompetence.” 
Among other details of conditions, immigrants are “herded like cattle in the ill-ventilated, 
fetid detention room,” there were no separate quarters for mothers with babies, there were 
1,100 beds for nights when anywhere from 2,000 to 4,500 people are housed, and the 
water supply was contaminated that “officials will not drink it.” The immigrant “comes 
full of hope; he often leaves the island full of hate.”230 Days later, the Harding 
administration promised to remedy the “evil conditions at Ellis” immediately by 
correcting the “inefficient and inhumane methods” of immigration enforcement. The new 
Commissioner General of Immigration W.W. Husband promised that “everything 
possible be done to remove the confusion that has caused the detention of thousands of 
immigrants in unhealthy conditions at the island and aboard ship.”231 Five months later, 
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63-year-old Kate Kalish, who had contracted pneumonia during her month-long detention 
at Ellis Island because of restrictive immigration quotas, died in her home in St. Louis.232  
The early 1920s saw the passing of two quota laws meant to curtail immigration. 
The Emergency Quota Law of 1921 was passed in anticipation of World War I refugees 
from Europe and limited immigrants to 3 percent of their national origin based on the 
1910 census. The Immigration Act of 1924, spearheaded by Albert Johnson and 
superintendent of the Eugenics Record Office Harry Laughlin, reduced this to 2 percent 
of the 1890 census, which disproportionately favored immigrants from Northern and 
Western Europe.233 As scholar Miroslava Chávez-García has noted, Laughlin had been 
working since the late 1910s to “draft and support legislation advocating the sterilization 
of those labeled ‘unfit’: primarily poor, white southern European immigrants” and in 
March 1924 testified in Congress about the “dangers of continued immigration from 
countries with degenerate peoples. His testimony helped pass the Immigration Act of 
1924.”234 As historian Libby Garland argues, “These new laws were a grand experiment 
in statecraft and social engineering. They attempted to codify a precise formula for 
American unity. They applied to European immigrants, albeit less harshly, a nation- and 
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race-based principle of exclusion similar to that which had been pioneered with Asian 
immigrants.”235 Moreover, Mae Ngai argues that the 1924 Act brought about a “new kind 
of thinking,” where cultural nationalism based on “prejudices among white Protestant 
Americans from norther European backgrounds and their desire to maintain social and 
political dominance” transformed into “a nationalism based on race.”236 Compounded by 
the introduction of these immigration quotas in the early 1920s, noncitizen detention 
conditions drew international attention. In 1921, “distressing accounts” by British 
subjects detailing bad treatment and “filthy” conditions at Ellis came under discussion at 
the House of Commons. There the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cecil Harmsworth, 
stated, “Repeated representations made to the United States government have, I regret to 
say, had no tangible result.”237 Commissioner Husband responded, “I don’t know what is 
meant by tangible results. We have expressed our sincere regrets and are sure it cannot 
happen again.”238 Early investigations laid part of the blame on steam ships that were 
carrying more British nationals than the quota numbers allowed which meant there was 
“no recourse save to detain the excess arrivals at Ellis Island until such time as the quota 
for the British empire permitted their admittance or until they could be returned to the 
port of embarkation.”239 Recommendations by an advisory committee appointed by 
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Commissioner Husband were to be adopted immediately. Among them were policies to 
give women and children improved quarters, larger facilities for immigrants to 
communicate with friends and family, and Sunday services held by Catholic, Protestant, 
and Jewish clergymen. Moreover, those refused entry would have their cases explained to 
them and noncitizens “will not in future be detained in the Ellis Island barges but in 
commodious quarters in the main building.”240  
A year after Harmsworth had spoken about Ellis at the House of Commons, his 
successor, Ronald McNeill, voiced similar concerns about conditions being “very 
bad.”241 Secretary of Labor James Davis went on the defensive and responded, 
“Immigrants are better treated at Ellis Island than any other port in the world.”242 Davis 
then met with the British ambassador, Sir Auckland Geddes, to discuss British citizens 
being subjected to “indignities and insanitary treatment at the American ports of entry.” 
After defending the treatment of immigrants, Davis discussed with Geddes rebuilding 
Ellis Island so that “different races may be segregated.” Moreover, Davis admitted there 
was “room for improvement” and that the station is “overcrowded from 50 to 100 per 
cent.” Davis later stated Geddes was “quite impressed” with the efforts being made at 
“handling aliens.”243 A few months later, an editorial in a Manitoba newspaper took issue 
with the exclusivity of those being assisted. The editorial remarked, “What is needed is 
not better treatment for British immigrants at Ellis Island, but better treatment for all 
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immigrants.” The editorial objected to the “harsh and prison-like treatment” where 
noncitizens “are numbered, ticketed, and housed like so many dumb creatures” and 
concluded, “The situation should be relieved by making conditions better for everyone, 
and by officially assuming that all newly-arrived immigrants are human beings with well-
defined rights to courteous and kind treatment.”244 Two years later, when the Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs in the House of Commons was asked whether he was satisfied 
with the conditions back in the United States, he replied, “No, I cannot say I am satisfied 
with conditions, and I hope an improvement will come before long.” However, he also 
stated that no retaliatory measures would be taken to force improvements.245 
With the Immigration Act of 1924, much of the admission process shifted to 
consular offices abroad and negated the need for processing centers. This meant for the 
most part that medical examinations were performed and visas were issued overseas 
before noncitizens arrived at ports of entry in the United States. Starting in 1924, 
therefore, line inspections were eliminated at Ellis Island. Historian Mae Ngai notes that 
this meant “upon arrival, immigrants’ visas were inspected, not their bodies.”246 Yet, 
quota restrictions had worsened conditions at Ellis Island in the first half of the year. In 
early June, more than 1,400 immigrants were detained at Ellis where sleeping 
accommodations were available for 1,000. Another 8,800 were detained pending 
permission to land.247 The congestion was alleviated when Congress stepped in to 
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overturn a Supreme Court decision. Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb centered on 
whether wives and children of residents would be subjected to the quota restrictions. 
Under a lower court ruling in Gottlieb, 8,000 immigrant wives and children had been 
admitted. However, the Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that wives and 
children came under quota restrictions.248 This then meant that the 8,000 immigrants 
admitted were all liable to arrest, detention, and deportation. In order to avoid large-scale 
detentions and deportations, Congress passed a joint resolution to overturn the Court 
decision, legalize their status, and permit them to remain.249  
As visa processing and inspections shifted abroad, it is often argued that Ellis 
Island experienced a transformation of sorts. In its last thirty years or so of operation, 
Ellis Island became essentially an “island prison” primarily for those deemed 
“radicals.”250 Following the Mexican and Russian Revolutions of the 1910s, “radicalism” 
seemed to have “fanned the flames” of rising nativism. As Shana Bernstein argues, 
“Americans feared foreign radicalism would contaminate their country by way of 
southern European, Asian, and Mexican immigrants. They associated foreigners with 
radicalism and persecuted them.”251 Or as Bill Ong Hing puts it, “To many Americans, 
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the ghost of Bolshevism seemed to haunt the land in the specter of immigrant 
radicals.”252 Thus, many were targeted for detentions and deportations. In 1920, a group 
of 40 “radicals” were held at the island for deportation to Russia. As a news article noted, 
“Most of the deportees have been held by the Federal authorities several months and 
some have been detained for more than a year. Others have been captives for several 
years.”253 As Robert Elias has argued, the targeting did not remain exclusive: “Patriotic 
America sought a “return to normalcy” after World War I, and those who stood out were 
labeled aliens, radicals, and outsiders. The emerging Red Scare targeted not only political 
activists and labor leaders but immigrants generally.”254 “Radicals” as well as other 
noncitizens were also being detained and deported along the southern border in Arizona. 
In 1921, Johann Diermeyer was arrested and held in the Winslow jail for “certain 
Bolshevik utterances.” He was later investigated and found to be a “radical” by the 
immigration service where a “quantity of red literature and soviet propaganda, found in 
his possession at the time of his arrest, was confiscated and destroyed.” He was ordered 
deported along with four other men deemed “illegal entrants,” all of whom were from 
Europe and held at the immigration detention headquarters in Tucson.255 In the meantime, 
there is evidence of further suicides and attempts among those detained at Ellis Island. In 
1937, for instance, Sara J. Rodriguez, an 18-year-old Cuban immigrant detained by 
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immigration officials while in New York, attempting suicide by drinking poison as she 
was being taken to Ellis Island.256 Ten years later, when Sofia Feldy, a 38-year-old 
immigrant from Poland, was refused entry by the Board of Special Inquiry, she hung 
herself in the detention room.257  
After the passing of the Internal Security Act in 1950, Ellis Island became 
overcrowded once again. The New York Times reported that the “one-time gateway of 
hope has become a hotel of detention.”258 The 1950 Act required the registration for 
communist or communist-front organizations and authorized detention “in a time of 
internal security emergency.”259 The Act would be followed by the McCarran-Walter Act 
of 1952. As Jenna M. Loyd and Alison Mountz argue, “Both acts built on legislation 
passed in the 1910s targeted immigrants with anarchist politics and the 1940 Smith Act, 
which required the registration of noncitizens and enabled the deportation of individuals 
who belonged to organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the 
government.”260 Despite a high wire fence, there were escapes. In 1953, for instance, 
three people escaped from Ellis Island by tying sheets and blankets together, sliding 
down to the ground from a window, and swimming four hours to the pier. They had 
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packed dry clothing together in a plastic shower curtain. While two were later caught, the 
third remained at large.261 
 
Detentions in Arizona 
Exclusionary detentions and deportations were simultaneously operating in 
Arizona along the southern border with Mexico. In 1909, it was reported in Tucson that 
the “ranks of immigration prisoners at the local detention quarters are again being thinned 
out, several having been deported since the last of the week.”262 A year later, a local 
newspaper headline read, “More Undesirables To Be Deported,” while listing two 
Hindus, a Russian, and nine Chinese men who would be taken from the noncitizen 
detention headquarters in Tucson to the Pacific coast and deported.263 The headquarters, 
which housed both the immigration district office and detention quarters, was inside a 
two-story brick structure just north of Pennington Street on Church Avenue. When it first 
began operations in 1910, it was handling mostly Chinese.264 This is in line with 
enforcement priorities of the time. As historian Kelly Lytle Hernández notes, “In 1904, 
the U.S. Immigration Service had established a small force of officers assigned to enforce 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts along the nation’s borders. Never numbering more than 
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seventy-five men for the Mexican and Canadian borders, the Mounted Guard monitored 
border towns and patrolled the borderlands to apprehend undocumented Chinese 
immigrants.”265 Yet, noncitizens of Mexican descent too were caught in the detention and 
deportation process. When Antonio Sanchez, an alleged deserter of the Mexican army, 
was brought to the detention center in Tucson, it was found that he had worked for a time 
at the Douglas smelter, got “ingloriously drunk” and has since been a “chronic inebriate.” 
As the article noted, “deportation will be the inevitable result.”266 As Lytle Hernández 
has argued, while Mexican migration continued all through the 1910s, it would be in the 
1920s when “Mexican labor emigration surged with massive expansion in southwestern 
agribusiness,” which would lead Congress to tightened U.S. immigration laws and 
establish the Border Patrol.267  
Detentions and deportations crossed gender and age lines. When Juliana Delgado, 
a native of Mexico and well known to be a “practitioner of immorality,” was found across 
the border on several occasions showing “more than usual persistence in her efforts to 
return to this country,” a warrant was issued for her arrest, incarceration, and eventual 
deportation.268 Even minors were not spared. When six Mexican boys were to be put on a 
train to Nogales, there was “rejoicing” at the noncitizen detention headquarters in Tucson 
because “pandemonium has reigned in the vicinity of their place of confinement.” The 
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boys apparently “fought and screamed, laughed and shouted and were the liveliest 
specimens ever held in confinement.” Their deportation, however, was noted as the “end 
even if that end be a chapter of a continued story.”269 Less than three months later, the 
Arizona Daily Star celebrated the emptying of the detention quarters in Tucson for the 
first time since 1908 after the deportation of 15 Chinese men.270  
Meanwhile, about 70 miles northwest of Tucson, the Florence bridge was under 
attack by consecutive storms in 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917.271 In September 1916, 
Governor Hunt and several others visited Florence to inspect the storm-damaged bridge. 
During their visit, their car plunged into the Gila River. As the engine stalled, the group 
faced a choice: waiting all night for help or getting out of the car and wading. Hunt led 
the charge, took off what clothes he thought would not get wet, and dove into the chilly 
water. The rest followed. At the other end of the river, they met a prison car that took 
them to the penitentiary. Hunt later stated, “if the people of the state could have seen me 
Saturday night wading the Gila river at Florence, with the major portion of my clothes on 
my head, they would have been of the unanimous opinion that I was creating quite the 
ripple.”272 Twenty years later, Hunt’s name would attach to “The State Highway to 
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Florence,” that ends at what is now Highway 79 at nearly the point where the Florence 
Bridge begins. 
Along the southern border in Arizona, exclusionary detentions and deportations 
operated broadly encompassing people of diverse backgrounds. In particular, there is 
evidence that detentions allowed counties to negotiate with the federal government in 
renting out bed space and bring in revenue. Tucson provides an example of how 
immigration prisoners exacerbated overcrowding issues during this time while bringing 
in revenue to the city and surrounding county. Since the mid-1910s, the immigration 
headquarters had been located in the building at the back of the A.U.O.W. building, 
which housed immigrant detainees. Three days after Diermeyer and the others were 
deported, Francisco Nosaragari and Rafael Ramirez were taken from the Tucson 
immigration headquarters to Nogales and deported on the charge of being “illegal 
entrants.”273 In 1923, six Europeans were brought to be held at the noncitizen detention 
camp in Tucson after seven Mexicans had been deported to Nogales the day before.274 
The next year, 12 immigration prisoners were moved from the Tucson headquarters to the 
Pima county jail where they were to be held “temporarily until permanent arrangements 
are made.”275 Incarceration at Pima county jail would prove fatal for Wong Mook a few 
months later. In February 1925, he was found dead in his jail cell after hanging himself 
                                               
272 “Gov. Hunt Wades the Gila River,” Arizona Republican (1890-1922), September 26, 1916, p. 
6. 
 
273 “Illegal Entrants Deported,” The Arizona Daily Star, May 28, 1921, p. 2. 
 
274 “Aliens Arrive,” The Arizona Daily Star, July 8, 1923, p. 2. 
 
275 “Officers Move Prisoners to County Jail,” The Arizona Daily Star, July 1, 1924, p. 3. 
 89 
with a short cord and a handkerchief. The news article reported, “No reason for the 
suicide was evident this morning.”276 Pima county jail would continue housing a variety 
of prisoners, including federal, immigration, county, and city, during this time.277 
 Exclusionary detentions provided revenue to local jurisdictions such as Pima 
county that were paid by the federal government to jail federal detainees, including those 
held for immigration violations. In 1929, for instance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Department of Immigration together paid Pima county more than $11,259. While 
the DOJ paid $8,599 for 315 prisoners, immigration paid $2,660 for 303. The 
discrepancy was explained by the longer waiting times for DOJ prisoners.278 Three years 
earlier, the county jail had seen a record number of 265 prisoners, mostly coming from 
Prohibition and immigration violations, housed in a building set to hold 96. As a result, 
the men were “bedded down on the floor, on the roofs of the tanks or anywhere else 
where it was possible to spread blankets.” When the number of federal immigration 
prisoners dropped to a 16-year low at the end of 1932, it was deemed a “sigh of relief” 
for the sheriff but difficult for the board of supervisors who would be getting a “new low 
record” in the “check for meals.”279 In May 1933, there were nearly 100 immigration 
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prisoners at Pima county jail.280 A year later, the county budget reported a decrease in 
revenue for several reasons one of which was that “the federal government is now not 
housing immigration prisoners in the county jail any longer than possible under its 
economy program and the moving of federal prisoners to the Mt. Lemmon prison camp 
has materially decreased the source of revenue from prisoners’ meals.”281  
Providing a necessary service to the federal government in housing noncitizen 
detainees meant bargaining power for local jurisdictions. A few months after the county 
budget report, the Board of Supervisors voted to charge the Immigration Service 80 cents 
per day for boarding detainees.282 The next year, the rate went up to 85 cents which was 
maintained in a new contract in 1936. As a news article noted, “The U.S. immigration 
service, at least, still loves Pima county in so far as its jail is concerned.”283 The 
negotiations and contracts paid off for the county. That year, the sheriff collected $61.20 
for support of federal prisoners while collecting $1,885.30 for immigration prisoners.284 
For the next several years, Pima county collected thousands of dollars for housing 
hundreds of noncitizens each year.285 In 1944, the Board of Supervisors signed a contract 
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with the INS to house prisoners for $1.20 per day.286 Four years later, an initial bid of 
$1.50 per day was revised to $1.25.287 Such revenue generation highlights not only the 
financial benefit noncitizen detainees held for local jurisdictions but also the way in 
which such carceral relationships had been operating for much of the twentieth century. 
Alongside this revenue generation, federal judges sentenced noncitizens to time in 
jails all along the border, which added to the carceral expansion. In August 1932, for 
instance, Judge Albert M. Sames was “speeding back and forth” across southern Arizona 
“busily engaged in cleaning up the court docket.” On a Tuesday, 59 noncitizens were 
sentenced to prison in Nogales for one day sentences. The previous day, 90 noncitizens 
were sentenced in Bisbee and Douglas. Nearly all were “Chinese who have slipped across 
the line recently.”288 A week later, a train “carrying only Chinese immigration prisoners” 
passed through Tucson, picked up all the Chinese noncitizens held in southern Arizona 
border jails, and took them to San Francisco for deportation.289 In July 1934, Sames 
                                               
immigration prisoners. “Ups and Downs Seen in Report,” The Arizona Daily Star, January 6, 
1939, p. 3. In a “busy first half” of 1938, the sheriff collected $2,616 for 216 immigration 
prisoners “Sheriff Submits First Half Report for Pima County Jail,” The Arizona Daily Star, July 
3, 1938, p. 4. For the first half of 1939, the sheriff took in $4,009 for 161 immigration prisoners. 
“Echols Reports Period’s Tasks,” The Arizona Daily Star, July 5, 1939, p. 11. In the first three 
months of 1939, the sheriff collected $2,622 for 84 federal immigration prisoners. “Sheriff Makes 
March Report,” The Arizona Daily Star, April 5, 1939, p. 5. The sheriff collected $615 for 87 
immigration prisoners in the first six months of 1940. “Sheriff Reports His Collections,” The 
Arizona Daily Star, July 3, 1940, p. 6. In 1941, the sheriff collected revenues of $1,887 for 227 
immigration prisoners. “Sheriff’s Annual Report Announced,” The Arizona Daily Star, January 
23, 1942, p. 16.  
 
286 “Contracts Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service Prisoners,” The Arizona Daily 
Star, April 15, 1944, p. 7. 
 
287 “Revised Quotation on Detention and Maintenance of U.S. Immigration Prisoners,” Arizona 
Daily Star, May 4, 1948, p. 15. 
 
288 “Sames Is Handling Immigration Cases,” The Arizona Daily Star, August 18, 1932, p. 2. 
 
 92 
sentenced 11 immigration prisoners who had pleaded guilty.290 Two years later, Sames 
was still sentencing noncitizens in Tucson to terms ranging from a day to six months in 
prison after which they were to be deported.291 In September 1941, Judge Dave Ling 
sentenced ten noncitizens to six months in prison and one noncitizen to five years’ 
probation for unauthorized entry. One of the noncitizens sentenced to six months, Angel 
Zuniga-Morales, asked Ling if immigration authorities could beat up people like him by 
explaining, “They shook me and made me say English words I did not know the meaning 
of.” Judge Ling replied that Zuniga-Morales “could avoid such incidents if he would stay 
on the Mexican side of the line or enter this country legally.”292  
Noncitizen detainees held within Pima County reacted against their confinement 
by attempting to or actually escaping. In December 1930, for example, ten noncitizens 
broke out of the newly completed Pima county jail by sawing through a bar on a window. 
The sheriff later explained that only immigration prisoners were kept in that part of the 
jail because he had always “considered it unsafe” and no “dangerous criminals” were 
ever kept there.293 Two months later, a second jail break attempt at Pima county was 
halted and the noncitizen was placed in solitary confinement. The new sheriff repeated 
the earlier sentiments that the “jail needs an inner wall of steel.” As the article noted, only 
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federal immigration prisoners are kept in that part of the jail and the sheriff and his force 
do not have direct control over them “other than to hold them for the federal 
government.”294 A month later, four men escaped from the Santa Cruz county jail in 
Nogales after breaking through the wire screening. One of the men was an immigration 
prisoner. The hole they used had “originally been made by a woman prisoner about two 
months ago, who was frantic to return to her infant baby, in Mexico. She was caught 
before she managed to escape, and later was released on account of the baby.”295 When a 
group of seven noncitizens escaped out of the east window at Pima county jail in October 
1931, five of them were recaptured less than a year later.296  
Such escapes and attempted escapes were not limited to county jails. In August 
1933, Augustin Ortiz, who was reported to “have a thick face below the cheek bones… 
extremely short hair… and has a scar near the right eye,” escaped from the local 
immigration office in Tucson while immigration prisoners were being examined.297 In 
May 1940, Tomas Cervera, a 40-year-old immigration prisoner, escaped from the federal 
prison camp at Mt. Lemmon.298 In July, the camp had three more escapes. One of the 
escapees was 23-year-old Carlos Rivera who had been transferred there from the federal 
prison at La Tuna, Texas. Rivera had escaped on a Sunday evening by following “the 
telephone line from the prison, thus avoiding all highways until he reached Sahuarita.” 
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He was caught there the next day and returned to the prison camp.299 While U.S. marshal 
for the Arizona district, Ben J. McKinney, was celebrated in early 1950 for his 
“efficiency” and having only one prison escape of “nearly 15,000 prisoners handled,” the 
sole escapee was an immigration prisoner, who “slipped his handcuffs while being 
brought to Tucson from Nogales and faded back into Mexico.”300 In 1954, another three 
immigration prisoners escaped from the Mt. Lemmon federal prison by walking away 
from the camp. Two were held for “illegal entry” from Mexico and one for “falsely 
representing himself as an American citizen.” The article noted they were “being hunted 
by prison camp guards and FBI agents.”301  
Another local jurisdiction grappling with the ebbs and flows of immigration 
enforcement was Maricopa County. A sole existing record shows not only names of 
immigration prisoners but also sums listed for their housing. The Register of Immigration 
Prisoners details that between July 1949 and February 1953, there were 6,690 people 
arrested for immigration violations.302 Of those listed, 6,661 are listed as Mexican while 
11 were listed as “white” and 12 as Canadian.303 Also listed are days and amounts 
periodically throughout the register where the amounts total to $5,914.60.304 At the same 
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time, the Maricopa county jail was experiencing severe overcrowding. In March 1952, 
Judge Renz Jennings visited the jail and said conditions were “intolerable” and that the 
jail’s overnight cells are “100 per cent overcrowded.” The sheriff explained that as many 
as 390 people had been held at the jail that was built to accommodate 236. As Judge 
Jennings noted, “There is hardly standing room and some of the prisoners don’t have 
room to lie down. I’m not criticizing any public officials. But conditions are so bad that 
something must be done now.”305 Two days later, the county supervisors promised to 
help the sheriff “clear up” the overcrowded conditions. The board chairman stated, “We 
will take action as soon as Sheriff Boies submits his plan for enlarging jail facilities.”306 
By August, a split board of supervisors ordered architectural plans to expand the 
courthouse annex for more courtrooms and expanded facilities for the county jail. One 
board member noted the “new jail facilities would get highest priority in the new 
construction.”307 
 In 1942, the War Relocation Authority constructed an internment camp 
approximately thirty miles west of Florence and thirty miles northwest of Eloy over the 
strong objections of the Gila River Indian Reservation government. Constructed in two 
months, the internment camp remained operational until 1945. In 1944, on the outskirts 
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of Florence was the largest prisoner-of-war camp ever built on American soil.308 Two 
years earlier, the army had paid $4 million for 500 acres for property north of the Gila 
River. Despite opposition from local community members, construction began and by 
May of 1943, the first Italian POWs were being housed at Camp Florence.309 When 
braceros could not fill the labor demands of the cotton crop, growers turned to the camp 
and by the end of the year POWs were involved in picking cotton.310 Wages for this labor 
were deposited into the U.S. Treasury. In 1944, the government earned $22 million 
dollars from POW labor.311 Axis prisoners also worked alongside U.S. civilians in such 
work as reconditioning motor vehicles to be sent to the Pacific.312 In February 1945, 
German prisoners of war working on Arizona cotton fields picked an average of more 
than 370,000 pounds of cotton per day in their six-day work weeks.313 After the war, the 
Arizona State Hospital used the camp’s hospital facilities for a year. In 1951, the federal 
government assumed jurisdiction of the camp.314 About 20 acres at the south end of the 
former POW camp was then used by the Bureau of Prisons as a federal prison camp.315 
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Standards were lax at the camp as there were “neither guards nor guns.” One article 
reported, “There is little difficulty with escapees for the inmates realize Uncle Sam has a 
long arm even though most of them are Mexican Nationals.”316 In 1957, part of the camp 
housed hundreds of elementary school children when their school was destroyed by a 
fire. As the newspaper reported, the Federal Prison Bureau “lent a helping hand to this 
community.”317 
In May 1952, a radio broadcast in Moscow claimed the United States was 
building Nazi-style extermination camps with barbed wire fences at El Reno, Oklahoma 
and Wickenburg and Florence, Arizona. The broadcaster stated, “The United States 
imperialists would like to get hold of the blueprints of the furnaces and gas chambers set 
up in a death camp on Koje Island. They are building new Maidaneks and Oswiecims in 
Arizona and Oklahoma, intended for the extermination of all who do not agree with their 
aggressive policies.”318 In fact, a “federal network of detention camps for dangerous 
subversives” was being constructed for occupancy starting in 1954 in the midst of Cold 
War hysteria. In addition to El Reno, Wickenburg, and Florence, camps were also to be 
placed at Avon Park, Florida, Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and at the old Japanese 
relocation center at Tule Lake.319 Renovated with the use of prison labor at a cost of $1.5 
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million, the camps were designed for use in any emergency under the 1950 Internal 
Security Act which authorized “rounding up and holding persons likely to commit 
espionage or sabotage should there be an invasion of the United States or its possession, a 
declaration of war by Congress, or an insurrection within this country in aid of an enemy 
nation.” However, as the head of the Bureau of Prisons James V. Bennett noted there 
were no plans for immediate use. Bennett said, “We are just being prudent. We want to 
be prepared, so we are sort of keeping a fleet of ‘mothball’ camps available.”320 Yet, two 
years later, the camps remained ready and some occupied. At the end of 1955, the 
Florence camp had about 150 prisoners and two-thirds of them were “illegal 
immigrants.” Security was not a question. As the New York Times noted, bloodhounds 
from the Arizona State Prison were available for recapturing escapees and despite the 
dogs sometimes faltering “in the desert before the fugitives do…almost all are caught.”321 
Immigration enforcement along the southern border was overwhelming 
authorities in the late 1940s and into the 1950s with troubling impacts on detention. As 
Kelly Lytle Hernández has argued, “U.S. immigration control was failing” along the 
border despite Mexican and U.S. officials expecting deportations further inland to reduce 
unauthorized immigration. As Lytle Hernández notes in this expectation “they were 
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wrong. Then they tried fences to discourage illegal immigration. But, again, they had 
miscalculated, and immigrants continued to cross through, around, over, and under the 
fences.”322 Particularly problematic was the impact of arrests and deportations on 
detention facilities. As Hernández argues, by the early 1950s, Border Patrol was 
“apprehending so many Mexicans that there was no place to keep them as they awaited 
deportation. INS detention centers were filled beyond capacity.” While waiting for 
additional funds to build new detention centers in Brownsville, Texas, and El Centro, 
California, immigrants were detained temporarily in “barns and fields.” Meanwhile, local 
governments recognizing “an opportunity in the Border Patrol’s lack of space and 
allowed the INS to rent beds for migrants in local jails.” As Hernández notes, renting jail 
space was “so financially successful for border counties that they invested in expanding 
their jail facilities to accommodate the thousands of migrants being apprehended.”323  
Yet, such contracts with immigration officials were not a new phenomenon in the 
early 1950s as county jails along the southern border had long been collecting revenue 
this way. Perhaps what may be striking is the way in which this era of exclusionary 
detentions culminated in the early 1950s with two simultaneous developments. On the 
one hand, arrests, detentions and deportations were accelerated along the southern border 
for much of this time period. Yet, on the other hand, formal detention facilities would be 
closed along sea ports after a change in policy in 1954. These two coinciding 
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developments would set the stage for the next phase in noncitizen detention when formal 
policy and detention numbers carefully hid an increasingly problematic reality for 
immigrants detained, especially along the southern border. 
Several policies along the southern border impacted the evolution of noncitizen 
detention in the early 1950s. In June 1954, immigration officials launched “Operation 
Wetback,” a “militarized, aggressive massive effort” in the Southwest to arrest and deport 
one million undocumented Mexicans.324 The operation, which was “conceived and 
executed as though it was a military operation,” involved about 750 immigration officers, 
Border Patrol agents, and investigators. Starting with apprehensions numbering about 
3,000 a day, the operation had arrested some 170,000 people within the first three 
months.325 Scholars have increasingly detailed the various causes and effects of this 
massive deportation campaign including its effect on detention. As Lytle Hernández 
points out, officials “arrested more Mexicans than they could handle. To hold the 
detainees, the officers turned public spaces into temporary detention facilities.”326 Less 
well analyzed is the impact on detention of a change in federal policy that came a year 
earlier. In June 1953, it was announced that all unauthorized immigrants arrested would 
go through the court system and be sentenced. This move away from the “voluntary 
departure” procedure meant that unauthorized workers would be given prison terms of 
anywhere from 30 days to six months. As the New York Times noted, “Instead of the 
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usual free bus ride back to the border when caught, the wetback will face a term in jail 
without pay.”327 Four days later, a group of 65 immigrants “most of them youths” from 
Safford, Douglas, and Nogales were given 30 day sentences after pleading guilty to 
illegal entry charges.328 In a single day in October 1953, 113 people were sentenced in 
the Phoenix district court to a month in the Florence detention camp before their 
deportation.329 In November 1953, 12 immigration prisoners received 30 day sentences 
while one received four months and another six months.330  
The result was overcrowded jails across Arizona. A week after the policy went 
into effect, nearly 500 immigration prisoners were held in county jails at Bisbee, Nogales, 
Tucson, Florence, Phoenix, and Prescott. Two federal work camps in Florence and 
Tucson were “filled near capacity.” The Florence camp was only used as an emergency 
since it was not eligible for use by federal marshals. Still, Florence had 60 immigrants. In 
one afternoon, district court Judge James A. Walsh sentenced 60 people “nearly all” of 
who got 30 days and some “repeaters got stiffer penalties.”331 As the Associated Press 
noted, “Southern Arizona jails are crammed with Mexicans caught jumping the border in 
search of farm jobs. And the situation is growing worse.”332 Overcrowded jails meant 
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conditions worsened. U.S. Marshal Ben Kinney stated, “Sometimes the prisoners 
complain that they haven’t enough room to sleep in but there isn’t much we can do.” 
Officials had to “stow the prisoners wherever they can find room, then haul them to court 
for disposition of their cases.” Pima County jail, for instance, had 148 federal prisoners 
and was built to accommodate about 80. It was further noted that if the situation got 
worse immigrants would “have to sleep standing up—they’ll be packed in so tight.”333  
Overcrowded jail conditions led to building new and expanding old facilities. In 
early February 1954, for example, the county jail in Phoenix, housed atop the Maricopa 
County Courthouse, was having “tremendous business” with 476 prisoners in a space 
built to accommodate 225. As the article noted, “When the jail is full, like now, 
sometimes almost 100 prisoners sleep on floor pallets.” The sheriff noted that the 
“situation will be eased somewhat” when the new county jail annex was opened.334 The 
county jail annex began operations in mid-March with a “spacious and well-equipped 
kitchen” where all meals would be cooked for 250 to 450 prisoners housed in addition to 
“a large, clean dining room for prisoners, an office and storage rooms.”335 Meanwhile, 
overcrowded conditions in other states was also leading to more federal prisoners in 
Arizona. For instance, around this same time, more prisoners from northern California 
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were sent to the federal prison camp in Florence and Tucson. The camps were already 
“drawing men from all bordering states, including northern California.” But the “chief 
change will be more prisoners from northern California.” Immigrants accounted for a 
great portion of those prisoners. As one article explained, for the past year, most 
prisoners at the camps “were Mexican nationals serving time for immigration 
violations.”336 
 
End of an Era 
As detention facilities were overwhelmed and new ones built and expanded along 
the southern border and elsewhere, official noncitizen detention policy was on the cusp of 
change driven by public outcry against Ellis Island. Conditions at Ellis had remained 
problematic for much of the first half of the twentieth century. A newspaper commended 
then Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins in June 1933 for her “determination to have a 
real probe of Ellis Island conditions,” and for assembling a committee for the 
investigation that embodied “efficiency, broad-mindedness and human sympathy.” As the 
article noted, immigration laws “are really incapable of being enforced in a genuinely 
humane way” but people detained at Ellis “are not criminals… at worst they are accused 
of illegal entry” so the system “need not be brutal” in its methods of exclusion. After all, 
Ellis Island “puts us on our defensive in the high court of world sentiment.”337 However, 
15 years later, conditions remained “intolerable.” CIO Leader Irving Potash described his 
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detention at Ellis inside a “small cell with no room to move around in, an adjoining toilet 
which could not be closed off even when in use, and a guard posted 24 hours a day at one 
of two small tables inside the cell.” Potash further explained that the “cell was so 
draughty that two of the prisoners came down with bad colds. The guard’s function was 
just ‘watching and listening.”338  
Detention at Ellis Island would end at the close of 1954 as official policy 
changed. In late July of that year, immigration officials announced they would move 
detention facilities off the island and into Manhattan where immigrants would be 
detained in a 12-story office building previously occupied by the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission. Edward J. Shaughnessy, district director at the INS living on the island, 
stated costs and savings for the government as primary factors.339 In October came word 
that there would be “no need for detention facilities” because a “much more lenient” 
system was on the way.340 Considering the timing, it may appear that this lenient policy 
was in response to political and diplomatic pressures faced by the U.S. government 
during the Cold War years. As scholar Mary Dudziak argues, “In spite of the repression 
of the Cold War era, civil rights reform was in part a product of the Cold War… At a 
time when the United States hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the 
international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and embarrassing… 
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The need to address international criticism gave the federal government an incentive to 
promote social change at home.”341 In light of previously mentioned international 
pressures, it is likely a more lenient detention policy followed a similar path. 
On November 11, 1954, Attorney General Herbert Brownell introduced the more 
lenient policy at a naturalization ceremony in New York. Brownell was “pleased to 
announce” a policy that “will make a vast improvement in one phase” in immigration 
enforcement. As Brownell noted, “It is one more step forward toward humane 
administration” of immigration laws. Brownell then explained, “In all but a few cases, 
those aliens whose admissibility or deportation is under study will no longer be detained. 
Only those deemed likely to abscond or those whose freedom of movement could be 
adverse to the national security or the public safety will be detained. All others will be 
released on conditional parole or bond or supervision, with reasonable restrictions to 
insure their availability when their presence is required by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.”342 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 had established 
a universal visa system that transferred screening to consuls abroad, negating the need to 
detain all new arrivals. Still, mandatory detention would continue under Section 235(b) 
since it dictated that anyone who “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 
admitted shall be detained.” However, Section 212(d)(5) gave the Attorney General 
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discretion to release rather than detain someone “for emergent reasons or reasons deemed 
strictly in the public interest.”  
Brownell stated that under the new policy “somewhat less than 1,000 might be 
detained in any given year in exclusion proceedings.” The effects were to be broad. 
Brownell stated, “The new detention policy is so far-reaching in scope and effect that the 
Department of Justice is discontinuing its six seaport detention facilities at New York, 
Boston, Seattle, San Francisco, San Pedro and Honolulu.” The next day, one article 
reported, “The seagulls took over Ellis Island today.”343 Ellis Island would be closed on 
November 19.344 As one article noted, “Ellis Island, once a picnic ground, then an 
arsenal, later a fort and finally the nation’s busiest immigration station, fell victim to lack 
of business.”345 Scholars have noted the significance of the policy change. As legal 
scholar Daniel Ghezelbash states, “From 1954 onwards, the US Immigration and 
Naturalization Service adopted a policy of using these parole provisions to release all 
arrivals, except those deemed to pose a risk to the community.”346 Loyd and Mountz 
argue that the INS “had ended its policy of mass detention (as at Ellis and Angel Islands) 
in 1954.”347 
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 Yet, the closing of Ellis Island raised significant questions about the nature of 
noncitizen detention itself that predicted future debates. In the weeks leading up to 
Brownell’s announcement, detained noncitizens at Ellis had been gradually transferred to 
federal detention facilities in metropolitan New York, including county jails.348 This 
brought the issue of noncitizens tangled in the criminal justice web to the forefront. In a 
letter to the editor in November 1954, Pearl Buck described the condition of those moved 
out of Ellis and into other detention spaces as “most unfortunate.” Buck wrote, “Here 
their plight is exactly the same as though they were common criminals. They are locked 
up with murderers, drug addicts and other degenerate types. Their food is inadequate, 
their bed mattresses dirty. They have little opportunity to get fresh air, and they must 
perform labor such as criminal persons perform.” Buck ended with a comment on family 
separation. She wrote that “husbands are separated from wives and children from parents. 
One lady from Rumania, for example, cannot see her 12-year-old son because no one 
under 16 is allowed to visit in the prison where she is incarcerated. The child is 
somewhere else in New York.”349  
The intermingling of noncitizens with “criminals” brought urgent calls for reform. 
A week after Buck’s letter, the New York Times questioned, “Should any detainees be 
thrown into prison? Also, regardless of where they may be housed, do existing laws and 
regulations give detained aliens sufficient protection from possible harsh and unjust 
treatment by immigration officials?” To the first question, they answered an “emphatic 
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‘no’ because jails house “those convicted or indicted by due process of law of having 
committed some crime.” Detained noncitizens, they noted, “haven’t even been accused, 
much less convicted, of anything.”350 After all, noncitizens held in detention are awaiting 
administrative, or civil, hearings to determine the resolution of their immigration cases. 
To justify the objection to immigrants being housed in jails, the article referred to Section 
242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 which stated, “The Attorney 
General is hereby authorized and directed to arrange for appropriate places of detention 
for those aliens who he shall take into custody and detain under this section.”351 The 
Times article argued that the provision made “no reference to the use of penal 
institutions.” The article concluded by urging that the government “has a special 
obligation to give aliens seeking entry every possible consideration, both for the sake of 
the aliens themselves and for the nation’s reputation.”352 The 1952 Act, which replaced 
the Immigration Act of 1917 while maintaining the national origins quotas, had been 
passed over President Truman’s veto.353 As Mae Ngai argues, “the retention of the 
national origins quotas reflected that logic which cast the native-born as the most loyal 
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Americans, especially whites of British and north European descent, and the foreign-born 
as subversive, especially Jews, who were imagined as Bolsheviks, and Italians, who were 
viewed as anarchists.”354 While quota policies remained in place, detention policy would 
continue to be debated. 
Discussions about where Ellis Island detainees were transferred to sparked back 
and forth strikes between federal immigration officials, the media, and the public. A week 
after Buck’s article, the Times printed a letter from M.F. Karman who had been detained 
at Ellis and later spent a week inside Eastview Jail. According to Karman, despite 
Shaughnessy saying that the jail was a “Class A” facility, there were many inadequacies: 
“the substandard food, dirty mattresses, lack of recreation and fresh air. Most serious is 
the menial prison work that detainees were required to do. Deplorable is the fact that 
there is an absence of any recreational facilities… Fresh air and exercise are dependent 
on the whims of matrons. Weeks pass before the inmates are taken to the roof of the 
prison.”355 The Times had printed that letter hoping the “actual experience of human 
beings is often more effective for reform than exhortation.” The same day, the Times 
reported that Sheriff Hoy of Westchester County was refusing to accept any more 
immigrants to Eastview Jail because he “did not like the idea” of putting people in jail 
without a conviction. After all, as the Times explained, “Jail is no place for detainees.”356 
The next day, Shaughnessy fired back saying immigration officials “now hold only fifty-
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six in detention,” despite Ellis averaging more than 200 before its closure. Commissioner 
of Immigration Joseph Swing added that the “disposition made of those who had been on 
Ellis Island should dispel fears that persons held on technicalities would be put into jails 
with hardened criminals. Such fears for those who may seek admission hereafter need not 
be entertained.”357  
Three days later, the Times mocked the “only fifty-six” immigrant detainees 
comment and retorted that the jailing of immigrant detainees raises a fundamental 
question best put by Representative Jacob K. Javits: “Are aliens ‘second-class human 
beings’ without the protection from abuse that should be everyone’s right?” Again 
referring back to Section 242 of the INA and its provision on “appropriate places of 
detention,” the article argued that prisons “can hardly be called ‘appropriate’ – at least in 
a civilized democracy.” As the Times noted, “Unlike the totalitarians and despots, we 
Americans abhor imprisonment by administrative officers’ fiat” and urged Brownell to 
do “his obvious duty.”358 Four days later, the INS rescinded the order to send detained 
immigrants to prisons and informed district directors that “under no circumstances may 
alien detainees any longer be placed in jail.” Immigration officials in New York were 
ordered to house all immigrants present and future at the Empire Hotel “pending the 
establishment of quarters at the agency’s headquarters.” But the move to the headquarters 
at 70 Columbus Avenue remained in doubt as the agency’s lease was set to expire and 
“the owner is not prepared to grant a renewal.”359 Still, hotels would only be for the 
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detention of “non criminal types awaiting deportation.” The Justice Department 
maintained that detention in jails would continue for “those aliens who are considered to 
be subversives or dangerous criminals.”360 
 Through a combination of domestic and international pressures concerning 
noncitizen detainees, Ellis Island had been shut down and detention policy was on the 
cusp of change. While objections to detaining noncitizens in jails seemed to have guided 
such debates, the practice did not end. In fact, as detention policy would change in the 
decades after 1954, noncitizens across the Southwest would be increasingly housed in 
jails and other detention facilities. Deemed the era of humane detentions by the federal 
government, it would be the final divergence between policy and reality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HUMANE DETENTIONS, 1954-1981 
While the closing of Ellis Island had been discussed starting in the late 1930s, it 
was not until the mid-1950s that such discussions came to fruition driven by financial 
motivations. In May 1954, a study by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
stated that the Island was not economically advantageous, and money could be saved if it 
was shut down.361 In late July 1954, Joseph Swing, then Commissioner of INS, 
recommended to Attorney General Herbert Brownell that Ellis Island be closed, and all 
immigration “business” be moved to the field office in New York City. As Swing 
explained, “this will mean not only a saving of $800,000 to $900,000 annually, but will 
provide for greater operating efficiency.”362 Four months later, when Brownell made the 
announcement of Ellis Island’s closure at a naturalization ceremony on Veterans Day at 
the Polo Grounds in New York City, he framed the closing as an introduction of a new 
“humane” immigration administration and enforcement era. Yet, perhaps the more than 
8,000 in line to become American citizens at the Polo Grounds that day did not realize 
the ceremony was a culmination of what historian James Patterson calls a “massive 
effort” in 1954 by the INS to actively promote “a more homogenous society” seizing on 
the “formidable patriotic fervor exerted by the Cold War.” 55,000 people were inducted 
into American citizenship that Veterans Days while the INS aggressively pursued 
campaigns to deport undocumented noncitizens.363  
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For his part, Brownell would later dispute notions that those years were an 
“undemanding time” by writing in his autobiography that it was in fact an era of “great 
change in response to significant political challenges both in domestic politics and in 
foreign affairs.”364 Part of those challenges lay in heightened security scares of the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Legal scholar Daniel Wilsher states after those years of upheaval 
noncitizen “detention nearly disappeared.” Pointing to the Immigration Act of 1952, 
which “created a range of parole alternatives even after deportation had been ordered,” 
Wilsher argues that the “new law was very liberal” and detention became “truly 
discretionary.” Moreover, Wilsher notes the Act introduced “important time limits” and 
that “detainees were not held longer than six months after a final deportation order.” All 
in all, Wilsher argues, “The 1952 Act was an important first expression by Congress of 
the need for alternative arrangements to separate out detention from deportation 
issues.”365  
Perhaps if the rhetoric of federal officials is believed, Wilsher’s argument holds. 
In early 1955, the INS celebrated the previous year as its “busiest year on record.” Swing 
attributed this to a mass roundup of Mexican “wetbacks,” a 50 percent increase in 
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criminal and subversive deportations, and nearly twice the usual number of 
naturalizations. As Swing pointed out, all this was in addition to the agency’s detention 
policies being “humanized.”366 The “humane” detention policy was quickly deemed a 
success. As Brownell reported at the end of January, “Only seventy-five aliens are now in 
immigration detention in this country.” Most of those detained are “housed in hotels or 
other facilities” maintained by the INS. Yet, Brownell added that this number was “not 
counting Mexican ‘wetbacks.’”367 Brownell further insisted that “operation wetback” had 
been “carried out ‘humanely’ in line with the Immigration Service’s new effort to put 
heart into the immigration laws.” The new detention policy was a further illustration of 
this purported humane administration. As Brownell noted, “We are giving both heart and 
conscience to the administration of immigration laws as American justice requires.”368 
Even the Supreme Court later commended the liberal policy in 1958 by writing: “The 
parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which needless 
confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted… Physical 
detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only as 
to security risks and those likely to abscond… Certainly this policy reflects the humane 
                                               
366 “1954 Busiest Year For U.S. Immigration Service,” The Arizona Republic, January 3, 1955, p. 
13. 
 
367 “Aliens in Custody Show Sharp Drop,” The New York Times, January 27, 1955, p. 25. 
Brownell further noted that “if an alien who has been previously released, or detained in a service 
or hotel facility, absconds or becomes physically obstreperous he may be held in immigration 
custody at an approved jail. Transfers to jail are made only upon the personal approval of the 
district director of the service, and a public record is made of such detention. It would be hard for 
there to be any abuse of this limited power.” 
 
368 “Wetback Apprehensions Drop From 3,000 to 300 Per Day,” The Morning Sun, January 27, 
1955, p. 16. Brownell further stated, “At the same time we are strictly enforcing the immigration 
laws against security risks, criminals, and other undesirables who are deportable more vigorously 
than ever before in our history.”  
 115 
qualities of an enlightened civilisation.”369 The official rhetoric of the federal government 
seems certain about this coming of a new age. 
 
A New Era? 
 Yet, this celebrated era of “humane” detentions laid the groundwork for the 
violent detentions that would begin in 1981. It did so in several steps. First, official 
detention figures either arbitrarily counted or completely discounted those noncitizens 
held temporarily in “southwest staging areas,” which maintained the fiction that 
detentions were no longer a de facto part of immigration enforcement. Second, these 
detentions nevertheless took place in both federal detention camps and local and city jails 
which had long been in the business of expecting federal funds for housing federal 
prisoners. These detentions stressed the aging infrastructure of these jails and led to 
massive overcrowding, which then called for reform through either building new 
facilities or updating old ones to improve conditions. Yet, taxpayers continually ignored 
these conditions and the plight of prisoners within these facilities by rejecting bond 
measures. Thus, local municipalities turned to the federal government for funding, which 
allowed for renovating, updating, and expanding prison and jail facilities across the 
Southwest. This era of humane detentions, therefore, saw not only continued 
apprehensions, detentions, and deportations of noncitizens in the Southwest but also the 
growth of the carceral infrastructure that laid the groundwork for the violent detentions to 
come. 
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 Analyzing the expansion of the carceral landscape during the era of “humane” 
detentions proves challenging for several reasons. While official national policy insisted 
that most noncitizens were not detained, it seemed to disguise the expansion of detentions 
in the Southwest with detention figures that were arbitrary at best and racist at worst. In 
1955, for instance, the INS reported that “only 184,000” noncitizens were detained “of 
which 173,000 were Mexican nationals who were detained for extremely brief periods 
pending their return to Mexico.”370 In June of that year, the New York Times alleged that 
the INS had “reversed its previous policy and is again throwing into jail aliens held while 
their cases are pending” and demanded “a frank explanation by whoever is responsible” 
for seven noncitizens held in the federal prison on West Street. The article acknowledged 
that immigration law allows authorities to detain individuals in “appropriate places” but 
argued that jails were not such places. Answering District Director Shaughnessy’s claim 
that six of the seven had served prison terms before, the article asks, “But isn’t this in 
effect punishing them twice for the same offense? And how about the seventh, who 
hasn’t been convicted of any crime? The public is entitled to the answers.”371 
The INS then began a haphazard policy of both counting and excluding Southwest 
“staging area” detentions in their annual reports. In 1956, they report that “only 145 
aliens in detention per day exclusive of those Mexicans held in staging areas.” The same 
holds true for 1957 when the “number who were detained, exclusive of those in staging 
                                               
370 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 
1955 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 17. 
 
371 “More Detainees in Jail,” New York Times, June 11, 1955, p. 14. 
 117 
areas in the Southwest, was 20,472.”372 Also that year, the INS instituted airlifts to take 
“hard core violators” who had repeatedly entered the U.S. without authorization “far into 
the interior of Mexico.” The airlifts would be cheaper than “housing and processing 
repeat violators” and was thought to be “effective in cutting down the number of repeat 
illegal entries.”373 In 1959, however, the INS reported that of the total 30,259 people held 
in detention, 20,125 were “other aliens, principally Mexicans, were assembled at Service 
facilities on the southern border for transportation to Mexico,” thus reversing their 
exclusionary counting policy.374  
Official statistics are further complicated by ambiguity. The year 1960 states a 
total number of 6,694 detentions but no further breakdown of who was detained. That 
report notes, however, that “three detention facilities on the Mexican border were used as 
staging areas for Mexican aliens scheduled to be returned to the interior of Mexico, either 
by bus and rail, or by airlift.”375 Culminating these years of arbitrary counting is the year 
1961 when official numbers reported that 10,272 were held in detention facilities. 
However, as the INS also reports, another “10,108 Mexican nationals were assembled for 
transportation back to Mexico at detention headquarters” and were not included in the 
detained figures.376 
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More broadly, detention facilities expanded throughout the Southwest during this 
era. While larger detention facilities at Ellis Island, Boston, San Francisco, and San Pedro 
were closed by 1955, contracts were awarded for the construction of a “detention 
establishment at El Paso, which serves as a collecting center for apprehensions in one of 
the most populated areas adjacent to the Mexican border.”377 A few weeks after 
celebrating the “humanizing” of detention policy, Swing announced plans to build this 
new alien detention facility in El Paso that was “in line with a new Administration policy 
designed to eliminate the holding of aliens in U.S. jails.”378 The plan was to build three 
barracks to house 200 aliens charged with illegal entry.379 By 1961, the El Paso facility 
was used as a staging area for deporting people from the north central section of Mexico 
and “taken by bus to Ojinaga, Chihuahua, thence by train to Chihuahua, Chihuahua.”380  
Explicit links between detention facilities and income for counties continued. In 
1957, for instance, a sheriff complained to the INS that the detention camp in McAllen, 
Texas was making his county jail lose income because federal prisoners are housed at the 
camp instead of at his jail and asked the INS to close McAllen. As the sheriff put it, “At 
considerable expense to the county we enlarged the jail by about one-third. But because 
prisoners were soon afterward moved to the McAllen camp, our county was left holding 
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the bag.”381 Several years later, the McAllen detention camp was closed and “a new, up-
to-date facility” opened at Port Isabel, Texas.382 In operation for eight years, McAllen had 
“housed thousands of aliens… for the most part they were Mexicans who illegally 
entered the United States looking for work.” People held at McAllen were then moved to 
similar camps in El Paso and Port Isabel.383 The sheriff had won. 
Such detentions took place amidst Cold War hysteria-driven national policies that 
expanded the carceral landscape. In 1969, the Associated Press quoted civil rights 
attorney, William Kunstler stating that the government had “set up six major detention 
camps and at least one of them contains some convicted draft resisters.” The Justice 
Department denied the allegation, “It’s all untrue. There are no such camps.” Yet, the 
attorney had visited the Allenwood camp and said the other five detention camps are in 
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the West.384 A few months later, Edwin McDowell, an editor of the Arizona Republic 
who later worked for the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, decided to 
investigate. McDowell states that he first heard of “concentration camps in America” in a 
“far left” magazine in 1966. Yet, McDowell notes that in addition to Charles R. Allen, 
Jr., Stokey Carmichael, Rap Brown, and “other militants,” even a “reputable 
organization” like the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) are all concerned with 
the detention camp issue. The JACL was giving high priority to S. 1872, a bill to repeal 
Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950. However, as McDowell notes, the campaign 
to repeal has not yet “picked up broad support because the general public refuses to take 
the Emergency Detention Act seriously.” The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 had 
authorized the attorney general to arrest and detain “each person as to whom there is 
reasonable cause to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will 
conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage” during internal 
security emergencies.385 McDowell clarified that while six locations had been selected 
and camps built in 1954, they were never used. McDowell continued, “By 1957, 
Congress decided there was no further need to maintain them, and it is no longer 
appropriated any money.” In the next line, McDowell writes, “The Florence camp is now 
a minimum-security federal jail for prisoners awaiting trial.”386 
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 Hearings regarding the repeal were held in 1970. Carl T. Rowan, a columnist at 
The Arizona Republic, claimed in March that the hearings will “remind millions of 
Americans of some of the most infamous days in the nation’s history,” referring to 
Japanese internment. Of the Emergency Detention Act, Rowan wrote, “This never-used 
law has been the basis of a lot of rumors in the last couple of years that ‘the 
establishment’ has plans to round up black militants, white revolutionaries, and other 
unpalatable dissenters and lock them up in the various detention centers authorized” by 
the Act. Citing the recent Chicago 7 trial against the Black Panthers, Rowan stated “there 
are ways to put troublemakers ‘on ice’ other than corralling them into anything that 
sounds as cruelly tyrannical as a concentration camp.” According to Rowan, what is 
needed is not only the repeal of the Act but also “some positive guidance and firm 
restraints set forth by Congress.”387 In September, the Justice Department urged the 
repeal of the law.388 Several weeks later, a House panel approved an amendment to the 
Act that an insurrection exist before detention powers are used and added new working 
that “no citizens of the United States shall be apprehended or detained pursuant to the 
provisions of this title on account of race, color or ancestry.”389 A year later, Congress 
passed the Non-Detention Act signed by President Nixon to repeal the law. Nixon stated: 
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“In taking this action, I want to underscore this Nation's abiding respect for the liberty of 
the individual. Our democracy is built upon the constitutional guarantee that every citizen 
will be afforded due process of law. There is no place in American life for the kind of 
anxiety–however unwarranted–which the Emergency Detention Act has evidently 
engendered.”390 The Emergency Detention Act then “passed quietly into history.”391  
Yet, accusations of the government running “concentration camps” continued in 
the 1970s, perhaps foreshadowing events to come in the next decade. Although the 
official national policy seemed to have remained in place, the 1960s and 1970s saw a 
steady increase in the numbers of those detained even despite the seemingly arbitrary 
counting methodology. From more than 34,000 detentions in 1962, detentions had risen 
to more than 94,000 in five years. In a 14-year time period, total detentions rose from 
34,512 in 1962 to 213,026 by 1975. Interestingly, the INS report from 1965 attributed a 
43 percent increase in initial admissions to “the result of the illegal influx of Mexican 
laborers seeking work after the “Bracero” law expired.”392 By 1968, detentions exceeded 
127,000. By 1970, this number had grown to more than 215,000 with non-Service 
facilities accounting for more than 121,000 of those detentions.393 By 1978, total 
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detentions had increased to 340,297. These figures are parallel and consistent with an 
overall increase in the number of apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol.394 Also during 
this time, records indicate that the INS used both Service and non-Service facilities as 
detention centers. For a period of eight consecutive years from 1964 to 1971, more 
noncitizens were detained at non-Service facilities than at Service facilities. The 
importance of non-Service facilities in studying the expanding carceral landscape proves 
invaluable because such facilities were and are paid to house noncitizen detainees as 
federal prisoners. Tracing the money received housing noncitizen detainees helps 
challenge the notion that this era saw a “humane” detention policy leaning away from 
detention and towards parole because localities received incomes from the detention of 
increasing numbers of noncitizens. 
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TABLE 1 INS Detentions in Service and Non-Service Facilities, 1962-79 
Year Service Detention 
Facilities 
Non-Service 
Detention Facilities 
Total 
1962 21,505 13,007 34,512 
1963 17,119 16,571 33,690 
1964 11,426 19,372 30,798 
1965 17,041 26,918 43,959 
1966 35,027 43,041 78,068 
1967 37,621 56,427 94,048 
1968 53,796 73,965 127,761 
1969 59,771 89,477 149,248 
1970 94,053 121,670 215,723 
1971 111,627 145,562 257,189 
1972 148,839 125,710 274,549 
1973 171,559 120,985 292,544 
1974 132,382 154,444 286,826 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
109,138 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
204,000 
103,888 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
112,312 
213,026 
N/A 
294,699 
340,297 
316,312 
Source: Entries compiled from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual 
Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office). 
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In order to accommodate the rising figures, INS expanded its facilities. In the first 
years of the 1970s, for example, contracts were awarded to build “an alien detention 
facility at El Centro, California; a bus repair garage at Port Isabel, Texas; border stations 
at Calexico and San Diego, California.”395 Total number of detentions remained above 
200,000 for much of the 1970s. By 1978, this number had increased to more than 
340,000. In addition to El Paso and Port Isabel, El Centro was the third and largest of the 
INS detention centers. The El Centro facility soon drew attention for its conditions. After 
less than a year in operation, activists charged the facility as a “concentration camp,” 
where people detained were kept for “months at a time with no regard for their legal 
rights” and are “not given adequate medical care.” Criticism also came from present and 
former members of the staff. One concern by both detainees and guards was poor 
ventilation especially in the Imperial Valley’s hot summers. Yet, INS officials reported to 
Congress that the “ventilation is adequate.” Moreover, longer detention times were used 
to threaten those detained. As former guard Antonio Benitez stated, “They used to tell us 
to get them to buy bus tickets so some guards tell the aliens it’s either a bus ride or 
another two or three months of waiting.”396  
Three years later, the Associated Press again reiterated the charge by describing 
the center as a “barbed-wire concentration camp.” The article noted that “mostly it is a 
sea of brown faces with looks of despair, people known only to their families in other 
countries and to U.S. immigration authorities.” While the vast majority of those 
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processed at El Centro are of Mexican origin, there are as “many as 25 nationalities” 
detained while people came from Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Utah, Idaho, 
Washington, Oregon, California, and Hawaii. James O’Keefe, district director of the INS, 
stated, “The centers are not ideal and we know it. They are way stations moving an 
endless wave of humanity from one country to dozens of others.”397 Two years later, the 
global contingent of detainees remained unchanged. As one official noted, “Every 
nationality under the sun comes through here at one time or another.”398  
A new detention facility in Brooklyn also came under fire soon after it opened. As 
one article noted in 1976, “There is no visible evidence on the outside that would 
describe the Immigration facilities in Brooklyn as a ‘concentration camp’” responding to 
critics.399 The facility had opened a year ago on the fifth floor of Building 300 at 136 
Flushing Avenue, where the Naval Support Activities Headquarters was housed. 70 
detainees were transferred from the INS building at 20 West Broadway in May 1975.400 
As one article described, “The top floors of four of the buildings toward Park Avenue are 
covered with iron bars and the glass windows are shut tight that no movement inside can 
be seen from the street.”401 The center held noncitizens from around the world. As one 
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INS official noted, “It’s a real mixture. We have as of yesterday, for instance, people 
from China, Lebanon, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Mexico, Trinidad, San Salvador and 
Guatemala.” But more than half the population was from the Western Hemisphere – 
Mexico, Central and South America. The facility, however, did not hold women. As the 
INS official stated, “When and if we do have an occasion to detain them, they are sent to 
Rikers Island.”402 A year later, there were 150 detainees at the Brooklyn facility and 9 
women in a special wing at Rikers Island prison.403 
Conditions at the center brought criticism and an eventual lawsuit. One reporter 
stated after the visit, “Originally established as a navy prison, the facility can best be 
described as crude and antiquated.” There was no privacy. The detained “use an open 
toilet facility that offers no privacy whatever. There are no individual rooms or cells… 
The men sleep in three large dormitories furnished with bunk beds and arranged in three 
rows of about fifteen in each row.”404 To protest conditions at the Brooklyn detention 
center, the Committee Against Racism held a march in mid-June 1976. Members stated 
they were “marching and demanding a full investigation of the living conditions… 
particularly, health facilities, crowding, treatment of persons being detained and 
Department of Immigration raids, which they say are increasing where people work.”405 
Yet, conditions did not improve. In March 1979, the New York Civil Liberties Union 
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filed suit alleging noncitizens at the center were subject to “cruel and unusual 
conditions.” The class-action suit, filed on behalf of Man Chung Lam, a 28-year-old 
native of China, alleged that “up to 120 men are detained in two locked dormitories 
where the lights are kept on all night and that they are punished arbitrarily by being 
placed in isolation cells for up to three weeks at a time with no opportunity to appeal their 
punishment.” INS responded that “three ‘night lights’ were kept on in the dormitories for 
‘surveillance’ because ‘we’ve had a number of escapes.” The lawsuit further alleged 
noncitizens had no opportunity to meet privately with their attorneys and that most 
detainees remain at the center for an additional three weeks after a deportation order had 
been entered.406  
As his case, Lam Man Chung v. Bell, et al., was making its way through the 
federal court system, Chung was deported.407 During a city regional hearing in 1980, INS 
stated the facility “is by its nature minimal.” However, experiences at the center 
depended on length of stay. The INS noted, “For the average stay, which is 6.5 days, and 
for perhaps up to a month, the facility probably does not deny detainees their 
constitutional rights. However, in the relatively rare cases where persons must be 
detained for longer periods, the facility falls short.” Yet, this was being remedied. As the 
INS noted, they had recently contracted with the Bureau of Prison’s Metropolitan 
Correction Center in New York City to “take, as transfers, all aliens when their detention 
surpasses thirty days. INS is also preparing to spend about $300,000 in improvements to 
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the New York Service Processing Center. The shortcomings of the present facility are 
being considered to prevent their replication in the new center.”408  
Detentions in the Southwest continued to expand throughout the late 1970s. In 
August 1977, there were a “record 35,000 illegal aliens” arrested in the San Ysidro area 
in California and “almost 70,000” north of Los Angeles. That same month, the chief 
Border Patrol agent in the Tucson area reported arresting “3,100 aliens.”409 These arrests 
contributed to the overcrowding situation at Pima County jail. As one editorial noted, 
“On the average, 110 of the jail’s inmates are federal detainees – mostly illegal aliens 
awaiting deportation hearings.”410 In 1977, there were 294,699 recorded detentions while 
the next year the figure hit 340,297.411 In the fiscal year 1979, more than 204,000 people 
were admitted into INS Service Processing Centers and another 112,312 were admitted to 
non-Service centers. Most of the admissions were in the southwest and 93 percent were 
of Mexican nationals.412 At the same time, detention conditions drew both national and 
international attention. In June 1974, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Emilio O. Rabasa, 
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sent a “diplomatic protest note” to the U.S. government over the treatment of 
unauthorized migrant workers. Rabasa’s note specifically mentioned the operation of 
detention centers. Rabasa wrote, “The Ministry considers that the existence of these 
detention centers, whose title already indicates a situation which must be remedied, do 
not contribute at all to resolving the problem. On the contrary, it is worsened.” The note 
further called for “fair and humane” treatment for those arrested and held for 
deportation.413 Yet, unlike when the British protested conditions at Ellis, diplomacy this 
time heeded no results. That same day, another news story described Mexican-American 
rights activists calling for congressional investigations in U.S. immigration policies all 
along the southwest. Herman Baca, chairman of the ad hoc committee on Chicano rights, 
stated that allegations of corruption in the INS should be further investigated although “to 
us of the Chicano community, the alleged charges are old and have long been common 
knowledge. Baca noted that deportations are expected to total 1 million for fiscal year 
1974 and this “will ultimately result in numerous violations of people’s civil and 
constitutional rights.”414  
As new facilities were built, officials celebrated the modern facilities and their 
conditions. One example is the INS facility in El Paso, Texas. That facility had originally 
been located on South Hammett street but was moved in October 1967 following the 
Chamizal Boundary Treaty, which turned over that land area to Mexico. A new Border 
Patrol sector headquarters along with a detention center “built as inconspicuously as 
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could be,” located behind the Border Patrol office was built on 27 acres of federal land at 
a cost of $700,000.415 As the officer in charge of the facility explained in 1969, “The new 
facility doubled the holding capacity of the old facility. Moreover, it is more modern, less 
congested, and less like a prison. None has ever escaped detention here and only one 
escaped the old facility just prior to moving here.” Yet, for detainees, El Paso was known 
as “El Corralon” (the large corral) after learning of the facility from former detainees. 
The compound is enclosed by a 12-foot wire fence with a “mil electrical” charge. The 
officer in charge insisted, “They [the detainees] are usually amazed at the treatment they 
receive.”416 Five years later, El Paso being compared to a prison continued. As the New 
York Times noted, even though detention centers are “not actually prisons, there are many 
similarities.” As the article explained, “Detainees sleep in large dormitories inside 
compounds surrounded by tall wire fences. Although they are not required to work, not 
even to clean up their beds, those who volunteer to do so are fed extra treats and are 
given cigarettes.” But most noncitizens apprehended by Border Patrol were not brought 
to the detention center. Instead, the vast majority are “taken across the border in vans and 
‘dumped.’” In May, Border Patrol had arrested 11,000 in El Paso but only “about 1,000” 
were brought to the detention center. The others were “Taken across the river to Juarez 
and released on the streets.” Of those brought, some were either facing formal 
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deportation charges for multiple entries or others were from small towns in the interior of 
Mexico.417  
The expansions of detentions across the Southwest meant the construction of 
temporary facilities while waiting for facilities to be expanded or built. Conditions at 
these temporary sites would soon become problematic. For instance, in 1977, the Los 
Angeles Times ran an article describing the conditions inside a temporary detention 
facility in Bell, California. Representative Edward R. Roybal (D-California) then visited 
the facility after seeing the article and stated it was “fit to house only ‘dog food’” and that 
it was “dehumanizing and in complete disregard of human rights.” The facility 
“resembling a large cage about 10 feet tall” was constructed inside a large warehouse and 
included “crude toilet facilities and limited seating.” As the Times described further, “It 
had no heating or air conditioning and had only three toilets – one of them a ‘portable 
potty’ – and two unsheltered urinals to serve the male detainees, who numbered up to 
200. There was seating for no more than 80 persons.” The facility was used “from two to 
four times a week” when the “regular holding tank” at the federal building at 300 N. Los 
Angeles Street in downtown was overcrowded. Local INS officials had said people were 
held at the facility only “for a few hours” and it was meant to be temporary until a 
permanent facility was completed in the downtown federal building. The INS 
commissioner ordered the facility closed; however, it “would be reopened if it can be 
brought up to standards.”418 That would prove unnecessary. A few months later, the new 
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permanent facility in the basement of the federal building opened. As the Times noted, 
“The new facility has a capacity of 350 detainees, 50 each in seven separate holding cells. 
Each holding cell is enclosed in tinted glass and has two stainless steel toilet bowls built 
into its walls.” Readers were further reassured, “Just as at the controversial Bell facility, 
most detainees are held only a few hours before being expelled or paroled.”419 
Another cause of the rising detention numbers was because of those held as 
material witnesses against human smugglers in the late 1970s. After serving his 18-month 
prison sentence for the Watergate scandal in Safford, Arizona, John Ehrlichman 
published two articles in the Arizona Daily Star in 1979 taking up “the cause of Mexican 
aliens.” According to Ehrlichman, one reason for overcrowded jails in Arizona is because 
people are being held as material witnesses. Ehrlichman writes,  
The U.S. marshal in Arizona says there isn’t room for all of them in federal 
detention facilities, so he contracts with rural sheriffs to keep the Mexican 
witnesses in their jails. This is good business for the Arizona counties. In one 
county jail, the sheriff gives his prisoners cheese sandwiches twice a day but 
draws $11 a day from the U.S. marshal for the care and feeding of each federal 
prisoner.420 
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But this good business was not limited to Arizona. In Brownsville, Texas, for 
example, 10-year-old Silvia Alvarado and her grandmother, María González-Mejía, were 
detained in a county juvenile detention center for 25 days. The two were caught at the 
border by Border Patrol while attempting to make their way to Virginia, where Silvia 
believed her mother was living. Her grandmother was held in case she was needed to 
testify against the man accused of having smuggled them. The ACLU filed a class action 
against the Justice Department for “unlawfully and unnecessarily” jailing hundreds of 
noncitizens seized in alien-smuggling cases. U.S. Marshals estimated that in the last 
fiscal year “15,000 adult aliens and 900 children will have been held as witnesses in local 
and Federal jails for up to three months. There are no reliable estimates on how many 
children will have been incarcerated while waiting for their parents or guardians to 
testify.”421 
 
Federal Prisoners in Arizona 
Despite the official policy change in 1954, detentions on the ground operated 
under a different reality, particularly in Arizona. By the time Arizona started making 
national headlines for its punitive approach to immigration enforcement, it had long been 
accustomed to using noncitizens, grouped together with all other federal prisoners, to 
expand its own carceral landscape. In particular, negotiations with INS for immigration 
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prisoners as well as non-Service facilities proves significant for this expansion. 
Analyzing the Board of Supervisors minutes in counties across Arizona during the era of 
humane detentions shows some evidence in the way in which the contracting of non-
Service facilities helped build the carceral landscape in Arizona during the era of 
“humane” detentions. Specifically, non-Service facilities continued receiving federal 
money to house prisoners.422 Within six counties analyzed in Arizona, for instance, the 
income received for housing federal prisoners is listed under “receipts from sources other 
than taxation.” Three counties show trends of peak incomes received for housing federal 
prisoners in the 1960s.423 Though incomplete and few in number, the existing records of 
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receipts of federal funds reveal the expansion of detentions in Arizona throughout this 
era. This expansion and buildup would lay the groundwork for the violent detentions to 
come. 
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TABLE 2 Yavapai County, Arizona Board of Supervisor Minutes, 1949-73 
  Receipts from sources other than direct taxation: Board of Prisoners 
 
Fiscal Year 
Budget 
Adopted Budget 
(Past FY) 
Actual Receipts 
(Past FY) 
Estimated Receipts 
(Present FY) 
1949 $7,500.00 $5,883.50 $6,000.00 
1950 $6,000.00 $5,314.00 $5,000.00 
1951 $5,000.00 $3,371.00 $3,600.00 
1952 $3,600.00 $3,950.00 $3,600.00 
1953 $3,600.00 $2,228.00 $2,000.00 
1954 $2,000.00 $4,610.00 $3,000.00 
1955 $3,000.00 $6,043.50 $5,000.00 
1956 $5,000.00 $5,717.50 $5,000.00 
1957 $5,000.00 $4,894.50 $4,000.00 
1958 $4,000.00 $8,930.50 $7,000.00 
1959 $7,000.00 $10,461.50 $7,569.74 
1960 $7,569.74 $7,948.50 $7,500.00 
1961 $7,500.00 $7,817.25 $7,500.00 
1962 $7,500.00 $7,482.55 $7,500.00 
1963 $7,500.00 $7,468.75 $7,500.00 
1964 $7,500.00 $13,520.00 $13,000.00 
1965 $13,000.00 $9,942.00 $9,000.00 
1966 $9,000.00 $4,886.00 $5,000.00 
1967 $5,000.00 $4,303.00 $5,000.00 
1968 $5,000.00 $6,014.25 $5,000.00 
1969 $5,000.00 $4,628.20 $4,500.00 
1970 $4,500.00 $5,205.75 $5,000.00 
1971 $5,000.00 $5,908.00 $5,000.00 
1972 N/A N/A N/A 
1973 N/A $6,195.00 N/A 
Source: Entries compiled from Yavapai County Board of Supervisor Minutes, Arizona 
State Library, Archives and Public Records. Phoenix, Arizona. 
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Maricopa County provides a demonstrative example of the expansion of the 
carceral landscape during this era. Throughout the 1950s, there is evidence that 
overcrowding jail conditions in the county worsened. In October 1958, for instance, a 
superior court judge was “deeply distressed by the many women, some of them pregnant, 
having to wait in line as much as an hour before getting to visit prisoners” in the county 
jail. The judge called the situation “inhumane.” She and another judge noted the “acute 
need for expanded jail facilities” and agreed that the public should be “awakened to the 
cramped conditions in the courthouse, and especially in the jail.”424 Yet, the public would 
not be awakened. Blame was passed around. County Manager Tom M. Sullivan noted in 
November 1959, “The board has, for years, been keenly aware of the crowded conditions 
in the county jail. In fact, this administration has twice submitted bond issues to the 
electorate which would have solved the problem. In each instance the citizens of 
Maricopa County defeated the bond issues.” This foreshadowed county officials turning 
to the federal government for funding they deemed necessary. A citizens committee was 
appointed, with a Phoenix hotel operator as chairman and assisted by Stanford Research 
Institute, to evaluate the situation.425 Two years later, the situation remained unresolved. 
The County then requested a special inspection by the Federal Bureau of Prisons over “its 
overcrowded, obsolete jail.” Despite being built for 200, the jail was housing as many as 
600 men and women in recent years. There was even a threat that “unless something is 
done to improve conditions, the bureau will discontinue holding federal prisoners 
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there.”426 As even Sheriff Boies admitted, “We are sitting on a powder keg. It’s a wonder 
something bad hasn’t already happened there.”427  
 Yet, something bad was coming. The Bureau of Prisons inspections reported that 
the Maricopa County jail was “terribly overcrowded” and that the “management of the 
jail was seriously handicapped” because of this. However, there were no “complaint of 
mistreatment or improper operation of the jail.”428 Despite this and the potential of a bond 
election in May that could have authorized several millions for new facilities, change did 
not happen. Six months after the Bureau of Prisons inspection, federal officials moved all 
the federal prisoners from Maricopa County jail. The move came on the heels of the 
torture of 19-year-old William Fernando Champlin, Jr., who had been continually beaten 
by other federal prisoners for two weeks. Champlin stated that he had “been the victim of 
a ‘kangaroo court’ during which an attempt had been made to hang him with his trouser 
belt.” Under the “personal order” from Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the Bureau of 
Prisons moved the 52 federal prisoners to other jails in Florence, Casa Grande, Prescott, 
and Tucson.429 Although Sheriff Boies would not comment, his chief deputy stated, “This 
is their [BOP] move so let them make the comments. The county jail is the same as it has 
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been in the past 10 years. We know it and they know it.”430 Perhaps it was evident that 
those involved in the detention process knew about the nature of the conditions. A few 
days later, federal prison officials offered remedies for the county jail which they deemed 
“a jailer’s nightmare.”431 The County eventually cancelled its agreement with the federal 
authorities, which meant it would not be receiving federal money for housing 
prisoners.432 Other jails in Mesa and Scottsdale were then used as temporary lockups for 
federal prisoners including the Arizona State Prison, where the warden stated that a “few 
‘tough’ federal prisoners would pose no problem at the crowded” facility.433  
 Sheriff Boies’ powder keg eventually exploded in early 1963. At 2:30 p.m. on 
January 2, prisoners at the Maricopa County jail set fire to mattresses and blankets in two 
of the nine tanks. The “blazing riot” lasted about four hours. The Arizona Republic 
described, “Scores of armed deputies and city police converged on the scene as smoke 
and flames poured from the outside windows of cells holding the rampaging prisoners. 
Ringleaders of the riot said they wanted public attention brought to what they termed 
unhuman conditions.” Sheriff’s Capt. Dave Edwards stated, “I used two canisters of tear 
gas when I saw they weren’t going to pay any attention to me.” Two hours into the 
situation, firemen “used high-pressure hoses aimed into the two tanks containing the 
troublemakers.” Deputies continued firing tear gas into the tanks. According to the story, 
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the riot quieted when an Arizona Republic reporter “went into the cellblocks and 
promised the prisoners their grievances would be aired and something would be done if 
there was any foundation to their complaints.”434 A second story quoted an unnamed 
“prisoner spokesman,” who said the riot began when prisoners lost their privileges after 
someone had whistled out of the window at someone on the street below. He apparently 
insisted there was more to come, “That’s just a little taste. Let them come in here and 
you’ll find out what we’re going to do.” He further stated that someone went into an 
epileptic fit after tear gas was fired into the tank. That same person had been “refused 
medical care a week ago when he suffered” a fit. The rioters repeatedly demanded, “Get 
rid of Edwards” because repeated requests to see him go unanswered. As the 
spokesperson noted, “We ask for him, but he never comes up here. We’re human beings, 
too, even if we are in jail. We just want our privileges and some decent meals. That ain’t 
too much to ask for.”435  
 The uprisings continued for a second day. This time prisoners “secured barred 
doors with strips of blankets. Then they refused to emerge as ordered.” Sheriff Boies 
ordered deputies with ax handles and billy clubs to “use necessary force” to “compel 
inmates to behave.” As Boies stated, “I want you men to understand that I’m the boss of 
this jail, and I’m not about to let you tell me how to run it. You’ll abide by the rules set 
by my office or suffer the consequences. I’m here to tell you that I’m not going to take 
any more nonsense from any of you men. I’ve ordered my officers to use any force 
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necessary to put down any further disturbances.” After the riot was subdued, the county 
board estimated damages at about $10,000.436 Despite complaints voiced about the food, 
Boies further insisted, “The food here is good. In fact, it’s a damn sight better than a lot 
I’ve eaten.”437 The riot was quieted without meeting demands. Yet, Boies laid partial 
blame on the “shamefully overcrowded” conditions at the jail. This was to be alleviated 
by a new county jail, located between Jefferson and Madison from First to Third avenues, 
to be completed in early 1964.438  
Riots and attempted riots continued at the county jail. In July 1963, mattresses 
were again burned in an uprising that “recalled a similar riot in the same cell block in 
January.” About 40 mattresses were burned “by disgruntled prisoners” in a riot. Club-
wielding deputies eventually ended the two-hour uprising. All mattresses were then 
removed from the tank. As Chief Deputy Bill Deatsch put it, “If they want to burn their 
mattresses they can sleep on the springs. They’re in jail and the sheriff says we’re going 
to run the jail the way we think it should be run.” Deputies were not certain who 
instigated the uprising but believed one person responsible was Ernesto Miranda, who 
was scheduled to be taken to the Arizona State Prison the next day to start his 45-to-50 
year sentence.439 In September, two potential riots were cut short when the Sheriff’s 
office was tipped off. As one article noted, “All available deputies in the office took off 
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their pistols, grabbed their night sticks and rushed into the jail elevator. The 
demonstration was quickly quelled.” As punishment, those involved in the uprising were 
forced to sleep without their mattresses.440 Federal prisoners would be kept away from 
the Maricopa County jail for the next decade. Eventually their return in the 1970s would 
bring back federal revenue.  
Situations at the Pinal County jail further demonstrate the ebb and flow of federal 
money coming in and ongoing negotiations with federal authorities. In January 1962, six 
federal prisoners escaped from the county jail by sawing the bars. Getting a saw inside 
the jail would not have been a challenge. As Sheriff Laurence White explained, “It’s 
easy. This jail was built for looks, not security. The jail’s on the ground floor. Why, 
someone could stick a machine gun through the bars without any trouble. Once, a 
prisoner sawed his way out with razor blades. They can twist those bars and it’s pretty 
hard to detect.”441 Despite all six being recaptured by the next month, the Board of 
Supervisors voted to close the jail to federal prisoners and stated the jail was adequate for 
county prisoners only.442 Yet, less than two weeks later, the Board agreed to continue 
housing the federal prisoners at the jail for another 30 days after a meeting with federal 
officials.443 Inevitably, money was promised because this was later extended with a new 
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contract where the county would receive $2 per day for each federal prisoner.444 In 
February 1963, Pinal County again renewed their contract to house federal prisoners in 
the county jail until March, while awaiting completion of the new federal jail at the 
prison camp in Florence.445 
Pinal County also housed the prison camp at Florence, which continued pulling in 
federal money. Several public vouchers show in detail the names of federal prisoners, the 
per day rate, and total amounts earned by the county for those held in Florence. For 
instance, a voucher for December 1961 paid to the Pinal County Board of Supervisors by 
the Department of Justice shows a total amount of $1,499 for housing prisoners for 858 
days at a rate of $1.75 per prisoner per day for 66 total prisoners. The price then 
increased to $2 a day.446 While it is difficult to ascertain what percentage or what 
prisoners were specifically held on immigration-related charges, there is evidence that the 
prison camp had been housing federal prisoners, including immigration detainees, since 
the early 1950s.447 In April 1962, President Kennedy asked Congress for $300,000 to 
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build a federal jail in Arizona. The detention facility would be built at the prison camp 
and hold those awaiting court appearances.448 While the camp housed 223 minimum 
security prisoners, the new funds would allow authorities to house higher security 
inmates. Of the allocated money, $240,000 would be used to build a new maximum-
security cell block at the camp with remaining $60,000 used for improvements on 
existing facilities. Until the facility is built, Pinal County offered the use of the county jail 
for maximum security prisoners.449 By November, construction was under way for the 
facility that would include three 20-man dormitories. Because the new federal jail will 
also not include rooms for female prisoners they would continue to be housed at the Pima 
County jail in Tucson.450 The BOP’s new maximum security federal detention center was 
formally dedicated on March 15, 1963. The total cost had amounted to more than 
$325,000 while all the concrete blocks had been made by prisoners themselves. The new 
facility was expected to relieve the overcrowding at Pima County jail and remove 
prisoners from Pinal County jail. A 21-year veteran of the Bureau of Prisons, Robert 
Burns, was put in charge of the facility along with 11 guards, two of whom were 
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transferred from the decommissioned Alcatraz.451 Three years later, the detention center 
had 60 to 70 prisoners and 19 guards. 
 By the mid-1960s, the prison camp’s population decreased. As Loyd and Mountz 
explain, “With this reduction, the BOP indicated that ‘a substantial portion’ of the 456.5 
acres it currently maintained would become available for other users.”452 After operating 
for 15 years, the federal prison camp in Florence closed by the end of 1966 and the 
government declared the area “surplus property.”453 Negotiations ensued between local 
and state officials over who would take the property. In late 1967, more than 400 acres of 
the camp were transferred to the Florence Chamber of Commerce. It was thought the land 
would be developed for “municipal recreation, education facilities and possible industrial 
site development.”454 The city attorney wanted to turn the property into an industrial 
park.455 Florence seemed to be on the rise. Three years later, a news article had declared 
in 1970 that Florence was a “town too tough to die.” Harkening back to its glory days, the 
story evoked nostalgia for the wild west past. Comparing Florence to the likes of 
Charleston, Benson, Patagonia, Globe, Payson, Prescott, and Tombstone, the article 
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described, “Like those towns, oldtimers were tough because they had to be. They were 
adventurers because they had no choice.” The story ended, “Every lover of the real Old 
West has to define it and find it for himself. There are still places to look as long as towns 
like Florence survive.”456 Yet, Florence began 1970 by being sued by the Arizona 
National Guard and the Arizona Department of Corrections, who alleged that the city 
renegaded on a deal to lease one-fifth of the former prison camp property back to the 
state for 50 years at $1 a year.457 Yet, that year the Florence Industrial Authority sold 600 
acres of the camp for $700,000 to the Western American Land and Cattle Co. of Phoenix. 
The company planned to use the land primarily as a residential community, to be known 
as the Florence Gardens.458 The next year, one article declared that after falling on hard 
times, Florence was “building again.”459 Eventually, the BOP will transfer their detention 
center, about a mile south of Florence Gardens, to the INS. During the era of violent 
detentions, Cubans detained at the INS facility would destroy it in protest of prolonged 
detention. The riot would be quelled, and the facility rebuilt. That rebuilt facility still 
functions as a Service Processing Center today. 
Meanwhile, during the era of humane detentions, Pima County in southern 
Arizona provides another illustrative example of detentions and negotiations over federal 
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prisoners expanding the carceral landscape. In the late 1950s, Pima County jail was 
approved “only as a holding jail” for federal prisoners who were moved out after 
sentencing.460 The jail had been built in 1923 and was housed on the second floor of the 
courthouse. In addition to federal prisoners including “immigration (wetbacks), both men 
and women,” the jail also housed city, county, and South Tucson prisoners.461 The 
County received tens of thousands in revenue for housing federal prisoners.462 Accounts 
surrounding the Pima County jail indicate that some of these federal prisoners were held 
on immigration-related charges. For example, when prisoners at Pima County jail set fire 
to mattresses in 1960 to protest medical policy, the undersheriff blamed the federal 
prisoners “most of them illegal immigrants, whom he said the county has no choice but to 
accept.”463 Pima County Sheriff Waldon Burr, however, believed the prisoners had set 
the fire “in the belief they could gain access to a jail corridor during the ensuing furor.”464 
A year earlier, Burr denied a story alleging that overcrowding conditions at Pima County 
jail had sent “a busload of aliens – to be airlifted back into Mexico” to the Santa Cruz 
County jail in Nogales. Burr had insisted that Pima County jail’s “federal wetback tank” 
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holds 100 prisoners and that he did not know “offhand how many are in it at the moment, 
but it is not full or crowded. We could put a great many more prisoners in it.” 
Alternatively, and perhaps just in case, Burr also noted that federal officials often move 
“wetbacks” to border cities and hold them “overnight and sometimes longer” before 
sending them back to Mexico so he could not “see anything unusual about their being at 
Nogales.”465 Either way, such descriptions like the “federal wetback tank” point to the 
way in which detentions were still operating along the Southwest in the era when official 
policy said they did not. While clearly delineating the discrepancy between policy and 
reality, these detentions would continue to expand under a different regime after the 
1980s. 
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TABLE 3 Pima County, Board of Supervisor Minutes, 1948-74 
  Receipts from sources other than direct taxation: Prisoners’ Keep 
 
Fiscal Year 
Budget 
Estimated Receipts 
(Past) 
Actual Receipts Estimated Receipts 
(Next) 
1948 N/A $22,436.30 $20,000.00 
1949 $20,000.00 $29,735.25 $25,000.00 
1950 N/A N/A N/A 
1951 $25,000.00 $26,871.70 $26,000.00 
1952 $26,000.00 $48,430.24 $35,970.61 
1953 $35,970.61 $42,504.40 $40,000.00 
1954 $40,000.00 $54,119.10 $50,000.00 
1955 $50,000.00 $55,398.75 $50,000.00 
1956-1962 Not Available 
1963 $45,000.00 $46,702.30 $48,000.00 
1964 N/A N/A N/A 
1965 $55,000.00 $43,886.20 $45,000.00 
1966 $45,000.00 $46,821.95 $50,000.00 
1967 $50,000.00 $66,072.50 $70,000.00 
1968 $70,000.00 $68,072.50 $90,000.00 
1969 $90,000.00 $92,224.00 $100,000.00 
1970 $100,000.00 $130,731.25 $258,000.00 
1971 $258,000.00 $305,569.34 $300,000.00 
1972 $300,000.00 $342,633.10 $367,000.00 
1973 $367,000.00 $317,572.02 $300,000.00 
1974 $300,000.00 $456,896.12 $600,000.00 
Source: Entries compiled from Pima County Board of Supervisor Minutes, Arizona State 
Library, Archives and Public Records. Phoenix, Arizona. 
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Throughout the late 1960s, Pima County’s estimated receipts for housing federal 
prisoners matches quite closely with money actually received, which seems to indicate 
how county officials could uncannily predict the inflow of prisoners into their jails. Or, 
perhaps they were numerologists. Regardless, this funding steadily increased as the years 
went by. From 1965 to 1974, the income received by Pima County for federal prisoners 
increased more than ten-fold.466 Moreover, the County received more money for federal 
prisoners than for city and county prisoners because of the high turnover attributed to 
federal immigration prisoners. For example, in 1968, the County received $3.50 a day per 
federal prisoner, which covered food and was also “prorated to cover the costs of 
bedding, lights, laundry, power, jailers’ time and jail upkeep.” It was noted that the rate 
was 50 cents higher than for city and county prisoners because a “generally greater 
turnover of federal prisoners ups the cost of such items as laundry.” This was particularly 
true for immigration prisoners “such as ‘wetbacks’” who “usually are not held in the 
county jail as long as other prisoners.”467 In 1969, the price went up by $1.75 to a new 
per diem of $5.25. In August of that year alone, the county pulled in more than $11,800 
for housing federal prisoners and the money was deposited into the county general 
fund.468  
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Despite the income drawn in with federal prisoners, their conditions of 
confinement remained dismal, which questions the quality of services the federal 
government was paying for. In 1970, in response to a reader’s question about the 
conditions of confinement and the number of federal prisoners in the county jail, the 
Arizona Daily Star noted, “The county gets $5.25 per day for boarding each federal 
prisoner. It is true that some are confined for more than a month in jail awaiting trial, or 
transportation to prison.” As to the number, the newspaper stated, “The number of federal 
prisoners in jail here varies widely, especially when a large number of persons are held in 
a roundup, such as that of aliens who have entered the country illegally.” Conditions were 
noted as somewhat the same as others incarcerated in the county jail. According to the 
newspaper, “the cells are windowless, but air is pulled from outside by the air-
conditioning system. However, their opportunities for exercise are limited to the jail cells 
and corridors since they cannot become trusties as some non-federal prisoners can.”469  
As federal income came in, however, plans were put in place for a new jail 
perhaps in an attempt to address the conditions. In June 1964, federal officials met with 
Undersheriff James Wyckoff to discuss construction details of a new facility. As one 
article noted, the U.S. marshal “houses federal prisoners in the county jail and therefore 
has an interest in jail construction.”470 A few days before the meeting, six people, two of 
whom were federal prisoners, had escaped from the Pima County jail. All were later 
apprehended and charged.471 The new $700,000 jail was nearing completion in 
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October.472 In April 1965, 165 prisoners from the old jail were transferred to the brand 
new facility on West Ajo Way. The new jail was supposed to accommodate 250 people 
and “meet the county’s needs for 15 to 30 years.”473 Yet, this would prove to be an overly 
ambitious expectation. 
There were no qualms about the link between federal money received and jail 
expansion. In August 1970, Sheriff Burr unequivocally noted that the “money paid to the 
county for housing federal and city prisoners is earmarked to help finance expansion of 
jail prisoners.”474 As expected, the new jail would not meet the needs for long. Expansion 
would be needed again at the end of the year as overcrowding compelled Burr to ask the 
Board of Supervisors for a $1 million jail addition. According to Burr the situation was 
“pressing,” and the proposal would be “more of a demand. We can’t crowd many more 
people into the jail.” Half the money would come from federal funds and the other half 
from “revenues the jail receives for housing city and federal prisoners.” As one article 
notes, these revenues totaled $200,000 and are “kept in a special fund.” Additionally, 
immigration enforcement was a significant factor because the Border Patrol alone paid 
the County “about $25,000 a month.” This filled the county coffers. Burr stated, “I think 
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there is enough money so the addition won’t cost the taxpayers any more in the way of a 
bond issue. But we can’t wait until it catches up with us.”475  
Here, federal prisoners played a key role. As Burr noted, “The jail was built for 10 
years but we’re pushing the walls out after six. If the Border Patrol brought in a heavy 
load of wetbacks (Mexican nationals caught entering the U.S. illegally) today, they would 
be sleeping on the floor.” Burr hoped the addition would alleviate trouble at the jail 
including “fist fights between inmates, attempted suicides and homosexual activity.” 
There had been “one inmate who tried to kill himself three times and that the fist fights 
occur nearly every day.” Additionally, federal prisoners required separate treatment. As 
Burr put it, “Even if a federal prisoner is lying there dying, we have to get a U.S. Marshal 
before the prisoner can be removed to a hospital.”476 The addition was thought to 
possibly allow the County to ask for an increase in the federal prisoner rate of $5.25 a 
day. However, not everyone agreed with Burr’s taxpayer-less funding plan. Although the 
city and federal government paid the county more than $32,000 per month for housing 
prisoners, County Supervisor Dennis Weaver stated, “that may not be enough to match 
the costs of running the jail and providing prisoner space.”477  
Immigration prisoners specifically were still providing some of this income. 
According to Burr, “One entire dormitory cellblock is contracted to the federal 
government for detention of federal prisoners – mostly illegal entrants from Mexico. The 
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number of men coming and going from that cell during a week’s time averages about 
150.”478 In at least one instance, immigration prisoners were robbed by officials at the 
county jail. In November 1970, Gerald David Marlar, along with three others, filed suit in 
the U.S. District Court against Sheriff Waldon V. Burr and five deputies for brutal 
treatment. Specifically, Marlar alleged that in processing noncitizens of Mexican descent 
on September 10, deputy Gregory “Red” Treahand had collaborated with some prisoners 
to “force the aliens, as they deposited their personal belongings in envelopes, to sign the 
envelopes indicating they contained less cash than they surrendered.” When Marlar, who 
had been acting as the interpreter, objected, he was transferred to a different cell and 
given “no mattress or blanket and forced to sleep on the floor.”479   
 Prisoners continually reacted against the overcrowded and dismal conditions. For 
example, in September 1970, about 30 of the 282 prisoners took over the jail for nearly 
an hour while holding deputies hostage. They succeeded in releasing about 100 men out 
of their cells. Deputies wielding shotguns eventually regained control. When one of the 
ringleaders, Robert Fierro, was caught he “begged to be shot rather than sent to prison.” 
Fierro and another man, Rocky Moore, had smuggled in a revolver through a trustee. 
According to Deputy Sheriff Michael Barr, “The 30 or so who went on the rampage 
picked up fire extinguishers, broomsticks, mop handles, and other articles, but laid them 
down when they saw the shotguns.”480 Federal prisoners, in particular, continued to 
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challenge the conditions of confinement. In February 1971, 15 federal prisoners were 
transferred to the Pima County jail after seven of them allegedly led a riot at the Santa 
Cruz jail in Nogales. Other prisoners were removed by immigration officials.481 The 
rioting in Nogales had left that jail unable to be used by federal prisoners. Dismissing 
initial reports that the prisoners had rioted because of inadequate jail food, the sheriff 
there later claimed the riot had involved drugs. Santa Cruz County Sheriff Zeke Bejarano 
said, “As the disturbance began, I approached the cell and asked the prisoners what they 
wanted. ‘Give us a kilo of marijuana,’ one prisoner answered. ‘We’ll settle for that.’”482 
When Bejarano ignored these demands, the prisoners started a fire. According to 
Bejarano, the riot eventually ended when “prisoners started to become asphyxiated form 
smoke in their burning cell.” Blame fell on aging infrastructure. As Bejarano complained, 
“We’re facing danger here daily. We just can’t control prisoners in this antiquated 
jail.”483  
 The blame also fell on the federal government for housing federal prisoners there. 
As one news article explained, “These federal felony suspects are hard-core types, 
desperate men, and more often than not are narcotics users.” Perhaps it helped the 
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argument that about seven of the riot instigators had in fact been federal prisoners. Sheriff 
Bejarano stated, “They had weapons, made by tearing out strips of the metal walls and 
chunks of exposed pipe. They intimidated the other prisoners into following them.” This 
implicated both aging infrastructure and practical considerations. Calling the jail “a time 
bomb that could go off again at any moment,” the analogy was combined with the aging 
infrastructure: “The bomb’s shrapnel is composed of metal and stone – the huge, 
dungeon-like blocks of stone used to build the jail in 1903, and the corroded metal cells, 
so decomposed the prisoners can tear off strips to make themselves knives and daggers.” 
Additionally, there were practical considerations of all prisoners being placed in a single 
tank. As Bejarano noted, “We have no way of segregating hard-core felons from 
Saturday night drunks and kids caught overstaying their work permits from Mexico. We 
have no individual cells. They all go into the tank.” Such indiscriminate housing not only 
harkens back to the debates of the 1950s that questioned whether noncitizens should be 
held in jails but also foreshadows the eventual criminalization of immigration itself. 
That tank was described as “an unbelievable hole, a filthy, dripping, kennel that 
would get a dog owner fined for keeping an animal there.” The article further described, 
“The tank has bunks for 30 men, yet it often holds 50. It has two toilets. It has a shower, 
but who needs it. The exposed water pipes pour down enough water day and night so a 
man is always soaked. An open hole in the floor regurgitates the day’s garbage.” In 
Bejarano’s defense, he had “been yelling” since he became a sheriff in 1963 for a new 
jail. Yet, that did not help the prisoners. One 16-year-old prisoner named Roberto from 
Jalisco had crossed the border to earn a few dollars and was at the jail on the night of the 
riot. As a federal prisoner, the government would have paid the County for his care. 
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Roberto explained the events that unfolded, “If I didn’t join the rioters, they would have 
killed me. If I did, I was afraid the deputies might shoot me.”484 Yet, federal officials 
continued housing prisoners at the jail based on alleged need. Rep. Morris K. Udall (D-
Tucson) contacted federal officials about their prisoners. Norman A. Carlson, director of 
the Bureau of Prisons, replied: “We do use this jail for the housing of federal prisoners, 
but only on a limited basis. We know that the jail is overcrowded and has only minimal 
supervision and housekeeping standards, however, the volume of federal prisoners in this 
area makes it necessary for us to continue to use it for holding our prisoners for a period 
less than 24 hours.”485 As a border county, perhaps “volume of federal prisoners in this 
area” referred to those like Roberto who were held on immigration violations. 
Nevertheless, Roberto’s plight, and anyone who was similarly situated, demonstrates the 
conditions he faced at a time when national detention standards were deemed humane. 
 Trouble at the Santa Cruz County jail continued the next year. In September 1972, 
after a “mass escape attempt,” deputies “were able to herd 30 prisoners into the 
antiquated, four-cell middle tank in the center of the high-ceiling room.” Those locked 
inside then reacted by “breaking up the trays by bending them between the bars of the 
cells. When officers attempted to interfere they were bombarded by rock fragments.” 
There was reportedly “serious damage” to the structure. Sheriff Bejarano stated, “We will 
accept no federal prisoners and no felony cases from the Nogales Police Department until 
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after repairs are made.”486 Seventeen of the 30 men were transferred from the jail 
immediately and the “13 left were confined to a four-cell maximum security cage, in the 
middle of the high-ceilinged 25- by 35-foot jail” with “16 bunks and one toilet in the 
cage.” All federal prisoners were then moved to Tucson.487  
 Meanwhile, back in Tucson, overcrowding continued at the Pima County jail. In 
March 1971, Jesus Ricardo Leyva-Marquez, a federal prisoner held on drug charges, 
answered to the name of a noncitizen who was asleep and was deported. Or as Burr put it, 
he was “definitely freed in Mexico.” Despite federal prisoners normally being separated 
between immigration violations and other charges, overcrowding had “forced jailors to 
place federal prisoners charged with being illegal entrants in the same tank with federal 
prisoners accused of committing felonies.” Additionally, jail officials did not fingerprint 
or photograph “suspected illegal aliens” but after the escape Burr wanted to ask, “Federal 
agencies to begin using plastic bracelets as identification tags for all their prisoners.”488 A 
hunger strike at the jail in November 1971 to protest jail conditions was short-lived 
allegedly because, as acting Sheriff Michael Barr put it, it was “poorly organized.” At the 
time the jail housed 349 people. The petition had listed demands asking for better food, 
clothing, medical attention, and better treatment of prisoners by jailers. Barr dismissed all 
allegations as a “way of getting attention” except that there “was some justification to the 
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charge of poor medical treatment, but only among federal prisoners.” As Barr explained 
it was not within the jurisdiction of the county to transport those prisoners to the hospital 
and “the lack of speedy treatment for them may be due to poor communication with 
federal authorities.”489 Despite the overcrowding, escape, and the brief hunger strike, the 
acting sheriff still deemed the jail “way ahead of any other jail in the Southwest” several 
months later.490  
Overcrowded conditions brought inspections and calls for reform. In February 
1972, a team of “specialists,” including representatives from the Washington State 
Bureau of Corrections, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, and architects from the National 
Clearing House of Programming and Architecture, deemed the jail “inadequate.” 
Following Sheriff William Cox’s request, the team had been sent by the Arizona Justice 
Planning Agency. The Agency had been created by Executive Order in 1968 by Arizona 
Governor Jack Williams to implement two major federal laws passed that year.491 The 
team reported the “jail was inadequate from the time it was built seven years ago; not 
able to handle more than 100 prisoners humanely.” The jail then had more than 300 
people.492 Two weeks later, Superior Court Judge Lee Garrett demanded an immediate 
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investigation into alleged brutal beatings and sexual assaults of prisoners at the county 
jail.493 The need for a new facility to relieve overcrowding was blamed on the federal 
government. As Board Chairman Jim Murphy stated, “They (the federal government) are 
forcing us to build a larger facility when no other county is forced to share the 
obligation.” According to Murphy, no other “Arizona county houses an average 150 
federal prisoners as long as Pima County does.” Yet, unhappiness with the contract 
seemed to go both ways. As U.S. Attorney William Smitherman retorted, the Board “has 
been threatening to throw us out of the jail, but that wouldn’t bother me a bit. We pay 
them $286,000 a year to house our prisoners and we get about 15 cents worth of service.” 
Smitherman relayed the experiences of federal prisoners at the county jail. He stated that 
prisoners get “beat up and raped in there. One of our prisoners gets beaten up, the FBI 
goes over and asks for an investigation and there’s no one there who will investigate 
this.”494 
At the same time, Sheriff Cox continued calls for a new jail. Under the federal 
Justice Planning Agency, a study was conducted into jail conditions at Pima County. At a 
conference releasing the results of the study, Cox claimed, “An entirely new jail is the 
only solution.” The study, while praising Cox for efforts made to correct current issues, 
blamed the jail’s construction. A correctional programs advisor with the Bureau of 
Prisons stated in the study that the jail was a “monstrosity of design, impossible to 
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adequately supervise.” According to the advisor, the jail was completed with the 
“assistance of the Southern Steel Corporation and a local architect who apparently had 
never seen a jail before.” One recommendation made by the report was to house “illegal 
aliens, misdemeanor suspects, and ‘selected sentenced prisoners’” in the city jail annex. 
Cox saw only one option, “The new jail would be a regional facility that would also 
house federal prisoners from Pima, Santa Cruz, and Cochise counties.” Cox thought there 
was a “good possibility” federal funding would pay some of the estimated cost which was 
“in the millions.”495  
A week later, the Board of Supervisors gave Cox approval to apply for a grant to 
study the feasibility of building a new jail. Additionally, the Board considered an idea to 
cut the jail population in half by dropping the contracts with the city and the federal 
government. Federal prisoners were a unique point of contention. As Chairman Jim 
Murphy noted, “Our county jail is the only one in the state that houses federal prisoners.” 
According to Murphy, there would be no reason federal prisoners could not be sent to 
Florence to await trial so that local taxpayers did not have to pay the bills.496 However, 
Sheriff William Cox did not think such as proposal would solve all the problems and 
specifically noted the $5.25 per diem rate the County received for federal prisoners. Cox 
stated that the County received about $300,000 a year to house federal prisoners and “last 
year received $89,000 from the city and about $22,000 from the Border Patrol to house 
their prisoners.”497 In a more immediate move, a week later 35 prisoners were moved to 
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the county jail facility in Ajo to relieve overcrowding. As the sheriff’s information officer 
noted, “We’ve had over 400 prisoners here (in Tucson) all week.”498 Several days later, 
of the 400 prisoners still held at the county jail, 160 were federal prisoners.499  
The next month, the Board met with federal officials to discuss removing federal 
prisoners from the county jail at a time when they made up “almost 50 per cent of the 400 
inmates” being held at the jail.500 Negotiations between federal and county officials were 
tense. Threats were exchanged at a meeting in April 1972. When the County supervisors 
threatened not to renew the contract to house federal prisoners in the county jail after the 
July 1 expiration date, Smitherman asked for as much notice as possible if this course of 
action was taken and then said he would ask the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) “to take a hard look at the $500,000 bloc money” granted to 
local law enforcement agencies. This not-so-thinly veiled threat was significant as the 
LEAA dispersed substantial funds at that time. In fact, as historian Elizabeth Hinton has 
pointed out, the LEAA was the fastest-growing federal agency in the 1970s, where its 
budget grew from $10 million in 1965 to $850 by 1973.501 Block grants were a large 
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component. As Hinton explains, “Federal policymakers used block grants to empower 
state planning agencies to develop their own path for the War on Crime by funding local 
projects and programs of their choice… In order to be eligible for LEAA grants, 
governors had six months to organize local and law enforcement officials to craft a 
criminal justice improvement plan. Once the LEAA reviewed plans… each state received 
a grant of at least $100,000 with additional funds available based on their population.”502 
If Smitherman’s threat materialized, the County could stand to lose hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in federal block grant money. 
As the back-and-forth went on, more immediate action was taken to attempt to 
alleviate the overcrowding at the county jail. The U.S. Marshal said he would attempt to 
transfer about 40 or 50 federal prisoners to other federal institutions leaving about 100 
federal prisoners at the jail.503 Days later, federal officials moved 31 prisoners from the 
county jail to facilities in Bisbee, Prescott, and Florence.504 But county officials were not 
the only ones raising red flags about the conditions at the jail. As federal officials met 
with the Board of Supervisors about housing federal prisoners, the city of Tucson, too, 
objected to the conditions faced by their prisoners. As Mayor Lewis Murphy noted, “The 
revolting inhumane conditions that I know exist there are intolerable in terms of the city’s 
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responsibility to the accused person. I want to get our city prisoners out of the county 
facility.”505  
 Weeks later, overcrowded conditions continued to draw warnings about trouble 
brewing. “It’s an above-ground dungeon. It was intended to be a humane institution, but 
that’s not the way it turned out,” stated one of the original planners of the jail. The jail 
was deemed “an invitation to mayhem” and a place that appears a “little better than an 
18th-century madhouse,” where you have “all the ingredients for a riot.”506 At the same 
time, drugs and alcohol arrests were held responsible for the overcrowding. A deputy 
commander at the jail estimated that “80 per cent of the county and federal prisoners are 
brought in on drug charges or drug-related offenses.” Officials seemed bewildered at 
drug related arrests rising since the 1960s. Pete Rubi, a supervisor at that time, stated, 
“Nobody figured then that we’d have a rash of drug prisoners. We had only a few federal 
prisoners, wetbacks, detained for a few days and then sent to the federal youth camp on 
Mt. Lemmon.” Dennis Weaver, another supervisor, noted, “Marijuana came into use, and 
the government has swamped us with federal prisoners.” Still, noncitizens were 
referenced as continuing to be a part of the problem of the jail population. Of the 150 
federal prisoners in total, about “20 of them are Mexicans illegally entering the United 
States, and they are detained only two or three days.” Objections continued to be raised. 
Supervisor Thomas Jay insisted, “I think a county jail should be a county jail, and not a 
regional prison.”507 Yet, an editorial in the Tucson Daily Citizen challenged the 
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contention of one supervisor that “drug offenses were virtually unheard of in 1965 when 
the jail opened.” The editorial stated, “A check on Citizen files shows that drug arrests in 
Pima County were increasing rapidly as long ago as 1953” and insisted, “The jail no 
longer is adequate or even up-to-date. It hasn’t been for years. It’s becoming more and 
more obvious that the jail was ill-conceived, improperly used by too many governments 
and carelessly supervised for too many years.”508 Perhaps jurisdictional overlaps had 
created too many complications. 
 The time had come for one government to take over. In late April 1972, the Board 
of Supervisors gave formal notice to the city and the federal government that contracts 
would be terminated unless there was a solution to the overcrowding. At that point, the 
average county jail population averaged “slightly under 400” people with about 50 city 
prisoners and 150 federal prisoners. Excluding all other prisoners would mean the 
population would come within capacity. Chairman Jim Murphy wanted city and county 
officials to come together to apply for federal funds jointly to solve the “detention and 
correctional problems.”509 Several days later, the Bureau of Prisons stated they would 
move between “80 and 100 federal prisoners” out of the Pima County jail. Federal 
officials insisted they would also try to “reduce the time remaining federal prisoners 
spend in jail from an average of 40 days to 20 days.” The prisoners removed from the jail 
would be transferred to Florence which will “not be enlarged, but more beds and other 
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essential items will be provided,” according to a federal official. Supervisor Thomas Jay 
noted that while the government was not yet “off the hook,” now the “door has been left 
open for the continuation of a county-federal jail contract.” In fact, as for the County to 
formally notify the federal government that the contract may be terminated, Murphy 
stated, “I don’t know that it is necessary now.”510  
 Various attempts were then made to ease the overcrowding all of which involved 
the use of additional facilities and none of which attempted to even mention underlying 
causes of the overcrowding. In May 1972, for example, federal and city officials 
considered reopening the old city jail farm, on Silverbell Road about one mile north of 
Grant Road near the west bank of the Santa Cruz River, to house both city and federal 
prisoners.511 Meanwhile, federal officials had begun to transfer 80 to 100 federal 
prisoners “to ease the pressure,” where the majority would go to Florence. Mayor Lewis 
Murphy believed overcrowding would get worse in the future specifically because of 
immigration prisoners noting the “federal government’s stepped up control-and-arrest 
program” along the Mexican border from Texas to California.512 This correlates to a time 
when distinctions between drug arrests and immigration enforcement in the U.S.-Mexico 
borderlands was starting to blur. As historian Kelly Lytle Hernández has pointed out, “By 
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the early 1970s, U.S. Border Patrol officers reported that the line between drug 
interdiction and migration control had become almost too difficult to decipher as it 
became increasingly difficult to distinguish between illegal immigrants and drug 
smugglers.”513 Reopening the old city jail annex would then relieve overcrowding in the 
county jail but it was believed this would be only “a temporary measure.” The annex 
would be used primarily for those accused of misdemeanors, including federal, county, 
and city prisoners.514  
The City of Tucson, in particular, was keenly interested in seeing the reopening 
take place. In early 1971, the city had requested Post Auditor Mrs. Irene F. Curry to 
examine options to move away from housing city prisoners in the county jail due to 
expensive procedures and faulty record keeping by the County. According to Curry, since 
most of the city prisoners were “drunks,” the 118-acre jail farm would provide an ideal 
solution. Curry noted, “Rehabilitation and detoxification could be accomplished for many 
of these prisoners through hard and healthy labor on the prison farm” where prisoners 
would raise crops, chickens, cows, and sheep. Roger O’Mara, the city manager, further 
noted, “Revenues from the farm products could very well make the jail annex self-
sufficient,” although he acknowledged that this option might involve “some legal 
problems.”515 Regardless, by the next year, Pima County revenues were used to restore 
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the farm. “The barracks-style facility, surrounded by chain-link fences topped by barbed 
wire, is being rehabilitated with $30,000 of county money,” noted one news article.516 At 
the end of May 1972, after some initial hesitation from the Board of Supervisors, a deal 
was eventually reached between the county and the city to reopen the old jail annex to 
relieve overcrowding.517 
While those jail farm negotiations were taking place, the per diem price for 
federal prisoners increased in June 1972 from $5.25 to $8.50 because of “rising costs 
involved in the keeping of prisoners.” The County anticipated “no difficulties” with the 
Bureau of Prisons accepting the new rate.518 Along with this new “maintenance increase,” 
there would be a limit on the total number of federal prisoners allowed to be admitted to 
the county jail. Per the agreement, no federal prisoners would be accepted when the 
prison population reaches 275 at the jail and 125 at the soon-to-be-opened city farm 
jail.519 At the same time, Judge Lee Garrett was again calling attention to conditions at 
the county jail. Garrett stated, “I have had complaints of cases where seriously injured or 
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ill prisoners went unattended for as long as eight days although they begged for medical 
care. Other judges also report such cases. It’s a terrible situation.”520 A year earlier, the 
Pima County Health Department had requested Sheriff Burr to “correct health 
deficiencies” at the jail. The letter from the Health Department stated the jail was 
“overcrowded and there is an insufficient supply of bedding. Mattresses are not in good 
repair and there are no covers. Blankets are not clean nor are they disinfected daily. A 
few inmates do not have blankets or mattresses.” One guard had stated that “week-old 
bread is served to the inmates.” Moreover, cockroaches were sometimes in some jail 
tanks, and floors, walls, ceilings, toilets, and washbowls are “not cleaned regularly.” At 
the time of the investigation, one urinal had been blocked and a toilet in another tank was 
not operating properly. Despite these conditions, the letter noted that the “overall 
construction of the jail was satisfactory.”521 Sheriff Burr blasted the report as “lacking all 
the facts.” According to Burr, the Health Department “talked only to the prisoners. 
They’re not going to give any establishment a good name.” He did not account for the 
details of the report that could have been ascertained without prisoner testimonials.522 
By October 1972, a newly renovated jail annex was opened at 3100 N. Silverbell 
Road to house minimum security prisoners. The annex would “house only inmates jailed 
on misdemeanor charges, all trusties and federal immigration detainees.” However, 
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Sheriff Cox emphasized the annex was “only a stopgap measure” while the County 
looked at “long-range plans to enlarge jail facilities.”523 Security standards perhaps 
remained less tight. In June 1973, for instance, three federal prisoners to be deported after 
their prison terms escaped through an open air vent. Others were preparing to follow 
before the opening was discovered by deputies.524 The next year, the federal prisoner rate 
increased from $8.50 to $9.50, which was expected to “add $35,000 each year to jail 
funds.” At that time, of the average 250 jail population, nearly half, about 110, were 
federal prisoners. The jail commander, Earl Rowe, planned to use the money to buy 
“light green jumpsuits, 15 color televisions and athletic equipment” in addition to electric 
shavers available to all of the male and female inmates at the jail. As Rowe noted, “It’s 
part of our rehabilitation program. After all, you can’t rehabilitate a man until he’s in 
jail.” Chief Deputy Lee B. Pitzer echoed the sentiment, “These additions are designed to 
make life a little easier for the inmates.”525 The next year, amidst lawsuits from prisoners 
asking for more showers, reading materials, clean clothing, and bedding,” the Board of 
Supervisors inquired from Sheriff Cox on the progress of his year-long jail improvement 
program. Cox responded that “the majority of the recommendations have been 
implemented.”526 However, not all was well inside the jail and transfers were coming. A 
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month after Cox’s response, there were two further disturbances in the jail’s C Tank. In a 
purported attempted to alleviate overcrowding, twenty prisoners, half of those coming 
from the C Tank, were moved to the Maricopa County jail.527 The Public Defender’s 
office filed a lawsuit arguing these prisoners were denied access to attorneys because of 
the transfer to Phoenix and asked they be returned to the Pima County jail. Sheriff’s 
deputies maintained the move was “to prevent violence in the jail here and relieve 
overcrowding.”528 Despite continued per diem increases for federal prisoners housed at 
the county jail (about half the population on average) that continued to bring in federal 
income, overcrowded conditions remained. 
Yet, by the next year, overcrowded conditions remained, and conditions were ripe 
for another increase in per diem rates. In March 1975, an editorial in the Tucson Daily 
Citizen stated, “It is a fact that Pima County needs a bigger jail.” Despite reports of 
“beatings, rapes, and unhealthy conditions – all of which are intensified, and probably 
often caused, by the overcrowding,” the “most important” issue was the “effect on the 
crime rate.” The editorial argued overcrowding would mean more people would be 
released. In the end, the onus was on the public. “The county jail, admittedly, is not a 
glamor issue and is one voters no doubt would rather not have to think about. However, 
they are being forced to face the problem as crime grows more and more threatening,” the 
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editorial argued.529 In April, the jail was so overcrowded that federal prisoners were 
turned away and not for the first time. In that instance, officials had turned away women 
prisoners because the 35-bed women’s dorm was full with three women sleeping on 
mattresses on the floor. Federal officials kept several others at the Santa Cruz County jail 
in Nogales while refusing to give a concrete number of how many were turned away. As 
the U.S. marshal put it, “We don’t discuss our problems with the press.” Sheriff Cox 
continued to lament, “There is no relief in sight for the packed jail.”530 
Nevertheless, such fatalism would hardly address overcrowding issues. A Pima 
County supervisor suggested either an increase in the amount charged to the federal 
government for housing its prisoners or the building of a new federal prison in Tucson as 
ways to ease the overcrowding.531 Questions of who would pay for a new facility 
dominated discussions among County officials as attempts were made to raise the federal 
$9.50 per diem rate.532 In June 1975, the Board of Supervisors set aside $150,000 for 
designing a detention facility while anticipating a possible $10 million bond for a new 
jail. Meanwhile, Sheriff Cox wanted to increase the federal prisoner rate to $25 per 
prisoner per day although actual costs were “about $18.50.” The higher cost of housing 
federal prisoners, then accounting for 25 percent of the jail population, would go toward 
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paying for a new jail, which was estimated to cost more than $10 million.533 Cox wanted 
federal officials to build a regional jail in Tucson to reduce the federal prisoner 
population but was not hopeful that this would happen. “The federal people tell us that if 
they build one in the Southwest, it will be in El Centro (California) because of the large 
number of federal prisoners they say they handle over there,” Cox explained.534 But that 
did not prevent County officials from soliciting the regional prison. Several months later, 
the County filed a $6-million grant approved by the Arizona Regional Justice Planning 
Agency to pay for the majority of a new 600-bed regional jail. If approved, the public 
would be off the hook as the $10 million bond issue would become a moot point.  
In the soliciting process, the County sought to establish their unique position 
among jailors in the Southwest because of the housing of federal prisoners. “We’re 
telling the federal government that we know of no other situation like Pima County in the 
Southwest or the rest of the United States. This is why we think the federal government 
should be involved in helping us build a jail. We’re just too cramped as it is,” Cox 
argued.535 At the same time, negotiations continued for an increase in the per diem rate. 
Ultimately, such negotiations proved fruitful. In October 1975, the federal government 
agreed to a rate of $21 per federal prisoner per day. Federal prisoners then made up about 
a third of the jail’s population. The finance director estimated that the County “will 
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collect an additional $800,000 to $1 million a year in increased payments for 
prisoners.”536 The jail was remodeled at the end of 1975, expanding the capacity from 
254 to 318. However, this was not deemed a permanent fix. As one news article put it, 
“the growth of the prisoner population will probably quickly outstrip it.” In December 
1975, there were about 290 people in the jail including 43 federal prisoners. During the 
remodeling, another 50 federal prisoners were held in Nogales, Phoenix and other county 
jails in Southern Arizona.537  
Despite the remodeling, dismal conditions remained. The next year, two people 
held at the jail set their mattresses on fire because they had “not received a change of 
clothing for at least two weeks.” While admitting the men “had a legitimate complaint,” a 
representative from the sheriff’s department nevertheless stated, “they were using the 
clothing delay as an excuse to cause trouble.”538 At the same time, 18-year-old Jose 
Manuel Aguirre had been held at the Pima County jail for 33 days without charges 
against him. Apparently, Aguirre was held to be a material witness in an investigation of 
a deputy who arrested and later assaulted him. That deputy had handcuffed an injured 
Aguirre and transported him to the hospital in the trunk of his patrol car. Aguirre was 
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treated, released, and charged for assaulting the police officer. Although the charges were 
dismissed the next day, Aguirre was “still in jail as a federal prisoner on charges of 
violating immigration laws.” The head of the local immigration office denied allegations 
that Aguirre had been held that long without charges being filed for financial reasons. As 
the official put it, “I would never leave a prisoner in there for a month at $21 a day.”539 
Five months later, there were 470 people housed in the jail as investigations into beatings 
and suicides “re-focused public and official attention” on the facility. The Board of 
Supervisors indicated that instead of acceding to Cox’s recommendation of a new jail 
facility, most of them would “like to see the sheriff get out of the jail business.”540 This 
would prove to be wishful thinking. 
Overcrowding also continued into the 1970s in Maricopa County. Four years after 
the new county jail was built, it was beyond capacity. One deputy indicated the situation 
was approaching a “critical” point. Sheriff’s deputies attributed the conditions to the 
“rising crime rate, the increase in population and higher bonds for criminal suspects.”541 
Yet, purportedly increasing crime rates were hardly a new phenomenon. As scholar Mona 
Lynch argues, “although Arizona did experience a crime bump during the 1960s and 
1970s, the state had experienced a relatively high crime rate throughout its history 
(especially theft-related crime), so it was not a new concern within the polity. Arizona 
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also experienced a population bump over the same period, so even to maintain the same 
rate of incarceration that had hovered around 100 per 100,000 citizens in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the capacity of the system would still have had to increase.”542 Perhaps 
planning ahead, the new Maricopa County jail was constructed so a two-story addition 
could be included at a later date. The jail addition would reportedly cost the county $1.5 
million.543 But financial help was available. A few months later, the County was 
considering a $225,000 federal grant from the LEAA to expand its jail facilities, which 
are “now bursting prisoner capacity.” At that point, a total of 701 prisoners were housed 
at the jail. A sheriff’s official noted that the jail is “filled to capacity at all times now.”544  
Two years later, Maricopa County signed a new contract with the federal 
government for housing federal prisoners after abstaining for a decade. The price was 
now $8.50 per federal prisoner per day for up to 50 prisoners as space allowed. 
According to U.S. marshal Pat Madrid, the contract would save the federal government 
thousands of dollars a year. As Madrid states, “We have been using the Federal Detention 
Center at Florence for the bulk of our prisoners since 1961. By using the county jail–only 
four blocks from the federal court building–we’ll save countless man-hours and expense 
involved in transporting these prisoners to and from court appearances.”545 Yet, the 
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conditions had hardly changed since the last time the county jail housed federal prisoners. 
The year after federal prisoners returned, protests again erupted at the jail. In September 
1974, two fires were set to mattresses, paper, and bedclothes. There were disagreements 
about the grievances that caused the protests. While some deputies reported that the 
prisoners were protesting the “midnight curfew on television watching,” others attributed 
“part of the problem” to overcrowding. Either way, at the time of the protests, there were 
“about 700, almost 100 more than the building was designed to hold.”546  
 In 1976, the Bureau of Prisons sought to build a detention center in Tucson or 
Phoenix modeled after their new high-rise facility in San Diego. The San Diego facility 
was apparently “so plush that it has been called a Hilton hotel.” Yet, opponents had a 
different take. As one news article noted, “Critics of the center call it the ‘Tijuana Hilton’ 
or the ‘Hotel Mexicano’ because more than half the inmates are illegal aliens reportedly 
living better than they do at home in Mexico.” The executive assistant to the director of 
the federal bureau, Joseph B. Bogan, stated that the center and two others in Chicago and 
New York are “humane, but not what we consider luxurious.” Bogan noted that the 
Bureau’s objective was to “provide an environment for our prisoners that is humane, one 
that would minimize corrosive or detrimental acts by inmates.” After all, as Bogan stated, 
those awaiting deportation or trial are “presumed innocent until proven guilty.” Bogan’s 
words presumably indicate the official policy of humane administration was still in place. 
Meanwhile, the proposed facility in Arizona was to house 400 prisoners. Congress was 
asked to appropriate $2.7 million for site acquisition, preparation, and preliminary 
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architectural work. If approved, construction money would be sought the next year and 
building would begin in 1978.547  
Yet, there were some objections raised. For one, it was argued that a federal 
prison would not be a permanent fix to the overcrowding issue. As the head of 
corrections at the Sheriff’s Department in Pima County noted, “Although about one third 
of Pima County’s prisoners are federal, the problem of overcrowding would be eased 
only temporarily.”548 For another, federal money coming in would be lost. As an editorial 
in The Arizona Daily Star noted, “The county already stands to lose more than $800,000 
per year it receives to detain federal prisoners. A proposed new federal prison could be 
built here. Part of that fee has also gone for jail improvements. A new federal facility here 
would reduce the county jail population by about 20 per cent.”549  
 The prison-or-no-prison gambit continued in the late 1970s. In July 1976, federal 
officials declared they would build not just one but two high-rise federal prisons in both 
downtown Phoenix and downtown Tucson after President Ford signed the $2.7 
appropriation. Bureau of Prisons spokesman Mike Aun stated that “both cities needed a 
federal prison because the situation in both cities is critical.” Location and aesthetics were 
deemed important. Each prison, called a “metropolitan correctional center,” (MCC) 
would be 10 to 22 stories. According to Aun, “We insist on having the facility downtown. 
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You build them near the federal court. This cuts down on security problems.” In fact, the 
MCCs would be “very secure and look like office buildings.” Relieving overcrowding 
was the driving motivation. At that point, the Pima County jail had “about 500” people 
with “about 110” federal prisoners.550 The BOP later explained the MCC moniker was 
“to acknowledge the metropolitan areas served and more importantly, to accurately 
reflect their functional mission: the housing of federal detainees awaiting trial, sentencing 
or other judicial disposition.”551 Yet, less than a year later, the proposed number of 
prisons was again down to one and even that was stalled as officials considered putting 
more federal prisoners in local jails rather than building a new facility. The $14 million 
request to build a federal prison had been cut by the Ford administration by May 1977. 
“All we’re doing is drawing back. We’re absolutely aware of the problem. We’re going 
to do something about it. We’re just not sure what that will be,” Aun explained. Yet, 
Pima County jail remained overcrowded. As Sheriff Richard Boykin put it, “I’ve got a 
story to tell them: I haven’t got room for anyone else.”552 But it turned out to be needless 
anxiety as both Tucson and Phoenix were on their way to winning their carceral 
solicitation battles.  
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Tucson was the first to win. In February 1978, federal officials announced that 
plans were back on for a new federal prison in the city. All that was left was purchase of 
the selected 40 acres of city-owned land on Silverbell Road near the Pima County jail 
annex. The site had been used as a landfill and had yet to be appraised. If bought, 
however, federal officials planned to build a 200-bed detention center to be completed in 
1980 that would be used to house federal prisoners awaiting trial, some sentenced 
offenders, and “illegal aliens awaiting deportation.”553 The prison eventually opened in 
1982. “From the outside, the federal prison on South Wilmot Road looks like an easy 
place to do time. The dirt yard is clean and freshly raked. The buildings are new,” a news 
article reported. When it opened, it was “hailed for its humane approach, its single cells 
with no bars, its campus-style design.” But the article continued that “iron bars have been 
replaced by irony” at the Metropolitan Correctional Center and the prison is “tougher on 
inmates than older and more notorious state prisons.” English classes were offered 
because “many inmates are illegal Mexican immigrants awaiting deportation.”554 
Immigration prisoners continued their incarceration within the prison system on the eve 
of a change in detention policy. 
As groups of law enforcement, prison officials, and politicians battled with the 
troublesome state of expanding incarceration in Arizona, those subjected to the carceral 
state endured continuing bouts of overcrowding and dismal conditions. Their protests 
were put down and then purportedly alleviated with renovated, expanded, and newly-
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built facilities. Among those caught in the midst of this struggle were noncitizen 
detainees, classified as federal prisoners and served up as income for Arizona counties. 
Their incarceration during a time of humane detentions questions the very core of official 
policy narratives and highlights the way in which policy and reality stayed disconnected. 
This disjunction would come to be resolved by a change in policy when detention would 
be premised on deterrence and the violent reality that detention had been all along would 
finally be coalesced with its purported policy objectives. 
 
Detention for Deterrence 
In 1980, immigration enforcement policy driven by noncitizen detention took a 
punitive turn. Mass asylum movements in the 1960s and 1970s culminated in an 
immigration crisis after 1980, the year presidential power changed parties. Attempting to 
address the refugee crisis, Congress had passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which finally 
aligned federal law with United Nations protocols, particularly as it pertained to the 
definition of ‘refugee.’555 Yet, several months later, official detention policy changed 
toward mass detention of nearly all potential refugees, particularly the seeming influx of 
Haitians. Detention was meant as deterrence. President Reagan’s Attorney General 
William French Smith explained, “Detention of aliens seeking asylum was necessary to 
discourage people like the Haitians from setting sail in the first place.”556 A year later, the 
Justice Department was busy enthusiastically enforcing the new policy by issuing 
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regulations that called for “the jailing of virtually all future illegal aliens.”557 Associate 
Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani further explained, “This administration will firmly 
enforce the law. The day of just coming into this country and getting in whether you have 
a right to be here or not is over.”558  
Those experiencing such deterrence-based detentions paid a heavy price. By May 
1982, at least six Haitians had died because of inadequate care at detention facilities. 
Suicide attempts continued with at least nine reported cases at Krome since March of that 
year. Such attempts were painfully linked to inhumane detention conditions. “They are so 
overcrowded that they can’t even get the privacy to commit suicide,” explained Sue 
Sullivan, the director of the Haitian Refugee Project.559 Elsewhere, INS officials 
tranquilized an asylum seeker from El Salvador and forced her to sign a voluntary 
departure form before deporting her. The asylum seeker later testified, “I felt horrible. I 
felt I was going to die.”560 As the decade wore on, people held inside immigration prisons 
were beaten, drugged, strip-searched, put into solitary confinement without explanation, 
denied access to lawyers, deported illegally, and tortured. Rather than aberrations, such 
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realities were “how the system operated.”561 The 1990s continued the trend of violent 
detentions. A nurse at a detention center in Houston recalled how immigration officials 
would call people for their “interviews,” take them outside, beat them, and bring them to 
the clinic saying they had gotten into a fight. Jesus Abreu, an INS detainee, stated about 
his captors, “We are completely without protection from their reprisals, and believe you 
me, they are expert at causing you harm, bodily and mental. They’ll just bury you in 
prison forever.”562 Violence had come calling. 
Smith’s explicit declaration not only changed immigration enforcement priorities 
but also set the stage for mass, violent detentions through the 1980s and 1990s into the 
present. Today, the U.S. incarcerates 34,000 noncitizens a day and around 400,000 
noncitizens a year with the majority subject to mandatory detention provisions.563 Such 
mandatory detentions highlight the way in which noncitizen detention is now premised 
on deterrence and the breaking of the will of noncitizens fighting their cases through 
prolonged appeals processes. While noncitizen detainees fight back by mounting legal 
challenges, they continue to face grueling detention conditions that have come to have 
tragic results. Since authorities began keeping track in 2003, more than 170 people have 
died while held in immigration custody across the country. Systemically inadequate 
medical care seems a large culprit.564 Or perhaps violence by another name. Arizona has 
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a unique role in this brutality. One hundred and twenty miles north of where Roberto was 
held 46 years ago is now the deadliest detention center in the nation where 15 people 
have died while held at the facility.565 No longer maintaining the narrative of humane 
detentions, the detention regime today has escalated from its punitive turn in the early 
1980s into a brutal and lethal expression of state power.  
As this virtually unchecked state power stealthily expanded throughout the era of 
humane detention in the U.S. Southwest, immigration prisoners bore witness to the 
inhumanity that played out in front of their eyes, the inhumanity they lived within the 
overcrowded, dismal conditions of county jails. As overcrowding increased and jail 
conditions deteriorated in Arizona, sheriffs and federal officials along with state and local 
politicians gambled with the lives of federal prisoners in their care to bring in more 
revenue. They then used this federal money to expand the carceral landscape. Yet, as old 
facilities expanded and newer ones were built, overcrowding and inhumane conditions 
continued. Many federal prisoners, among whom noncitizen detainees were counted, 
repeatedly fought back with protests hoping to call attention to their plight and change the 
conditions of their confinement. In doing so, they both contested official narratives of 
“humane” detention and demanded their humanity. Perhaps in their reaction against being 
held inside aging human cages, they foresaw the violence of the future and attempted to 
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stop its advance. It was a battle they, and their future counterparts, would ultimately lose. 
The calls for humanity in the era of its namesake went unheeded. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VIOLENT DETENTIONS, 1981-PRESENT 
 
Introduction 
The era of “humane” detentions would end when mass asylum movements in the 
1960s and 1970s culminated in a supposed immigration crisis in 1980. The perceived 
“crisis” anticipated later developments in the 1990s when the ending of the Cold War saw 
refugee movements “reframed as unprecedented in scale and chaotic in scope in order to 
fit with a narrowing of Western asylum space.” As migration scholar Katy Long further 
argues, “International actors and academics alike tend to talk about the end of the Cold 
War as the trigger for major changes in the nature of refugee flows, with a close to the era 
of widespread individual asylum. Yet while it is certainly true that the early 1990s saw a 
number of major refugee crises involving massive and complex patterns of flight, what 
the end of the Cold War altered was not the nature of refugee movement, but the nature 
of international response.”566 In the United States, this response would involve first 
replacing the previous case-by-case asylum policy with a purportedly comprehensive 
one. In that regard, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, signed into law by 
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President Carter, which sought to finally align federal law with United Nations protocols 
from 1951 by adopting a more ideologically-neutral definition of ‘refugee.’567 Only those 
who met the definition could be admitted into the United States. 
Yet, several months later, President Reagan’s Attorney General William French 
Smith reintroduced de facto detentions.568 However, detention would now be explicitly 
premised on deterrence. The era of Brownell’s policy that had purportedly moved away 
from de facto detentions was officially over. A Justice Department spokesman stated, 
“The rules say that, if illegal aliens come to this country without proper documentation, 
they will be detained. All we’re doing is enforcing the law, while the other 
administrations looked the other way… All we’re trying to do is regain control of our 
borders.”569 Deterrence would not be effective, and the consequences would be grave. 
One recent work has argued that “legislators sought to remedy the failure of deterrence 
both through continued detention and criminalization efforts that were concerned 
explicitly with rendering Afro-Caribbean people as the problem. The salience of 
deterrence would continue with Central American asylum seekers fleeing conflict in their 
countries.”570 The United States would show “relatively little interest” in aiding these 
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refugees because the vast majority were “peasant aligned with guerrilla forces looking to 
remove corrupt regimes propped up by the American military… In the eyes of the US, 
socialists could not be national liberators.”571 So, once they entered the borders of the 
United States, they would be collectively detained instead. 
 The policy of detaining to deter refugees clearly violates both international and 
domestic law. As the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee reported in 1989, this detention 
policy violated the statutory right of asylum seekers to apply for asylum, the non-
refoulement principle, the Refugee Act, the rights of asylum seekers under the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the right not to be penalized or unnecessarily 
subjected to restrictions on movement under the 1967 United Nations Protocol. The non-
refoulement principle in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which forbids states 
to return a refugee to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened, is generally 
accepted by most legal writers as part of customary international law.572 The Committee 
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also noted that the policy was inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights both of which stated that no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. Moreover, the policy also went against 
the Executive Committee of the UNHCR’s conclusion in 1986 that refugees should not 
be detained automatically.573 The Committee recommended an end to the detention 
program “directed against undocumented aliens which heavily affects asylum seekers. 
The detention program should be restricted to its purpose before 1980: to detain only 
those individuals who either constitute a threat to society or are likely to abscond.”574  
The expansion of noncitizen detention in the 1980s onward had tragic human 
consequences far surpassing what had come before. As scholar Michael Welch argues, 
this change in enforcement policy produced Kafkaeseque detentions of essentially 
“warehousing illegal immigrants.” Despite some national trends of correctional facilities 
becoming “less-than-total institutions,” by allowing more contact with the outside world, 
Welch argues that noncitizen detentions are the exception to that trend, where “detainees 
remain exceedingly isolated from their families, their lawyers, and the courts.”575  
Between the frequent transfers, the lack of legal representation, the harsh conditions of 
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confinement, deplorable living conditions, language barriers, inadequate medical care and 
mental health services, and brutality against detainees through physical and sexual abuse, 
the experience of often prolonged detentions “can be traumatic.”576 Such 
characterizations can be seen as the devolution of the noncitizen detention regime now 
involving figurative death, characterized by pain, suffering, isolation, unfairness, and 
ultimately, injustice. Compounding this would eventually be the rise in deaths for those 
held inside administrative cages pending resolution of civil proceedings. 
Prison building and the expansion of detention facilities were operating in full 
speed throughout the 1980s driven by the birth of private prison companies. In 1983, 
Thomas Beasely, Doctor R. Crants, and T. Don Hutto began Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA, today rebranded as CoreCivic), the world’s first private prison company. 
CCA began operations in a county jail and juvenile detention facility in Tennessee in 
1984. That year, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC) formed as a division of The 
Wackenhut Corporation (today known as the GEO Group). After CCA lost a bid to take 
over Tennessee’s entire prison system for $250 million in 1985, the company went public 
the next year.577 Recent scholarship has increasingly analyzed the origins and 
development of the private prison industry at this time. As criminologist Michael Hallett 
argues, the private prison industry is a reemergence of for-profit imprisonment industry 
that began with the post-Civil War convict lease system, which “reinscribed forced labor 
as a viable source of economic production.”578 According to Hallett, “private prisons are 
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best understood not as the product of increasing crime rates (rates have been falling for 
many years), but instead as the latest chapter in a larger historical pattern of oppressive 
and legal discrimination aimed primarily at African American men.”579 Hallett also notes 
that “Hispanic men also have a far higher likelihood of going to prison than do white 
males, though this likelihood is still lower than that for African Americans.”580 Other 
scholars have noted the uniqueness of the private prison industry of the 1980s. As Judith 
Greene argues, “Private prison companies represent just one sector of the business 
interests that have profited greatly from the U.S. prison boom. But it is the only sector 
that was founded for the explicit and paramount purpose of profiting from this 
phenomenon, creating a financial momentum that strives to grow its market share even 
while a declining crime rate and a slowing economy have combined to moderate the 
prison population growth curve.”581   
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The incorporation of the private prison industry into the carceral landscape in the 
mid-1980s had a particular impact on noncitizen detention. As Mark Dow points out, the 
first two privatized prisons in the United States were noncitizen detention centers. WCC 
ran a facility in Aurora, Colorado and CCA had a facility in Houston, Texas. Dow 
explains, “When CCA was first awarded its Houston INS contract, it had not built a 
facility. So it locked up its first immigration prisoners in rented motel rooms and soon 
had its first escapes when the inmates pushed the air-conditioning units through the 
walls.”582 Yet, the contract had been justified on economic efficiency. An INS spokesman 
reported that the CCA facility in Houston costs $23.84 per person per day in 1984 
whereas it averages the federal government $30.26 per person per day at its own 
detention facilities.583 Of course it does not hurt that CCA investors would be earning 
money. After all, financial gain for investors in private prison companies is “another 
blunt reminder of the economic forces driving correctional policy.”584 As Greene argues, 
when state prison populations “slowed to a near halt” in the early 2000s, business was 
“booming for private prison companies thanks to anticipation of a rapid increase in the 
federal market for immigrant detention.”585 The increased criminalization has led to 
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increased economic exploitation. As Daniel E. Martínez and Jeremy Slack argue, “Rather 
than merely deporting the surplus labor force in times of economic downturn, systematic 
criminalization and incarceration ensures that excess undocumented labor is 
economically exploited to its full potential before being removed. Detention facilities 
have become sites of capital extraction beyond the surplus value of labor, ultimately 
extending to the commodification of the imprisoned body, especially in its extreme form 
with the exponential growth of for-profit private prisons.”586 This trend continues as 
private prison companies such as CCA continue to be awarded government contracts 
even despite systematic problems. In the case of CCA, there have been charges of 
“understaffing prisons, denying pensions to workers, abuse of inmates by prison guards, 
violence, and escapes. Worse still, CCA prisons have not provided adequate medical 
treatment to inmates and have maintained substandard prison conditions that have led to 
prison protests and uprisings.”587 Yet, CCA remains in business.   
On the downside of corporations and investors profiting economically from the 
incarceration of noncitizens are the human consequences. As Dow argues, “where there is 
no accountability, the arbitrary use of authority governs the trivial as well as the 
substantial. One insidious aspect of the private contractor’s relationship with the INS is 
that it pairs bureaucracies that are hostile to public scrutiny. The buck stops nowhere.”588 
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Within this unfettered arbitrariness, the human consequences take shape as “unjust 
detention of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers who, in effect, become raw 
materials for the corrections business.”589 However, as we have seen, they have been 
“raw materials” for much of the twentieth century and certainly way before the 1980s 
when the private prison industry entered the carceral landscape. 
Yet, the decade of the 1980s provides a defining marker for understanding the 
transformation of noncitizen detention. It was here that policy and reality melded as both 
became violence. After official detention policy changed, noncitizens detentions 
expanded dramatically. Concurrently, the Southwest was expanding its carceral 
landscape to meet immigration demands. In April 1987, for example, Arizona Governor 
Evan Mecham signed a letter of intent to sell the state’s new prison in Yuma to the INS 
for $11 million. The proceeds would be used to help build a 400-bed, medium-security 
prison addition in Tucson. The INS had sought the prison to relieve overcrowding at its 
facility in El Centro, California.590 Of course, counties were still in the business of raising 
revenue through housing federal prisoners. In June 1987, for instance, Val Verde County 
in Texas expected a $300,000 shortfall and looked to the county jail for more revenue. 
The new Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was held to blame for the 
“dramatic decrease” in their jail population, which decreased revenue paid by the INS 
and the Bureau of Prisons. As scholar Amada Armenta notes, IRCA, which is famously 
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remembered for granting amnesty to nearly 2.7 million undocumented noncitizens, also 
called for “a massive deployment of resources to the United States-Mexico border, in the 
form of agents, physical barriers, and technological surveillance, and included provisions 
for interior enforcement.”591 According to jail officials, normally the county jail received 
“$24,000” a month from the BOP but was now receiving “only $600” a month. But it was 
simply a matter of time. As Sheriff J.R. Koog noted, “Once the (immigration) law is 
tested, we’ll be right back in business again.” In addition to adding the jail to a waiting 
list for more prisoners, Koog was also considering bringing in 24 Cuban prisoners. The 
INS was willing to pay $700 a day to house the group. But Koog was concerned, “They 
(Cuban prisoners) are a high risk. We may be biting off more than we can chew. They 
have nothing to lose, and nobody wants them.”592  
The next month, the County instituted a hiring freeze and deposited federal 
income into the general fund to stay in the black for the fiscal year. The county auditor 
estimated they would receive $238,140 from the federal marshal and $32,256 from the 
Bureau of Prisons and the INS.593 Eventually, 24 Cubans were moved to Val Verde 
County jail, where 12 escaped in July, were captured within a few hours, and were 
transferred to Mississippi. While Koog was told that the 24 prisoners had committed 
crimes, he found out the majority had been on “administrative hold” for seven years. 
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Koog noted, “We were very surprised to learn that most were being imprisoned on 
administrative hold. After the 12 Cuban prisoners attempted to escape, we divided the 
Cubans up among the other prisoners. We had very little trouble with these prisoners’ 
behavior. The main problem all along was the lack of information regarding their future 
releases.”594  
But trouble could come soon enough. Political rhetoric facilitated the drive toward 
who was policed during the 1980s when it “brought together two indefensible enemies of 
the state: the criminal, especially the drug criminal, and the alien.,” according to 
American Gulag author Mark Dow.595 The INS then in the late 1980s instituted several 
programs meant to make immigration enforcement more efficient by pursuing these 
“enemies of the state.” The INS introduced the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program 
(ACAP) and the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) to identify “criminal aliens” earlier 
as the first formal “jail status check” programs. The programs called for immigration 
officers to “conduct on-site interviews with potentially deportable inmates in jails and 
prisons to prevent their release from criminal custody.” The programs focused on the new 
category of “aggravated felonies,” an immigration offence created by the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988.596 In December 1988, the INS instituted a new policy directed at 
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Central Americans that required asylum seekers to remain in the Rio Grande Valley until 
their claims were settled. By early January 1989, the policy was challenged and a judge 
issued a temporary restraining order against the INS. However, the order was later 
vacated by the court because it prohibited “the functions and operations of an agency of 
the Federal Government.” In February, the INS was again allowed to enforce the travel 
restriction and Commissioner Alan Nelson stated plans to begin detaining and deporting 
Central Americans who were economic rather than political refugees. Asylum seekers 
would be given one-day hearings and then detained while they appealed their rejected 
claims. They would then come in front of a judge to ask for bond which varied between 
$1,000 and $4,000. If they could not post bond, they would be held in detention for 
weeks, or months, or until they left the country “voluntarily.” The Helsinki Watch 
Committee called the new policy “inhumane, unjust and not adequate to address the 
complex problems that cause mass influxes of asylum seekers.”597  
 Inhumanity extended naturally to conditions of detention. By early January 1989, 
300 Central Americans were camping in a “tent city with no sanitary facilities outside a 
church-sponsored refugee center” in Harlingen, Texas. Another 150 people were living in 
“an abandoned motel with no windows, heat or plumbing.”598 Local officials in Harlingen 
pursued court action to close down the processing center, which was a former furniture 
store on a shopping street where officials accepted asylum applications, because of 
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sanitation and fire code violations. In mid-February, the processing center was moved to 
Bayview, Texas. Conditions at Bayview, also called the Port Isabel Service Processing 
Center, or the Corralón by those held there, had remained abysmal for much of the 
1980s. In his expose, Tony Hefner, who worked as a security guard for five years at the 
facility writes, “The camp reminded me of a slaughterhouse I’d seen as a boy. The rancid 
smell of urine and feces, stale tobacco, and sweaty bodies packed tightly together 
permeated the concrete rooms and hallways.”599 When officials announced the decision 
to move processing to Bayview to asylum seekers still waiting at Harlingen, the reaction 
seemed expected. As The New York Times described, “Many of the aliens seemed 
perplexed, but they were given no other information. Nonetheless, some of them took 
map in hand, put their thumbs to the air, and started hitchhiking, the method of 
transportation that had carried them thousands of miles from their homes to Texas.” The 
center itself was crude. As the article noted, “A former army base, now used by the 
immigration service primarily as a detention camp, the Bayview center is surrounded by 
rough scrub forest, farm fields and citrus groves.”600 The journey from Harlingen to 
Bayview was 20 miles. As the Helsinki Watch Committee reported, “Reportedly, asylum 
seekers walking there are arrested on their way and thus prevented from applying for 
asylum affirmatively.”601 By March, about 2,500 immigrants were held at Bayview. On 
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March 16, about 200 to 300 people protested their confinement by chanting in Spanish, 
“We want freedom,” and “The people united will never be defeated.” The nearby Border 
Patrol office called the disturbance “minor.” When 50 to 70 people rushed one of the 
chain-linked fences, 170 Border Patrol agents and riot police were called to restore order. 
Border Patrol agents claimed they “did not know what caused the brief uprising,” 
although people have “complained about a lack of food, an inability to contact their 
families and other problems at the camp.”602   
 Immigration enforcement, particularly along the southern border, would 
demonstrate this punitive turn most clear starting in the early 1980s. In July 1979, several 
immigrants picked up by border patrol agents near San Ysidro, California were beaten 
over two days by border patrol agents. The incident was likely neither unremarkable in its 
frequency of occurrence nor unprecedented. Yet, in January 1980, two of the agents, 
Jeffrey Otherson and Bruce Brown, were convicted in a U.S. district court for depriving 
and conspiring to deprive the victims of federal rights. The defendants appealed the 
verdicts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court stated, “The message of 
this case is clear. So long as the American flag flies over United States courthouses, the 
federal courts and the federal justice system stand as bulwarks to assure that every human 
being within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be treated humanely and dealt with 
in accordance with due process of law by those entrusted with the power to enforce the 
law.”603 What is remarkable about the case was that the convictions were 
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“unprecedented,” the first time INS employees had been convicted of criminal charges 
stemming from their work.604 Yet, criminal conduct was just beginning to be noticed. 
Two years after the unprecedented conviction, immigration officials were again abusing 
their powers with the treatment of those in their care. In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, the 
Ninth Circuit found that immigration officials had forced Valium down the throat of an 
asylum seeker from El Salvador and guided her hand to sign a form waiving her right to 
seek asylum. The judge in the case stated, “You don’t treat people like that. I wouldn’t do 
that to the worst criminal who came into this courtroom.”605  
Like seen in Orantes-Hernandez, noncitizen detentions would also take a more 
punitive turn after 1981. In May 1982, the Bureau of Prisons was put in charge of 
detaining Haitians and not the INS. This was explained as a practical issue at a House of 
Representatives subcommittee hearing. Associate Attorney General Giuliani explained 
that the “nature of detention… has changed.” This was purportedly because of the 
dramatic increase in asylum applications, going from “I think 1,000 or 1,500” to “over 
100,000,” which has “produced a backlog.” INS only had experience with short-term 
processing. Giuliani stated, “The typical Mexican situation is a good example. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service will apprehend large numbers of illegal aliens 
from Mexico each year. They will be held for several days. Most of them will agree to 
voluntarily return to Mexico. That is short-term detention and it is the kind of thing that 
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INS is very well equipped to handle… It made sense that the Bureau of Prisons would 
have primary responsibility much the same way the Bureau of Prisons does for other 
organizations with INS acting, in essence, as a client of the Bureau of Prisons.”606 After 
all, the Bureau of Prisons was well trained in this situation. The bureau director noted at 
the hearing that “for many years, the Bureau of Prisons has housed illegal aliens. The 
magnitude of the problem, of course, has grown in recent months because of the influx of 
the Cubans and Haitians. But it is certainly nothing new for us to be responsible for INS 
detainees.” Admittedly, the Southwest played a key part in preparing the Bureau. As the 
director explained, “For example, in our southwest institutions, particularly out in San 
Diego, for many years we have housed illegal aliens who have been picked up coming 
across the Mexican border into California, Texas, and Arizona. This, of course, is 
something new in the northeast areas, particularly with Cubans and Haitians.”607  
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Haitians and Cubans 
 The stories of Haitian asylum seekers demonstrate the punitive and brutal 
transformation. As Jenna M. Loyd and Alison Mountz argue in their recent work, the 
implications of the policy change that focused on the mandatory detention of Haitian 
asylum seekers is a significant consideration in understanding both the criminal law 
system and refugee policy. As the authors argue, “the concerted and creative efforts 
employed by the U.S. government to remove and prevent the arrivals of Haitians and 
Afro-Cuban people repeatedly led to the invocation of exceptional categories, the 
creation of new laws, and the consolidation of the tight discursive connections between 
Blackness and excludability, detainability, and criminality.”608 In the early 1970s, 
hundreds of Haitians fled their country and reached Florida in overcrowded boats. Some 
of the boats had come from the Bahamas where Haitians had worked for years with 
special work permits. However, as that country headed toward independence from 
Britain, new work permits were no longer issued because of “demands by natives that 
Haitians were taking jobs from citizens.” By 1974, after reviewing about 400 cases, the 
State Department found that over 90 percent had fled for “economic reasons,” and were 
denied political asylum. Six were granted political asylum. Detentions expanded. In mid-
March, 91 Haitians were in custody in Miami after which 50 were moved to Port Isabel. 
Detentions took a toll. In April 1974, 27-year-old Tirenne Deville was found dead in his 
cell in Miami with a sheet tied around his neck a day before his scheduled deportation 
back to Haiti.609 Deville’s suicide brought protests and INS raids in Haitian communities. 
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One example is the Haitian community in Brooklyn that was raided several times in April 
1974. As one article noted, “Many Haitians see this dragnet as a response by the 
government to the protests that have occurred since the death of Tirenne Deville and as 
an attempt to silence them.”610 In September 1975, William Isidor, one of 81 Haitians 
detained at a jail in Immokalee, Florida, slashed his throat. Isidor feared death if returned 
to Haiti and become despondent after more than four months of detention. Isidor 
survived. At the jail, Father Antoine Adrian reported that the Haitians were “confined to 
two rooms, each about 35 by 45 feet, and are permitted in the prison yard a mere 30 
minutes every two weeks!” While receiving $6.50 per person from the federal authorities, 
jail authorities were apparently spending only $1.50.611  
 The Haitian community in the U.S. reacted against prolonged detentions. On 
Christmas Eve 1981, Haitians detained at Krome began a hunger strike to protest their 
incarceration. At that point, there were more than 700 Haitians detained there. Three days 
later, the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami organized a demonstration in front of Krome 
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that drew 500 people, most of whom were thought to be from Miami’s Little Haiti 
neighborhood. As the demonstration went on, about 200 people broke through the 
security lines, some chanting “liberte, liberte” in an attempt to free the detained 
immigrants. The charge was stopped by immigration security guards and Metro Dade 
police using clubs and tear gas. As the demonstrators retreated, they began setting fires 
and nearly 12 acres of the Everglades were set on fire. In the melee, about 30 Haitians 
escaped although 20 “returned voluntarily or were recaptured” according to an INS 
spokesperson. An attorney for the Haitian Refugee Center called out the “unnecessary 
violence” by police and the beating of a demonstrator. According to the attorney, “There 
was blood.”612 Detention conditions deteriorated quickly for Haitians at detention centers 
around the country. In April 1982, the INS reported 2,014 Haitians in detention facilities 
with the largest populations in Fort Allen, Puerto Rico and Krome, Miami.613 By May 
that year, at least six people had died because of inadequate care and suicide attempts 
continued to increase with at least nine unsuccessful attempts at Krome in the previous 
two months. Suicides were painfully linked to overcrowding. As Sue Sullivan, the 
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director of the Haitian Refugee Project, noted, “They are so overcrowded that they can’t 
even get the privacy to commit suicide.”614  
 Some detained Haitians were almost transferred to Arizona. In early March 1982, 
the Bureau of Prisons announced they would be moving more than 200 Haitians from 
New York to Arizona, most likely to detention center in Florence and the prison camp at 
Safford.615 Days later, U.S. District Court Judge Eugene Spellman halted the transfer 
ruling that the relocation would deprive the Haitians from pro bono legal services and the 
INS had not specified reasons for the transfer.616 Spellman then reversed his decision at 
the end of March and authorized the transfer of 157 Haitians to Florence but rejected the 
transfer of an additional 85 Haitians to Safford. The mixed decision was justified by the 
notion that the Haitians would have “better access to legal counsel and would be 
comfortable” in Florence but would not have legal counsel and access to other service 
programs in Safford. The Arizona climate was also deemed a factor as the judge held that 
Haitians would be more comfortable because the “climate is comparable to that of the 
Haitians’ island home.”617 Nevertheless, the planned transfer was eventually canceled. 
Norman Carlson stated, “There are 158 Haitians, and the facility in Florence could take 
                                               
614 Lee May, “Refugee Groups Deplore Haitian Centers,” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1982, p. 
27. 
 
615 The transfer was justified as complying with a court order that bars juveniles from being 
housed with adults. Apparently, there were juveniles held in New York prisons where the Haitian 
refugees were held. “200 Haitian refugees to be sent to Arizona,” The Arizona Republic, March 3, 
1982, p. A10. Associated Press, “Haitians to be sent to Arizona,” The Arizona Daily Star, 3 
March 1982, p. C-9. 
 
616 Anne Q. Hoy, “Judge halts relocation of Haitians to Arizona,” The Arizona Republic, March 5, 
1982, p. A2 (States News service). 
 
617 “Shift of 157 Haitians to Florence OK’d,” The Arizona Republic, March 25, 1982, p. B1, B14. 
 207 
only 75 or 80 of them. We decided early on that they would not be split up in any way, 
and there just aren’t the facilities in Florence to take them all – we’ll have to find some 
other place.”618 
 The Haitian story is often contrasted with the Cuban one. In 1980, 125,000 
Cubans arrived in Florida in small boats. This ‘Mariel Boatlift,” has been called “one of 
the most remarkable migration events in U.S. history.” Most Cubans were admitted to the 
U.S. and became permanent residents or citizens. Despite most benefitting from a more 
lenient admissions policy, several thousand Cubans were “immediately ordered excluded 
from the U.S. and were detained pending repatriation. Several thousand others were 
temporarily admitted to the U.S. pending completion of their application for permission 
to enter but were later arrested for crimes committed in the U.S., and then ordered 
excluded due to these crimes.” Although Cuba agreed to repatriate 2,746 Mariel Cubans 
in 1984, several thousand Cubans have remained in INS detention over the last twenty 
years.619 The U.S. held these noncitizens in “indefinite detention, often in maximum-
security federal penitentiaries.”620 Their detentions bring the story back to Arizona, and 
specifically Florence in Pinal County. In Florence, the INS Service Processing Center 
was about to witness a tense atmosphere in the 1980s. The INS Center was built on the 
former POW camp that BOP had taken over and turned into a prison. When the prison 
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had moved to Tucson, INS took over in 1983. Placed between an Arizona National Guard 
armory and the Florence Gardens subdivision, the 20.5-acre center was surrounded by 
wire-mesh fences topped with barbed wire. The fences had gone up after there were two 
escapes. While imprisoning only men, the facility was globally representative with 
people from Mexico, El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, New Zealand, Argentina, Iran, 
Belize, Jordan, and Denmark. In 1984, supervisor Manuel Cornejo noted that besides the 
two escapes, the “only trouble at the facility has occurred during soccer games.” The 
center had mainly been created because state and county prisons and jails could no longer 
sustain immigrant detainees. But the center also had economic benefits. According to 
Patrick Kane, INS Phoenix district assistant director, the facility was saving the INS 
hundreds of thousands of dollars a year.621 
The summer of 1985 began with a hunger strike at the INS Center. Twenty-three 
Cubans began the protest on July 13 to call attention to their uncertain legal status.622 One 
protester passed out and received medical treatment.623 According to officials, there were 
15 hunger strikers on the second day and only three by the third day.624 After going 
without food for nearly four days, the remaining protesters ended the hunger strike when 
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officials convinced them that “their complaints couldn’t be handled in Florence but that 
INS authorities in Washington had been notified of the problem.”625 Yet, as Robert Kahn 
notes, when he got to the prison on July 23, he was told by a Cuban prisoner that the 
hunger strike was still going on and a guard told him there had just been “almost a 
riot.”626 Cubans were not the only ones enduring prolonged detentions at Florence. In a 
letter to the editor printed in July 1985, Ann Adams of Tempe noted how she had “just 
had the rare privilege of helping to bond out two Central Americans” from the Florence 
detention center, who had been there for nine months. When she helped one man from El 
Salvador direct dial to his native country, a recording noted, “Due to the conditions in our 
country, your call cannot go through.”627 By July 30, there were 128 immigrants detained 
at Florence and 81 of them were Cubans. Prolonged detentions continued. As Manuel R. 
Cornejo, the facility supervisor, noted, “Out of eighty-one that I have here, I don’t think 
there’s one of them that’s had a hearing.”628 The powder-keg was once again ripe for 
explosion. 
The riot that “almost” happened in July would actually happen the next month. At 
10 p.m. on August 21, 1985, 65 people held inside began chanting for their freedom or to 
be sent back to Cuba. They were among more the 102 Cubans held at the center. They 
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had arrived during the 1980 boatlift. None had yet had a hearing in front of an 
immigration judge. Mark Dow has written that the “act of protest sometimes seems to be 
a negotiation not just between the keeper and the kept but between demand and 
despair.”629 Perhaps in this desperation, protesters barricaded themselves in the cell 
blocks, tore up the plumbing and electrical fixtures, broke windows and furniture, and 
smashed televisions. The “uneasy situation” ended by early afternoon the next day. No 
one was injured. Officials estimated the damage would take four to six weeks to repair. 
One official noted it was the “worst he’s ever seen following a riot at an immigration 
center.”630 Ruth Anne Myers, district director of the INS, reported, “The place is an 
absolute disaster.” As a 12-member SWAT team stood by, Cornejo had spoken to the 
prisoners through a bullhorn say he was “concerned about them getting hurt and about us 
getting hurt” should authorities forcibly enter. Meyers noted, “We’ve been aware that 
something like this was going to happen at any time since they’ve been here” because the 
prisoners were “just a powder keg of people who don’t know what’s going to happen to 
them.” At the end of the riot, “helmet-clad officers led shackled prisoners out of the 
cellblocks and onto buses bound for holding facilities in Phoenix and El Paso.” From 
Phoenix, they were sent to federal prison facilities in Oklahoma and California. As 
Meyers stated, they were sent “wherever space is. We have been in big trouble looking 
for space.”631  
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Finding available space was critical since the INS reported they had “no plans at 
present to release any of the Cubans… or to deport them to Cuba or any other 
country.”632 Repair costs were estimated at more than $200,000 and was estimated to take 
two months. Finding available space added to the costs of repair because contract space 
was calculated per head per day. Maricopa County jail, a long detainer of federal 
prisoners, was now charging the INS $50.50 a day, whereas bed space at the INS-run 
Florence center had cost much less.633 Clean-up of the facility was completed and repairs 
began by early September to restore the center left “uninhabitable” by the riot. The 
repairs would include a new building to serve as administrative offices. Nearly a 100 
Cubans would be returned once the repairs were completed.634 By November 1985, about 
5,500 Cubans were still held in federal, state, or local prisons across the country in 
Florida, Texas, New York, and Arizona.635 Their situation remained unchanged. As Kahn 
noted, “The Cubans were sent to whatever prisons had space to hold them. Their situation 
                                               
631 Ric Volante, “Cubans moved from Florence following riot,” The Arizona Daily Star, August 
23, 1985, p. 1. Ric Volante, “28 Cuban prisoners leave Tucson for California,” The Arizona Daily 
Star, August 24, 1985, p. 13. 
 
632 “Repair cost uncertain in Cuban inmates’ riot,” The Arizona Republic, August 24, 1985, p. B4. 
 
633 Ric Volante, “Riot-repair cost near $225,000,” The Arizona Daily Star, August 28, 1985, p. 
13. 
 
634 Associated Press, “Detention-unit repairs start; Cubans to return,” The Arizona Republic, 
September 4, 1985, p. B3. Laurie Asseo, “Repairs Begin After Riot: Cubans Will Return To 
INS,” Florence Reminder and Blade-Tribune, September 5, 1985, p. 1. “Inmates Will Return: 
Clean-up, But Not the Repairs, Complete After August Riot,” Florence Reminder and Blade-
Tribune, September 12, 1985, p. 1, 3. 
 
635 Associated Press, “Sen. Chiles Sues Over Criminals at Immigrant Center,” The Washington 
Post, November 26, 1985, p. A14. Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) sued to force the Reagan 
administration to remove “Cuban criminal refugees” from Krome. As Chiles noted, the mixing of 
“Mariel criminal refugees” with “more than 400 illegal immigrants” is a “constant threat to the 
community at large as well as to U.S. personnel and other peaceful alien detainees at Krome.”  
 212 
had not changed, only their location. Rioting would be repeated nine months later at 
Miami, at Oakdale and Atlanta in 1987, and at Talladega, Alabama, in 1991.”636 While 
the Atlanta riots in November 1987 were going on and more than 70 people were taken 
hostage, the Arizona Republic reported that the 112 Cuban prisoners in Florence “worked 
on rocking chairs to give to children for Christmas.” Ventura Brizuela, 32, of Bayamo, 
Cuba, remarked, “Everything is normal. Nobody inside wants any problem.” Officials 
credited “ongoing talks and education programs” for the calm in Florence. Yet, six 
additional guards, Florence police, Pinal County sheriff’s deputies, guards at the nearby 
State Prison, and Border Patrol agents in Tucson were all on standby. After all, prolonged 
detentions were still ongoing. Brizuela, who was jailed in Cuba for stealing a bag of rice, 
had been in INS facilities for seven years for a murder accusation he denied. As Brizuela 
noted, “I’ve never been free. Seven years for nothing. I thought I was going to be free.”637 
The director and the district director of the INS visited Florence and informed the Cubans 
that they would not be deported without “a full and fair and equitable review,” regardless 
of how long such a process would ultimately take.638 
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The first 34 Cubans arrived at the renovated Florence facility in February 1986. 
At the end of the month, 92 of the 192 detainees at the center were Cubans.639 The 
restored INS facility learned from past mistakes. A protest led by Central Americans in 
April 1986 was dealt with swiftly. Manuel Cornejo, the chief of the center, noted on April 
7 that “no more than 18 inmates had joined for a few days last week in an ‘informal’ 
work stoppage that ended without affecting operations.” However, six protesters were 
immediately removed from the facility and transferred to Maricopa County Jail. The 
protest was likely more widespread and organized than Cornejo reported. More than 30 
people participated in a hunger strike beginning on April 3 to protest their prolonged 
detention, being overworked, and being denied medical care.640 Cornejo admitted on 
April 8 that “some inmates had been refusing to eat and that slight disciplinary action had 
been taken Tuesday against 18 inmates who refused to follow guards’ orders.” The 18 
were locked in isolation cells. Disciplinary actions focused on not allowing the August 
riot to repeat. Part of that had to do with the belief that the “presence of Cubans has 
contributed to the unrest.” As Cornejo noted, “We’re aware of the changing complexion 
of the population and becoming more cautious.” Scott Coffin, the INS deputy district 
director stated, “It’s very important that the Cubans see that we are in control.”641 
Cornejo and Coffin were right to worry about the power struggle with Cubans. 
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Four months later, on a Sunday morning in August, 16 Cubans cut holes in the 
fences around the recreation yard at the INS center and escaped. Twelve were captured 
“within hours.” The others gave chase to federal officials in hot pursuit. Two men were 
captured Monday morning. While chasing down the others, a Border Patrol pilot flying 
his Cessna-182 low to the ground, ran into a dust devil, crashed his plane, and landed in 
the hospital. The last two men were captured late Monday afternoon.642 While the Cuban 
contingent failed in their efforts, another group succeeded a month later. On an early 
September morning, seven people from Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Ghana, and Fiji escaped from the center. Unlike the Cubans, they had been housed in the 
“facility’s minimum-security dormitory.” They remained at large.643 The presence of 116 
Cubans was producing “some unease” in the town of Florence. In particular, Chief of 
Police Tom Rankin had “never seen a Cuban” when they arrived at the INS center and 
emphasized their supposed criminality. As Rankin noted, “We have to remember these 
Cubans are felons. Knowing what I know of them, I approach them the same way I would 
a rabid dog.” Yet, while Florence residents “weren’t thrilled,” there was no panic or 
protest when they arrived. Even after the escape of the 16 Cubans, “Florence went about 
its business” and “Cubans were hardly the talk” of the town. Yet, Rankin would just as 
soon “dump the Marielitos back in Cuba.”644  
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Early the next year, after being in charge of the facility for three years, Cornejo 
took over as assistant district director for detention and deportation in San Juan, Puerto 
Rico. Cornejo remarked, “It’s been a real challenge to start this facility up from 
nothing… It’s been gratifying seeing the facility grow from the time I came here… The 
facility now speaks for itself. It’s very well organized. I can walk away and know that 
things are going to be done, the detainees taken care of, and that things are on schedule.” 
Cornejo noted,  
I enjoy seeing the different people from literally all over the world come in and 
out of the facility and dealing with them. They come here sometimes from very 
harsh environments and don’t know what to expect, and to watch them leave here 
knowing that they’ve been treated fairly – a lot of them take that with them back 
to their own countries, or if they stay here, to wherever they go.645  
 
Replacing Cornejo was Phillip C. Crawford, a second-generation immigration officer and 
a 10-year veteran of the INS. Crawford stated his intentions for the Florence detention 
center: “Over the next two years we’ll develop it into one of the most modern 
facilities.”646 Such modernity was certainly in line with the plans of high-ranking state 
officials for the future of Arizona’s original carceral town. 
 
Detentions in Arizona 
 In Arizona, Florence was about to gain unexpected carceral notoriety. In her first 
state of the state address in January 1989, Governor Rose Mofford offered a “long term 
solution for locating prison facilities.” Mofford explained her vision, “It is my strong 
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belief that an expansion of the facilities at Florence into a ‘prison city’ represents the 
most effective long-term means of resolving the thorny issue of locating prison sites.” 
The “one major impediment” to that carceral goal was the “lack of adequate housing in 
the Florence area.”647 House Majority Leader Jim Meredith was thrilled saying, “To 
make Florence a prison city is an exceptional idea, something that should have happened 
a long time ago.” The Arizona Republic reported that residents and town officials were 
“delighted” adding that Police Chief Rankin felt “honored” to have the town mentioned 
by the governor.648 Others weren’t as thrilled but felt not much would change in terms of 
Florence’s notoriety. As Mayor Wilbur Freeman noted, “Florence has had the reputation 
of being a prison town for years and years. When people in Phoenix and Tucson think of 
Florence, the first thing they think of is the prison.”649 Regardless of the impact on the 
town’s reputation, town growth was expected to follow the state-sanctioned housing 
expansion. As City Councilman Carl Douglas put it, “Whether you like it or not, let’s 
face it, the prison is another business. Half the time, most of us don’t even know it’s 
there, so if it expands, it won’t bother us a bit.” Store owner Bill Day added, “The prison 
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is not a detriment. It’s an asset to the community.”650 The next week, three members of 
the Florence town council formed a ‘prison city’ committee to travel to Phoenix to meet 
with Mofford and a state task force to “begin exploring ways to create more housing in 
Florence.”651  
 While Mofford and town officials set great carceral expectations for Florence, 
other cities in Arizona were hardly about to take a back seat. In the fall of 1991, the 
Bureau of Prisons requested proposals to construct a 1,000-inmate, medium-security 
facility for its prisoners and INS detainees. Companies starting bidding and cities starting 
negotiating. One company, Dominion Leasing Inc. of Oklahoma, held discussions with 
Tucson city officials about using city property on South Wilmot Road, across from the 
state prison complex and near the federal Metropolitan Center. The property itself was 
being considered for a police-fire training academy. However, Kendall Bert, director of 
Tucson economic development, did not think the two uses would be mutually exclusive. 
According to Bert, “Early discussions have made it clear that the detention facility could 
help underwrite a significant portion of the infrastructure costs for the academy plus 
provide a very substantial annual return to the city.”652 But in March 1992, the City 
Council rejected the lease. Recall petitions were issued against three council members 
who voted against the lease. In April, the Metropolitan Tucson Chamber of Commerce 
and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) called on the City Council 
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to approve the lease to build the private prison, citing the “300 permanent jobs and $6.5 
million annual payroll” expected to the city. Chamber Chairman Dr. Bill Mangold argued 
that the prison would allow Tucson to “play a role in alleviating overcrowded conditions 
in other such prison facilities, facilities that offer less than adequate living conditions.”653  
 LULAC, in particular, provided a significant voice. Formed in 1929, LULAC 
pursued a political mission aimed at helping Mexicans naturalize and claim rights as U.S. 
citizens. As David G. Gutiérrez notes LULAC “proved remarkably successful in 
achieving many of its state political goals… From 1929 through World War II LULAC 
organized successful voter registration and poll-tax drives, actively supported political 
candidates sympathetic to Mexican Americans, and aggressively attacked discriminatory 
laws and practices in communities throughout Texas and the Southwest. More important 
over the long run, LULAC also achieved a number of notable legal victories in the area 
of public education.”654 Yet, LULAC was also selective in their pursuit of “an agenda of 
assimilation, excluding from membership Mexicans who were not U.S. citizens.”655 
During the 1930s, LULAC officials fought to make sure Mexicans were formally 
designated as white instead of a separate race.656 As Vicki Ruiz notes, “In their quest for 
respectability and political clout, LULAC members distanced themselves from working 
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class, mestizo identities.”657 During Operation Wetback, for instance, LULAC “remained 
skeptical of allegations of brutality, convinced that they originated from interests intent 
on employing illegal laborers” and “went so far as to characterize its support for 
Operation Wetback as in the best interests of deported workers, because farm work 
effectively turned them into animals.”658   
When it came to the private prison in Tucson, potential benefits to the city were 
emphasized. David Rodriguez, the director of LULAC, was “optimistic that many of the 
jobs at the proposed prison, which would be built to hold Immigration and Naturalization 
Service detainees, would go to Hispanics.” Yet, one of the reasons some council 
members had rejected the lease was because of their “concern about reports of 
immigration service mistreatment of prisoners and fears that the prison would lead to 
increased arrests of illegal immigration in this area.” Rodriguez said LULAC was 
“equally concerned” about that but LULAC also “has a responsibility to those Hispanic 
Americans in our community who have a genuine need for the gainful employment 
necessary to raise a family and educate our children. We are in no position to export jobs 
from this community. All of us as a community must vigorously pursue opportunities 
which will result in employment.” The prison was to be a saving grace. Rodriguez 
highlighted that the prison “will provide opportunity for hundreds of Spanish-speaking, 
career-seeking individuals… It is the very type of clean industry we need to encourage. It 
                                               
657 Vicki L. Ruiz, From Out of the Shadows: Mexican Women in Twentieth-Century America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31. 
 
658 Craig A. Kaplowitz, LULAC, Mexican Americans, and National Policy (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 56. 
 220 
is the very type of career opportunity that we see many Hispanic Americans pursue.”659 
In a parallel development, historian Kelly Lytle Hernández calls the dramatic rise in the 
number of Hispanic Border Patrol officers since the late 1970s the “most significant 
change” in the Border Patrol personnel.660 
Two sites in Pinal County and one site in western Arizona were also marked for 
the prison bidding game. Seventy-five miles northwest of Tucson, CCA was considering 
a prison location in Casa Grande. That bid competed against United Concepts’ bid for 
neighboring town, Eloy, about 20 miles southeast of Casa Grande. United Concepts, a 
joint venture between Kentucky-based Concept Incorporated and Texas-based United 
Correctional Corporation, proposed a 35-acre facility northeast of Eloy on Hanna Road. 
Yet, there was confusion about the nature of the prisoners to be housed. The Justice 
Department had specified 500 beds for sentenced prisoners from the Bureau of Prisons 
“primarily illegal aliens,” and another 500 beds in a separate facility for immigration 
detainees awaiting deportation “primarily illegal aliens with criminal histories.” Bonnie 
Sinsel, a Bureau contracting officer, stated that most would be “illegal aliens” although 
“we can’t say they will all be illegal aliens.” There was similar ambiguity with the nature 
of crimes committed. Ernie Bartolo, the bureau’s assistant administrator for community 
corrections, stated in response to questions about the nature of criminality to be expected, 
“Well, no, not really because you’re talking about illegal aliens. There are very few 
exceptions where you have some kind of history about these individuals. But based on 
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our experience, we haven’t run into a significant number of problems in dealing with this 
type of offender at our other facilities.” CCA and United Concepts operated with two 
different interpretations of what this meant. CCA thought half would be “detainees who 
had violated no crime other than being the United States illegally,” and the other half 
would be medium-security prisoners who had violated immigration laws, “like 
smuggling.” Meanwhile, United Concepts thought half would be “INS detainees” and the 
other half would be “regular medium-security prisoners,” where half of those would be 
“undocumented aliens.”661  
Both Pinal County sites were competing against Quartzsite, a city 200 miles 
northwest of the county. Initially, Quartzsite won the bid for the five year $85.8 million, 
1,000-bed contract though to bring 300 jobs to that city. A spokesperson for the Bureau 
of Prisons justified, “Several factors were involved. They met all bid specifications and 
agreed to begin construction almost immediately.” The Casa Grande mayor Jimmie Kerr 
was “flabbergasted and very disappointed” because he felt that city “had a very good 
shot” but was nevertheless “glad it’s coming to Arizona.” Eloy city manager John 
Vidaurri stated, “I feel disappointed. I’m sure that the city council will echo that same 
disappointment… I got a copy of some of the requirements in original request for 
proposals, there’s some information in the bid proposal that seems to indicate a 
contradiction as to site chosen and other requirements. I don’t know whether we’ll 
register a protest. That’s a council decision.” He was right.662 Eloy mayor Armida Flores 
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joined by United Concepts filed a formal protest. Flores had been selected mayor by a 
unanimous vote of the city council a few months earlier.663 In a letter to Sinsel, Flores 
wrote, “the City of Eloy bases its protest on what appears to be the selection of a site and 
a contractor that should have been less competitive in the bid award process… The City 
expresses its concerns in the hope that BOP/INS officials will consider a review of the 
bid awarded.” Flores noted the original bid had required the facility be “near a jet-capable 
airport and emergency services.” Flores argued the nearest airport to the Quartzsite 
location was more than 36 miles away. Meanwhile, the City of Eloy had a jet-capable 
municipal airport about seven miles from the proposed site. Flores also pointed out that 
the original bid required off-site medical facilities and noted that the Casa Grande 
Regional Medical Center was less than eight miles away.664  
Two months later, the Quartzsite contract was canceled without explanation and 
hopes “in Eloy and Casa Grande [were] on the rise again.” A bureau of prisons public 
information officer stated, “What happens next has not been determined… Anything is 
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possible.”665 Prison bidding was formally reopened. In December 1992, in the hopes of 
keeping their private prison dreams alive, Eloy City Council agreed to annex 1,640 acres 
of land on the site where United Concepts wanted to build the prison. At the same time, 
the City voted to join the Greater Casa Grande Valley Economic Development, by paying 
$5,000 a year annual membership, to provide more jobs to the city. Flores was appointed 
the city’s representative. Council Member John Escarcega, who agreed that “we should 
pay something” also explained his hopes for the future of Eloy, “I believe in Santa 
Clause. We’re going to get (economic development).”666  
Perhaps Eloy got itself put on the nice list. In May 1993, BOP/INS gave United 
Concepts a notice of intent to award the contract and had 30 days to prove they had the 
financing to build the prison. CCA was going to “count the days” and then ask the bureau 
whether it was next in line since it was ready with the site and the financing.667 1994 
would be a good year for Eloy and those who had solicited the private prison. In February 
1994, Flores resigned from the previously council-picked mayor position to run for the 
city’s first election for mayor and won.668 Eloy Detention Center opened in July 1994 and 
was divided into two sections, 500 beds for INS and 500 beds for BOP. Concepts Inc. 
was to receive $4 a day per inmate under a three-year contract, with two one-year 
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renewal options.669 The facility had been “designed with courtrooms for EOIR [Executive 
Office for Immigration Review] judges and office space for INS and EOIR staff to 
provide an IHP [Institution Hearing Program] for the Bureau inmates and deportation 
proceedings for the INS detainees.” Eloy had a unique claim to fame. As John L. Clark, 
assistant director, community corrections and detentions, noted in a House subcommittee 
hearing later, “The IHP at Eloy was the first program where non-U.S. citizens are 
designated specifically to receive their immigration hearings at the beginning of their 
sentence. After completion of their hearings, inmates are transferred to other institutions 
to free up beds for more non-U.S. citizens in need of hearings. Furthermore, the Eloy 
program provided hearings for Mexican nationals.”670 In August, Eloy Detention Center 
received a $192,400 grant from the state’s job-training fund to create 296 jobs.671 That 
summer the U.S. prison population exceeded one million for the first time in the nation’s 
history.672  
On October 23, 1994, about 300 people of the nearly 800 incarcerated at the 
Concept Inc.-run Eloy Detention Center rioted. The center had been open less than three 
months. The Associated Press reported “inmates went on a rampage.”673 The “rampage” 
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evolved into a “destructive rampage” in newspapers as wire stories circulated in the days 
following.674 The incident began late that Sunday afternoon involving about a 100 people 
from the BOP side of the prison who refused to leave the recreation yard for the evening 
meal for “no discernible reason.”675 Although “a large majority did not want to be 
involved,” the scene escalated a few hours later when “the feeling of solidarity may have 
prompted” others to go along.676 Warden J.B. Hopkins said a fire broke out when some 
people “got inside a building and ignited something, possibly a mattress.”677 One article 
noted, “Television broadcasts showed smoldering mattresses which apparently had been 
burned in protest.”678 A later article confirmed that “anybody looking could see smoke 
coming from one of the buildings indicating a fire was inside.”679 The fire activated the 
sprinkler system and flooded the building with a 24-bed segregation unit where “unruly 
inmates are kept.”680 Hopkins claimed the damage was “superficial” since those involved 
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had “just ransacked the place,” without causing structural damage.681 Hopkins further 
noted, “The inmates themselves were not in a mood where they wanted to hurt anybody. 
They just wanted to be destructive.”682 
No one escaped. There was only one injury to a guard who was “hit by 
coincidence by a rock but the skin was not broken.” She did not need medical help. 
Apparently the protesters did not know the guard was hiding on the roof and she had 
radio contact with officers outside the whole time.683 In addition to the Eloy police, the 
Pinal County Sheriff’s Department, the state Department of Public Safety, the Border 
Patrol, Southwest Ambulance, and the Casa Grande and Eloy fire departments all 
responded to the “major” disturbance.684 Governor Fife Symington put National Guard 
units on standby but were not sent to the prison.685 People were heard yelling 
“libertad.”686 Some were pepper sprayed and later “allowed to take showers” in exchange 
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for settling down without retribution.687 Early on, officials claimed to be dumbfounded 
about why the protest took place. Several articles claimed Hopkins did not know why the 
riot took place.688 Others claimed that “inmates were angry over several issues, including 
the food, lack of cable TV and fuzzy signals from Spanish-language TV stations.”689 The 
Tucson Citizen, The Phoenix Gazette, and the Mesa Tribune ran nearly identical stories 
that Tuesday about the causes being food and the lack of cable television.690 Hopkins also 
thought it was “not uncommon for a new facility to experience problems in its infancy” 
because as he put it, “It’s like a new home.”691 It is perhaps an oddly appropriate analogy 
since someone would not normally set fire to a new home three months after moving in 
unless something was seriously wrong. 
Yet, what exactly was wrong perhaps remained less obvious. The riot was not the 
first “disturbance” since Eloy Detention Center had opened in late July. Four weeks 
earlier, there had been a food strike. Official accounts noted that the predominantly 
Hispanic population held inside “demanded more Hispanic-type meals.”692 According to 
Hopkins, prison officials had solved the problem by “changing the portions and type of 
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food.” Once it had been solved, “everything’s been fine,” which was why Hopkins 
remained “totally shocked” by the riots.693 While acknowledging this sit-in food strike, 
Hopkins maintained the Tuesday after the riots that “there was no sign of trouble at the 
prison” before the riot.694 That Monday at noon after the riots, the cafeteria at the 
detention center had resumed serving food and the “prison was back to normal.”695 
Nearly a week later, the story remained that food and lack of cable television had been 
the “driving forces.”696  
 Retired Judge Donna Hamm, head of the prisoner-rights group Middle Ground, 
received letters from those held inside that told a different story. According to Hamm, the 
letters stated that Eloy was “run like a maximum-security facility.” As she noted, “There 
is no freedom to walk around on the yard. Their movement is highly restricted.”697 Hamm 
believed the riots probably stemmed from a lack of a proper grievance system. Hamm 
said, “When the grievance system is a kangaroo court, a rubber stamp for the 
administration, the prisoners will sometimes take matters into their own hands.”698 More 
than two decades later, Hamm still believes the official account remained at the margins 
of the whole story. Hamm notes, “Those ‘reasons’ are not reasons at all. They might be 
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the catalyst which set things off, but the underlying reasons are usually related to prison 
staff who don’t treat inmates fairly, who abuse authority, who demonstrate a lack of 
concern for the overall welfare of inmates, and an administration that is unresponsive to 
expressed concerns. When prison officials blame major riots on ‘food’ and ‘lack of cable 
tv,’ they are attempting to divert attention from their own responsibility in creating 
problems via poor management practices and sloppy attention to best practice 
procedures.”699 Hamm continues to sometimes receive letters from those held at Eloy. As 
she notes, “Their primary complaints center on medical care, visitation problems, 
disciplinary unfairness, complaints of excessive use of force or abuse of authority by 
guards, [and] an unresponsive grievance system.”700 Hamm’s account was in fact 
confirmed by The Arizona Daily Star two years after the riot. According to a BOP report 
requested under FOIA, the prisoners had rioted because officials “failed to meet basic 
needs ranging from medical care to toilet paper.” The report noted that overall sanitation 
was “very poor” and the dining and kitchen areas had a “significant pest problem.”701  
Another riot followed in November 1994. This time in the INS side and involved 
about 80 or more people who “grabbed fencing pipe, baseball bats, broom handles and 
other makeshift weapons.” Five guards suffered minor injuries.702 Apparently, they “were 
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upset about getting timely releases as the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays are 
approaching.”703 Officials from Tucson’s Consulate of Mexico visited Eloy the day after 
the riot and noted that frustration over delays had caused the riot. People had thought they 
would get a hearing within 14 days of being transferred to the facility. It turned out the 14 
days was a minimum and some people had been waiting as long as 40 days. Their news 
release stated, “INS assured us that they would expedite deportations. Additionally, INS 
will conduct meetings with Mexican national groups and individuals were requested.” 
Taking this “compromise” to the people rioting, consulate officials asked them “to cease 
their protest attitude.” Marco Antonio Garcia Blanco, then Mexican consul in Tucson, 
specifically noted, “It is important to emphasize that the consulate officers did not receive 
any complaints against the authorities or services provided in the prison at Eloy. Their 
protest was only based on the delay in the deportation hearings.”704  
Tucson attorneys representing people on the BOP side of the prison did not seem 
surprised by the first riot back in October. One attorney stated, “It was a really wretched 
place to be, with nothing to do and very little in the way of programs.” The same attorney 
noted there had been complaints of poor food and the slow pace of deportation 
proceedings. Another attorney had remarked three days before the October riot that the 
facility “seemed ripe for a riot.”705 Yet, Warden Hopkins maintained the October and 
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November riots were “unrelated” because they involved “different inmates and issues.”706 
The November protest had begun peacefully around 2 p.m. and was over by 5 p.m. Two 
protesters were involved in negotiations over timely releases. However, around 200 
others “became more aggressive and started using rocks and steel bars to damage the 
prison, breaking windows and possibly setting some fires.” Eloy police were alerted at 4 
p.m. Half an hour later, all but 20 people were back in their cells. As the Eloy police chief 
noted, “This time the prison had their own riot team and they were successful in moving 
inmates to an area where they could be controlled.”707 Another thirty minutes and Eloy 
was quiet again.  
There had been concern about safety issues from the public when the detention 
center opened. Current Eloy City Council Member Andrew Rodriguez, who claims to be 
the youngest person ever elected to the position, recalls debates during that time although 
he was too young then to participate. Rodriguez, who was born in Casa Grande in 1985 
and raised on the south side of Eloy, states, “I remember I was young my mom… heard 
both sides… and my dad heard both sides… some people were saying, ‘oh no, it’s going 
to be dangerous… for the kids.’” This was vital since some of Rodriguez’s fondest 
memories of growing up in Eloy was that “you can actually be outside, you can play 
outside, ride your bikes, and not have to worry.” Rodriguez eventually took a job 
working as a guard at the detention center, where he would remain until his election to 
the city council. Rodriguez reflects, “at the end of the day, it hasn’t really been a big 
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issue… when they first opened they had that riot… like a small riot… I have no idea 
[what it was about]… it was nothing major… CCA took care of it… nobody in the city 
was at any time in harm’s way.”708 After all, CCA is just “like a normal business… they 
come to the city and… want to build a new prison and they have to go through the same 
process as everyone else. They have to go through planning and zoning, they have to get 
city permits, they have to pay the same fees – of course, they have to pay more because 
their building is so huge – they got to go through every single step….” Besides there was 
tax money on the line. As Rodriguez notes, “when inmates buy commissaries it’s taxed. 
When CCA does construction out there… the City of Eloy gets construction tax.” Pass 
through monies were also in play. Rodriguez explains, “ICE gives us a check for 
whatever amount on the inmates they have there. Then we give that to CCA… that’s their 
money. Then Eloy Detention Center turns around and gives the city money for whatever 
was negotiated per person.”709 
 Meanwhile, 30 miles northeast from Eloy, Florence was pursuing Mofford’s 
vision for the city. The Central Arizona Detention Center, the new prison on state 
Highway 79 built at a cost of $17 million, had accepted its first prisoners in late October 
1994 while work on the facility was expected to be completed by mid-November. The 
CCA-run prison was meant to help the U.S. marshal house its prisoners in a facility that 
was not an overcrowded county jail. An editor of the local newspaper remarked that the 
prison betrayed expectations, “There are no bars on holding cells, just locked doors with 
windows. Prisoners are milling about within secured areas doing any one of a number of 
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things… As the warden roams through the bright white halls prisoners seem to greet him 
in a friendly manner.” The editor attributed this to CCA’s attitude toward incarceration 
which “not everyone agrees with.” But despite this, security is not lax as the system 
“appears complex and modern. There are cameras and intercoms everywhere. Employees 
carry radios. A person has to go through two doors to get from one section of the facility 
to the other.”710 Elsewhere, by December, the senior warden at the Arizona State Prison 
urged Florence to clean up its act or risk jeopardizing future prison projects. Charles L. 
Ryan, the Senior Warden, noted, “The only thing I’m certain of about convicted felons in 
the state of Arizona is that they will continue to go to prison… as taxpayers we should 
get a better bang for our buck.” This involved offering better housing options for prison 
employees, most of whom commute from out of town. Ryan wanted to see a change in 
the “almost non-existent” Florence rental market and utilize inmate labor for street and 
park maintenance to “help better the appearance of the town.”711  
While Florence worked on their town appearance, Eloy had other carceral 
concerns. In December 1994, a newspaper article cited several current and former 
employees at Eloy Detention Center who gave alternative accounts of what had sparked 
the twin riots. One former guard stated, “My life is worth more than $5.42 an hour” at a 
time when the federal hourly average for guards was $6.74.712 Low pay, lack of training 
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and supply shortages were all mentioned by the employees. As the article pointed out, 
these were “hallmarks of the private-prison industry.” As Dennis Palumbo, a criminal-
justice professor then at Arizona State University noted, “It’s not easy to make a profit in 
that business, so they’ve got to cut corners any way they can.”713 Months later, an 
editorial in The Arizona Daily Star, lambasted policies at Eloy Detention Center that 
hired recent high school graduates, trained them for two weeks, and paid them much less 
than state prison guards. As the editorial noted, “You don’t save money when you must 
periodically muster every available law-enforcement officer in the state to put down riots. 
And a cheaply run, unsafe facility will cost you more in injury, death and lawsuits than it 
will ever save.”714 Yet, Warden Hopkins retorted that rather than inadequate pay or the 
lack of training, the riots demonstrated that his employees lacked confidence in their 
abilities. According to Hopkins, “We’re working to build maturity and a law-enforcement 
mind-set, which takes time to develop.”715  
But the private prison company was not willing to wait. After the two riots, 
Concept Inc. decided to hire an experienced warden to help run the facility. In early 1995, 
John Gluch, who had experience as a warden in three separate states, came to head Eloy 
Detention Center. Gluch had worked for BOP for 24 years and had been the warden at 
                                               
Compensation and Working Conditions (June 1996), p. 35-38, available at 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/occupational-pay-across-regions-in-1994.pdf. 
 
713 Miriam Davidson, “Workers: Shortages sparked prison riots,” The Arizona Republic, 
December 27, 1994, p. B2. 
 
714 The editorial noted that while Eloy guards are paid $5.87 an hour, Arizona state guards are 
paid about $10 an hour. “Underpaid prison guards,” The Arizona Daily Star, editorial, February 4, 
1995, p. 16. 
 
715 Miriam Davidson, “Workers: Shortages sparked prison riots,” The Arizona Republic, 
December 27, 1994, p. B2. 
 235 
four federal prisons in Connecticut, Michigan, and Texas. The BOP had given Concept a 
“cure notice” for Eloy Detention Center that they were not meeting the conditions of the 
contract. Essentially, according to Gluch, BOP told Concept, “if you don’t do the things 
we are asking you to do… we are going to withdraw the contract or cancel the contract.” 
As Gluch notes, “I was hired specifically by Concept at that time to take care of those 
issues… so that was my mission.” According to Gluch, Concept faced several problems. 
He states, “The problem was the Concept folks had run some small operations in Texas 
and never had experience with the Bureau of Prisons and didn’t – couldn’t – really 
comprehend the requirements of the contract that was spelled out in there. In addition, 
they started with a warden who didn’t have any real experience. He was a naval officer 
that ran a brig which is entirely different than a major prison and it was all brand new 
staff and he had very little experience.”716 
 In April 1995, CCA purchased Concept Incorporated, the then third largest 
company in the prison industry, in a stock-for-stock transaction worth $40 million. In 
May 1995, after Gluch had taken over, another riot took place at Eloy Detention Center. 
It was the same day CCA announced it had bought Concepts Inc. Gluch notes that once 
he got the issues over the cure notice “taken care of, the cure notice was lifted then 
Corrections Corporation bought the facility from Concept.”717 A newspaper reported the 
two events were “unrelated.” The riot took place in the INS side of the prison and 
involved about 100 people. There were 100 INS officers at the scene. INS officers fired 
rubber bullets at the rioters. There were no apparent injuries. The “incident” last six 
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hours. A sergeant from Eloy Police Department said he did not hear why “the INS 
inmates were rioting.”718 Gluch recalls, “Right after I got here we had a disturbance but 
by then our staff had been trained and we knew how to deal with it. Really it was not a 
big issue at all, it was handled right away.”719 A few months later all was well again. By 
the end of August, Eloy chamber members toured the detention center and CCA would 
donate $200 to the Eloy Food Bank. As the news article noted, CCA “prides itself on 
being an active community member and hopes to help local non-profit groups with 
projects.”720 But by the end of the following year, CCA would sue the City of Eloy over 
having to pay too much in taxes. 
The year 1996 had started with such promise. In April, CCA was set to expand 
the detention center by increasing the number of beds to 1,500 and adding more than 100 
jobs for the city. It helped that the center’s support facilities “were overbuilt to handle an 
expansion.” The expansion and improvement project was estimated at $5.3 million. But 
signs of trouble in the CCA-Eloy relationship appeared. In the same article, the warden at 
Eloy expressed concern that the city “has been working on new ways to tax” the 
detention center which was “counterproductive.”721 Meanwhile, in July, five people 
escaped from the detention center and were never found.722 Despite admitting that as a 
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neighbor of the detention center he would have felt better if “prison officials sent word to 
me of the escape,” the Enterprise editor urged the community to appreciate the economic 
developments of the city that have “really paid off” with the increase in tax revenue 
brought by the detention center.723 A week later, CCA Detention Center appeared as a 
contributor to the Santa Cruz Valley Food Bank.724 A later newspaper article noted that 
the city budget that year had “more money in it than in the past years “thanks to Eloy 
Detention Center.”725 Yet, in November CCA sued Eloy over being assessed $371,947 in 
privilege taxes, a sales tax normally imposed on hotels, restaurants, and rental properties 
within the city. CCA had paid the tax and $60,000 in penalties under protest but sued for 
the return of that money with interest.726 The more than $400,000 in dispute was placed 
in a trust.727 A year later, an agreement was reached where Eloy kept half of the disputed 
funds, returned the rest, and agreed to assess a tax on lease payments. The tax would 
bring in about $10,000 per month to the city from 1994 until 2009 but was “considerably 
less” than what the city would have received by taxing the detention center as a motel. 
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Both CCA and Eloy agreed to drop the lawsuit and pay their own attorney’s fees. Both 
sides had won.728  
 Yet, CCA also had other problems. In October 1996, six prisoners from Alaska 
cut through the razor-wire fences at their Central Arizona Detention Center in Florence 
and escaped. The prison had 1,300 prisoners at the time. All six men were “considered 
dangerous.” Four men were later recaptured but two remained at large.729 Governor Fife 
Symington was infuriated and demanded reimbursement from CCA for costs of capturing 
the prisoners. In a letter, Symington wrote, “This escape threatens the security of all 
Arizona citizens and requires state and local law enforcement agencies to take special 
action to locate and apprehend these dangerous felons.” CCA expressed their willingness 
to fully cooperate and meet his demands.730 In March 1997, an editorial in The Arizona 
Republic urged that while they supported private prisons they also support “needed” 
regulation of the industry. Citing the escape of the six prisoners and the transfer of more 
than 250 inmates from New Mexico to CADC in Florence, there needed to be “prudent 
regulations” of private prisons in Arizona. As the editorial stated about the New Mexico 
prisoners, “hazardous material was being shipped into Arizona with scant control or 
regulation. And this was hazardous material… with legs.”731  
                                               
728 “CCA, city settle tax dispute, both sides win,” The Eloy Enterprise, March 12, 1998, p. 1. 
“CCA agreement tabled by council,” The Eloy Enterprise, April 29, 1999, p.1. 
 
729 “Murderer, 2nd felon still free after break from private prison,” The Arizona Republic, October 
21, 1996, p. B2. 
 
730 Pamela Manson and Guy Webster, “Governor demands answers on escape,” The Arizona 
Republic, October 22, 1996, p. 1. The next month, two Oregon prisoners climbed over a 
privately-run prison fence near Houston and made it nearly 200 miles before they were caught. 
Oregon later took back all of their prisoners amid the outcry. Associated Press, “Legal loopholes 
wide open for private-prison escapees,” The Arizona Republic, November 7, 1996, p. A2. 
 
 239 
The next month, Symington proposed a plan to build a private prison in Mexico to 
house the majority of Arizona’s Mexican prisoners. His chief of staff offered rural 
carceral solicitation as sufficient justification, “We have a lot of rural communities 
around Arizona that compete for prison projects. So it is not as if we are trying to send 
some kind of ugly industry south of the border.” In fact, this was a humanitarian measure: 
there would be no border to prevent family visits, Spanish would be the prison language, 
and the food would be Mexican. Critics condemned the proposal. The president of the 
State Bar of Arizona called it a “lousy idea.” A law professor asked, “What if inmates 
want to challenge conditions? What if an inmate falls and breaks a leg? How does he 
sue?” The state corrections director countered, “We would still be liable for the lawsuits. 
It’s so simple and common-sensical that I don’t know why anyone hasn’t thought of it 
before.”732 At the same time, while deportations surged dramatically in every major 
metropolitan area nationwide, Phoenix was left out. As INS officials “scrambled” to 
explain why Phoenix was an exception to the upward national trend, partial blame was 
laid on lack of detention beds. Phoenix bed space was “not on-line yet, so we’re a little 
bit behind the curve on the other districts due to a contracting problem,” the Phoenix 
district director noted. But there was nothing to worry about. The district director 
emphasized, “I don’t believe this is anything alarming. This should be a momentary blip. 
Our removals are definitely going up.”733  
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Gluch served as the warden of Eloy Detention Center for five years. He notes his 
part in seeing the vision of a well-run prison facility realized. Gluch states that “one of 
the things I worked on a lot was morale. [The staff] had virtually none because they 
didn’t have very much leadership before… to get them to get pride in their operation 
that’s a very important part of running any facility like that.” Gluch prides himself on 
being a “good warden” that interacted with staff and inmates on a regular basis. As Gluch 
notes, “you got to be out on the compound running around.” In his interactions with 
people held at Eloy, he notes that while “some complain about everything, the vast 
majority want to do their time and go home without as much issue as they can.” 
However, there was a common complaint even when he was there as the warden. Gluch 
states, “They always complain about medical care. They want medical care better than 
you and I can get on the street or more quickly than we can get it.” When asked about 
how the medical care is(was?) at the facility, Gluch replies, “It was better than you can 
get on the street – more responsive. We have immediate response to any medical 
situation and trained staff…We meet all the requirements of whatever contract it is…we 
were in full compliance.”734 At the end of December 2000, Gluch was promoted to 
managing director of CCA’s western region and Thomas Long took over as warden of 
Eloy Detention Center. Gluch noted upon his promotion, “Right now the company’s 
focus is on customer relations and filling empty beds as well as institutions running 
smooth and safe.”735 
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Governor Rose Mofford’s dream eventually came true in Florence. Today, there 
are three Arizona state prisons, seven county and federal prisons, and two private prisons 
(both CCA facilities) in the city. Florence has indeed become a “poster child for the 
expansion and profitability of the prison-industrial complex.”736 For those living and 
working in the city, “prisons are their lifeline.” Journalist Deepa Fernandes notes, “As the 
desert town of Florence attests, prisons can in fact sustain a community while making 
private companies a lot of money.”737 Interestingly, the city is still waiting on a major 
grocery store. However, not everyone is pleased about the lifeline of the town. Florence 
Vice-Mayor Vallarie Woolridge moved to the town in the mid-1980s from Kansas City. 
Her main draws were the small town and weather. A few months after moving to 
Florence, Woolridge was hired by the Coolidge School District for her expertise in using 
computers. She later noted how she trained other staff members since she was the only 
one with the technical knowledge. When Woolridge was elected to the Florence city 
council, she was the first African American to hold such a position. During our interview, 
Woolridge reflected, “it was pretty sad. 2004 and there had never been a black person on 
council but needless to say that’s another story.” She describes the prisons as their “own 
little community” separate from the town. Woolridge states, “we don’t have a lot of 
involvement… we don’t have any say in how they run their facilities as long as they are 
doing it per state laws and guidelines… so we’re kind of separate entities… they’re their 
own community or entity separate from ours although they do have to follow the town 
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procedures and guidelines. But we don’t get to tell them what to do… and they don’t get 
to tell us how to run our town.” When asked about whether more prisons should come to 
Florence, Woolridge responds, “I don’t really want to see more prisons. I really don’t like 
the private prisons but they’re here. But I’d really like to see the state do away with 
private prisons. I don’t think they serve their useful purpose. And even prisons have 
gotten away from rehabilitating people. They’ve just become a big money making 
business and I would really like to see us do away with those private prisons. But no, I 
don’t want to see more prisons here. We have enough.”738 Pensive and somber, she then 
stares off into the distance. Perhaps it was carceral fatigue. 
The relatively quiet expansion of the carceral landscape in Pinal County took 
place against the backdrop of more loudly prominent law enforcement developments in 
neighboring Maricopa County. There, in 1991, voters had rejected a $40 million bond 
issue that would have funded prison expansion by building a 1,000-bed facility.739 
Instead, riding on a no-new-taxes yet tough-on-crime campaign, voters elected Joseph M. 
Arpaio as sheriff the next year. Born to Italian immigrants in the early 1930s, Arpaio had 
served in the U.S. Army, as a police officer, and then later as a special agent with the 
Drug Enforcement Administration. The year after being elected, Arpaio considered 
putting people in tents to “make more room for the bad guys.” The tents were to go up 
around the county’s Durango Jail in southwest Phoenix. “I’m tired of hearing about jail 
overcrowding, and I don’t think we have enough people in jail. This is realistic, and I’m 
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confident it will be done,” Arpaio stated. The tents were to be up by June that year. As 
Arpaio explained, “With the crime and drug problem out there, we need more space, and 
this is a good way to do it at a very reasonable cost. I’m sure people will back me up on 
this.”740 Arpaio was not wrong. Voters of Maricopa County would back him and his tent 
city prisoner housing for more than two decades. 
On August 2, 1993, the In-Tents Jail, located behind the Estrella Jail at 29th 
Avenue and West Durango Street, “opened for business.” The jail was surrounded by a 
“16-foot-tall fence topped with razor wire” and had tents that were donated by the federal 
government. Arpaio planned to use the tents to house people sentenced to work-furlough 
and work-release programs, serving their time at nights and on weekends. There was 
widespread agreement from many sources that all seemed well. A news story in The 
Arizona Republic declared that the jail had “hot and cold running water and portable 
toilets on site.” The managing editor of American Jail declared it was a “feasible idea.” 
The executive director of the Arizona Civil Liberties Union relayed that it was only a 
temporary fix but that he had heard the jail was planned well. According to Arpaio, 
Phoenix planning-and-zoning officials, the Maricopa County Health Care Agency, and 
the state fire marshal had all given their approval.741 An editorial in The Arizona Republic 
commended Arpaio for following through on his campaign promise to erect a tent city to 
ease overcrowding “in fine style.” As the editorial pointed out, “Arpaio is thinking big.” 
Readers who may be “hoodwinked into thinking the tents constitute cruel and unusual 
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punishment” were reassured: evaporative coolers were to be installed in each tent.742 
Some readers, however, did not need such reassurances. Bruce Bushing of Waddell wrote 
a few weeks later, “Don’t get me wrong; I have nothing against prisoners being kept in 
tents in the Phoenix heat during the summertime. It’s almost ironic how justice is 
sometimes served.”743 Perhaps what is ironic is his use of the word justice. That same 
day, Arpaio wrote a guest column that tent city “lets the people of Maricopa County 
know that they don’t have to build jails costing as much as hotels to be safe in their 
homes and on the streets.” Arpaio also had advice for other law enforcement officials: 
“police officers and judges should not hesitate because of concerns about jail capacity as 
they contemplate arrests and sentences.” But, just in case, Arpaio made the argument that 
tent city does not come “close to the cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the U.S. 
Constitution.” In a misapplication of domestic and international legal precedent, Arpaio 
fallaciously reasoned that this was because “jails in the Middle East and Latin America” 
are in fact the real definition of “cruel and unusual punishment” and “inhumane.”744 
To little surprise, all was not well as the jail erupted on at least three separate 
occasions in its first six years. The first took place a little more than two months after 
opening. On October 27, 1993, more than 100 people who had recently been transferred 
rose up at In-Tents Jail to protest living conditions. The incident was not immediately 
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reported to the media. News outlets eventually broke the story a week later describing it 
as the “first outbreak of widespread violence at the tent city.” Despite this Arpaio 
downplayed its seriousness, “It wasn’t a riot or anything close to it. I call this a learning 
process for us.” It took 16 or 17 detention officers to “quell the disturbance.”745 People 
also protested by escaping. In June 1994, Benjamin Walker, who was halfway through a 
six-day jail term, broke a padlock and scaled a fence around the tents. He was caught and 
two years were added to his sentence.746 Three months later, Jeffrey Talent climbed a 
fence and walked out. He was later caught in Tucson and faced additional charges.747 
Despite calling the 1993 incident a “learning process,” little was learned or 
changed three years later. Arpaio was reelected in November 1996. That month the jail 
erupted for the second time. On November 17, about 300 or 400 people (about half the 
jail population) held at the tent city jail took control for five hours to protest conditions. 
Fires were set and rocks were hurled. Initially, news articles reported that the riot began 
when a fight broke out between two inmates. A few hours later, 100 police officers and a 
squad of rifle-carrying National Guard moved in.748 For County Attorney Rick Romley, 
the riot was not unanticipated. “Those of us in law enforcement were not surprised this 
happened. I want to support Joe, but we want to provide at least minimal care,” Romley 
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stated.749 A later 2,100-page report obtained by The Arizona Republic found the story of 
inmate fighting to be false. The report stated that the riot was set off when a detention 
officer pepper sprayed Bobby Joe Baxter as he was using a portable toilet. But conditions 
in general were dismal and ripe for protest. According to The Arizona Republic, the 
report “contains a chilling account of jail conditions – and of a riot that could have been 
far more disastrous but for sheer luck.” The article quotes people held at the prison 
stating, “The DOs (detention officers) get their attitude from the big boss, the sheriff. 
They know he says we should be treated like garbage, so they think it’s OK to push us 
around to act like a bunch of thugs.” The report further noted that people held at the jail 
came together to target specific guards, jail facilities, and Arpaio. As one person held 
there stated, “If it would have been a race riot, it’s either kill or be killed. But every thing 
out there was a unity, that’s all it was. Everyone stuck together.”750  
Two days after the riot, Arpaio started moving people back into tent city jail. 
Despite what may seem to be obviously problematic conditions, federal and county 
officials continued to mull the causes of the riot while Arpaio and his officers defended 
the jail. The riot had taken place amidst an ongoing investigation by the U.S. Justice 
Department over civil-rights abuses in Maricopa County jails. In March, a Justice 
Department letter to a county supervisor noted that the use of excessive force was 
“especially and unacceptably prevalent” in at least three sites, including tent city.751 The 
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union representing county detention officers later laid blame on the Board of Supervisors 
for not building more jails and hiring more officers.752 But Arpaio maintained the riot did 
not have anything to do with overcrowding or conditions because “even coddled” 
prisoners riot.753 Elsewhere, there was agreement among national prison experts that no 
other sheriff “keeps inmates in a tent city, deploys chain gangs, deprives prisoners of 
coffee or serves green bologna sandwiches.” A director at the Institute of Criminal Justice 
stated, “This was inevitable. I would think this is sort of a wake-up call for the guy, I 
hope.”754 Donna Hamm, director of Middle Ground, stated, “His [Arpaio’s] attitude is 
that these people are throwaway people. That attitude has bled down into the staff 
attitude. The staff feels it has license to abuse and humiliate inmates.”755 Affirming this 
perspective were the people directly experiencing tent city. Days after the riot, there was 
unanimous agreement of its cause: “It’s the sheriff’s fault.” Phoenix attorney Joel 
Robbins explained, “The way that jail is run comes from the top down. Sheriff Arpaio 
has taken this ‘toughest sheriff in America’ reputation and used it to make conditions at 
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the jail almost unbearable for the inmates.”756 As the jail was being cleaned up, Arpaio 
maintained, “I am not going to change the program. This is not a country club. If I start 
changing everything now, they’ll riot every time they’re not happy.”757  
Nevertheless, Arpaio met with four people held inside tent city jail two days after 
the riot and promised to make some changes. A news story claimed that what people had 
complained about was medical service and sanitation so Arpaio, who canceled a speech 
at the International Narcotics Officers Association in San Diego to make the meeting, 
promised to provide trash cans, more portable toilets, and make efforts to improve 
medical service. However, Arpaio also noted, “All my programs will stay in place. I 
don’t think this riot was caused by pink underwear or bologna.”758 Two months later, 
Arpaio would again change his mind, this time about taxes, new prisons, and the limits of 
tent city. “It’s very difficult, because I am the one who’s been saying I’ll put up tents 
from here to Mexico, but the reality is, I cannot put dangerous criminals in tents.” For the 
“dangerous criminals” Arpaio suggested a new medium- to maximum-security jail for 
3,000 people.759 After holding on to a no-new-jails position for years, Arpaio would join 
other law enforcement officials advocating prison expansion.    
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Tent city continued to make the news. In February 1997, faced with a shortage of 
detention officers, Arpaio decided dogs with cameras would do. Four “specially trained 
German shepherd dogs” were to be equipped with miniature video cameras to monitor 
the jail. In addition to saving money, there would be security benefits. As Arpaio 
explained, “Are you going to jump over a fence with some crazy dog there?”760 In mid-
May, the dogs, bred and raised in the former Czech Republic and costing $32,000, were 
introduced to tent city at 7 at night because Arpaio did not “want the animals to suffer 
heat exhaustion.”761 The next year, California Governor Pete Wilson visited Maricopa 
County jails to find possible solutions to his state’s jail overpopulation problem. Wilson 
commended Arpaio, “He is trying to prevent people from coming back here. That’s even 
more important than the cash savings for the taxpayers. This is a very good operation for 
people smart enough to learn from an unpleasant experience and not have to repeat it.”762 
California was not alone. Counties in Ohio, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas were 
all considering modeling tent city facilities.763 All the while, federal investigations into 
prisoner abuse continued. 
                                               
760 Jim Walsh, “Jail getting canines with video cameras,” The Arizona Republic, February 9, 
1997, A1, A12. 
 
761 Abraham Kwok, “‘Seeing-eye’ dogs to prowl tent jail,” The Arizona Republic, May 21, 1997, 
B1. 
 
762 Richard Ruelas, “Show and tell at jail: Calif. governor draws ideas from Tent City,” The 
Arizona Republic, January 18, 1998, B1. 
 
763 Ruelas, “Show and tell,” B6. Wilson was also introduced to 18 female prisoners who were part 
of Arpaio’s female chain gangs as they stepped off a bus. Asked if he would have liked to talk to 
them, Wilson passed. As the women walked away, they chanted, military style, “I don’t know but 
I’ve been told. Sheriff Joe is mighty bold.” To this, Wilson “chuckled.” Ibid. Female prisoners 
had been moved to tent city back in the summer of 1996. “Moving to a tent for the summer,” The 
Arizona Republic, May 16, 1996, B1.  
 250 
Yet, at the end of June 1998, the Justice Department ended its three-year 
investigation over jail operations (begun in August 1995) and dropped a lawsuit over 
prisoner abuse. The Department claimed Arpaio had complied with jail improvement 
requirements. Arpaio, on the other hand, claimed the dismissal proved prisoners were 
never victims of systematic mistreatment and declared victory. Arpaio’s public 
information staff claimed the headline: “Justice is done. Jail brutality claims unfounded.” 
The article stated that while the use-of-force issue was “resolved, medical and mental 
health care within the jails remain under a federal investigation.”764 A year earlier, 
Amnesty International had visited Maricopa County to investigate treatment of people 
held in jails. They reported that most people held at tent city spent their time “confined to 
the tents.” The tents themselves “provide serious environmental hazards which make 
them unsuitable for inmate housing.”765  
After an eight-month inquiry into whether jail conditions had in fact changed, The 
Arizona Republic reported that they had not. At that point, Arpaio was listed as a 
defendant in more than 800 lawsuits, while having written a book and made 500 talk-
show appearances. While commanding an 85 percent approval rate in Maricopa County, 
his jail continued business as usual. Despite the lawsuit being dropped, Arpaio 
maintained, “Conditions are the same. Nothing’s changed.” Just in January 1998, Cedric 
Saulsberry, held at tent city jail, had been “kicked, choked, and jolted with a stun gun, 
then hauled to a jail infirmary where guards pinned him down and shoved a catheter up 
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his penis, drawing blood instead of urine.” Five people held inside relayed the same 
events in separate interviews. Yet, a sheriff’s report blamed Saulsberry for violating jail 
policy and using obscene language.766 Such unfiltered state violence carried on 
uninterrupted in Maricopa County. Arpaio’s popularity was a significant contributor. 
When he is asked how he gets away with tent city operations, Arpaio responds, “You 
know how to get it done? You do it! If we were so bad, do you think I’d still be sheriff 
after five years? I haven’t been driven out of town.”767 As Hamm noted, “Joe Arpaio is a 
good snake oil salesman… People are buying his snake oil… They think he has it under 
control. It’s far out of control.”768  
But critics could not stop tent city operations. In August 1998, Arpaio threw a 
birthday party for the jail “with himself as the guest of honor and a 500-pound, black-
and-white-striped birthday cake as a prop.” The executive director of the Arizona ACLU 
condemned the jail “as horrible today as it was five years ago.” But Arpaio would not 
retreat, “They can eat it along with their criticisms. This shows that I’ll never back 
down.”769 At the same time, Pima County started considering proposals for a smaller 
version of Maricopa’s tent city although we much less enthusiasm. As Sheriff Clarence 
Dupnik explained, “I have not been fond of using tents. I am not fond of using tents. I 
will never be fond of using them. The only reason we are considering using tents is that 
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we don’t have any money to build more buildings.” Paul Gattone, an attorney with the 
Southern Arizona People’s Law Center, called the tents “cruel and unusual punishment.” 
Gattone stated, “We’re dealing with human beings and people with constitutional rights. I 
don’t know if Sheriff Clarence Dupnik is trying to match the ridiculous reputation of 
Arpaio. I hope not. I think it’s just a recipe for disaster.”770 Disaster would strike 
Maricopa’s tent city a third time. On the night of June 12, 1999, about 200 people rose up 
and set fires to the tents. The rebellion was put down with patrol dogs and pepper spray. 
All was quiet after about an hour. Arpaio was not dissuaded, “These tents will always be 
here. They’re not going anywhere. This is only the second little disturbance in the whole 
jail system.”771  
Even after the “disturbances” of the 1990s had subsided, Arpaio’s tent city 
continued to make headlines. In 2001, Arpaio used “posse members, canine units, 
mounted patrols and his SWAT team” to shakedown Tent City and its visitors after 
reports that contraband was being smuggled in to facilitate escapes. The search came 
after officers had stopped a recent escape attempt by two people held at the jail.772 Two 
years later, it was reported that more than 100 people held at Tent City could have been 
exposed to active tuberculosis.773 The next month, in July 2003, when temperatures 
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reached 126 degrees inside the tents, Arpaio “offered one concession” and allowed 
people to strip while insisting, “They’re tough, they’re used to the tents.”774 A year later, 
in July 2004, Arpaio made another concession: he allowed country singer Glen Campbell 
to perform for those held at Tent City after Campbell completed his 10-day sentence for 
DUI. According to Arpaio, the mini-concert was part of Campbell’s time served. “We 
have some guys in here who cut hair, some who work in the kitchen and some who clean 
the floors. This inmate’s work is singing, and it’s not costing me anything,” Arpaio 
stated.775 
 
Eloy Detention Center 
Three months later, on October 13, 2004, the third and last Bush-Kerry 
presidential debate took place at Arizona State University in Tempe. The topic of the 
night was domestic affairs. A year earlier, in March 2003, INS (which had been part of 
the Justice Department since 1940), was transitioned to the newly-created Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, detention functions were handed over to the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.776 During the debate, Kerry said we 
absolutely must be safe and secure again. Bush replied we could if “we stay on the 
offense against the terrorists.” On immigration Bush wanted to increase border security 
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with new equipment and a temporary worker card that allowed a “willing worker and a 
willing employer to mate up.” And he obviously would not “reward illegal behavior.” 
Kerry wanted to fix the “leaking” border, crack down on illegal hiring, and an “earned-
legalization program” for people who have “stayed out of trouble.”777  
 No one mentioned noncitizen detention. 
Yet, 60 miles southeast from the debate, lives were about to intersect. Jesus A. 
Ruiz, an immigrant from Mexico who became a U.S. citizen in 2000, faced an 
opportunity for promotion from his position as a Sergeant at Eloy Detention Center to 
Inmate Systems Manager. Ruiz had spent most of his life living and working in Pinal 
County and is grateful today to the private prison company in charge of the center for his 
livelihood. As he notes, “my kids have food, I’m very grateful for the opportunity – to 
my home and my family.”778 Ruiz received the promotion. Meanwhile, José López-Lara 
sat in his cell inside the detention center where Ruiz worked, his case pending within the 
barbed wire fences and locked doors of the 1,500-bed facility operated by CCA. The 
private prison company had by then become an integral part of the small rural 
community. Just a few months before, CCA teamed up with Home Depot and various 
community organizations to host the town’s annual “Christmas in April” project to 
revitalize two homes. As one CCA official noted, the event was “proof that a community 
can come together for the betterment of its citizens.”779 Later, Ruiz would note of the 
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detention center, “We’re always doing something with the City of Eloy.”780 Yet, it 
appeared the betterment was intended for ‘citizens’ in the most literal sense. Because 
even though the detention center provided revenue and jobs to the community and was 
not supposed to be a jail (despite locals referring it as a “prison”), José remained 
incarcerated. Most certainly few in this rural community thought about coming together 
for his betterment. Seven days after the presidential debate in which the plight of those 
like him were ignored by both candidates, José turned 56. He was probably anxious to get 
home. But four days after his birthday, José was dead.781  
José died at the Maricopa Medical Center in Phoenix. His official cause of death 
is listed as cerebral infarction, an ischemic stroke caused by a reduction in the blood 
supply to an area of the brain.782 There is no way to know with certainty whether his 
death was preventable. Perhaps better medical care could have made a difference. Maybe 
not. Yet, what is known with certainty is that José’s death marked a grim beginning and 
brought notoriety to Eloy in a way that few could have anticipated. 
Perhaps if José’s death had remained isolated, the vastness of the Sonoran Desert 
and the remoteness of Eloy may have allied to conceal the human cost of the city’s 
lucrative facility. Yet, four days after the new year, death came for another at the 
detention center. Elias Lopez Ruelas was 54 years old when he died after being taken to 
the RTA Hospice in Casa Grande. His official cause of death was cirrhosis of unclear 
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etiology.783 While cirrhosis, or chronic liver damage, cannot be cured, it can often be 
treated if diagnosed. Diagnosis often requires lab tests or imaging for detection. Like 
José, perhaps if Elias had received better care, he may not have died when he did. The 
sons of Maya Nand are certain that would have been true of their father. Almost a month 
after Elias died, Maya suffered cardiac arrest while detained at Eloy Detention Center. He 
was twenty-two days away from turning 57. Maya, who was diabetic, had been 
frantically calling his family for more than 10 days after being abruptly taken into 
custody at the family home in Sacramento in mid-January. The last call Maya made to his 
family was the first time his sons ever heard their father cry. One son, Jay Ashis, later 
relayed that call, “He said, ‘Son, if you don’t get me out of here today, I’m going to die.’” 
Maya foretold his own fate. The day after the last call, Maya was taken to an emergency 
room in Casa Grande. After being diagnosed with congestive heart failure and later a 
heart attack, he was airlifted to St. Mary’s Hospital in Tucson on life support. His family 
drove twelve hours to watch his heart fail. He died shackled to a hospital bed.784  
 The lack of proper care inside noncitizen detention centers has also had 
devastating consequences for those facing psychological symptoms. This is particularly 
true at Eloy Detention Center. Three days before Christmas 2005, the Eloy Enterprise ran 
a story titled “CCA death in cell” in the section “Of interest… In Brief.” The story, 
totaling less than 60 words, told how guards at Eloy Detention Center had found a 
“detainee unresponsive in his cell.” He was pronounced dead at 5:20am on December 14 
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of an “apparent suicide.”785 No further details were provided. In a later investigation of 
83 deaths of immigrant detainees between 2003 and 2008, The Washington Post found 
that 30 were “questionable.” Juan Salazar-Gomez’s death that December morning at Eloy 
was one such listed.786 Almost certainly Juan, who was 29 at the time he was found in his 
cell, never anticipated the grim precedent his death would set.787 Juan’s death marked the 
fatal beginning of a string of suicides that have since followed. 
In early 2006, BOP decided not to renew its contract with the Eloy Detention 
Center due to budget issues. Nearly 500 BOP inmates were to be moved out of the 
Center.788 Prison jobs were on the line. Eloy Mayor Byron Jackson, a former corrections 
officer, wrote to ICE, “The city of Eloy has had discussions with CCA regarding the 
development of a Residential Services Agreement for the housing of detainees/ inmates at 
the Eloy facility. Should ICE have a need for detention space at this facility, the city 
would be happy to enter into discussions/ negotiations with ICE.” CCA was attempting to 
find employees new jobs. In the meantime, employees at EDC were asked to sign non-
disclosure agreements “designed to limit their conversation with reporters and others.”789 
While waiting for ICE to approve the contract, prison employees anxiously awaited their 
future. One corrections officer who went by “Mr. Ray” noted that 126 people had already 
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been laid off. Ray said, “I’ve been there 12 years and they’re doing cuts by seniority. But 
if there are pay cuts your senior officers are going to be looking for work elsewhere. A lot 
of people are leaving now.”790 ICE eventually approved the intergovernmental service 
agreement with Eloy. The per diem rate per detainee was $68.45.791 Meanwhile, Jackson 
had little reservation of Eloy “becoming known as a prison town.” Jackson noted, “I think 
people are comfortable with the environment… Heck, it’s been 10 years now with very 
little problems whatsoever.”792 Despite four deaths so far, Eloy Detention Center stayed 
open for business. 
Yet, conditions at Eloy Detention Center remained the same. On New Year’s Day 
2006, Jose López-Gregorio had turned 32. The husband and father likely spent his 
birthday and the coming of a new year worrying about how to feed his family. They were 
going hungry and he had to make a choice. In mid-August, he left his family with a 
month’s supply of food and headed north. By the end of September, he was at Eloy 
Detention Center.793 For twenty-one days after being incarcerated, Jose did not receive a 
physical examination. After he was finally examined, medical personnel ignored a sick 
call for seven days.794 Guilt-ridden over leaving his family and being unable to rejoin 
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them, Jose contemplated ending his life. On September 24, he was placed on suicide 
watch in isolation after fellow detainees reported he was voicing suicidal thoughts. A 
medical doctor met with him at 7 p.m. that night. The doctor reported his risk as low, 
discontinued suicide watch, and placed him on 15-minute checks. The next day, the 
doctor met with Jose. Jose was “very upset, sobbing, expressing much guilt.” The doctor 
diagnosed Jose with Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood. As Jose was scheduled 
to leave the facility the next day, no further follow up was scheduled.795 Four days later 
Jose, still at Eloy, was found in his cell with a bedsheet tied to the upper bunk. He was 
taken to Casa Grande Regional Medical Center and later pronounced dead.796 ICE later 
stated after an investigation, “Medical care in this facility does not meet ICE 
standards.”797 Yet, the facility stayed open. 
 As Eloy Detention Center continued to operate as if nothing was amiss, the death 
toll increased. In November 2006, a few months after Jose’s death and less than a year 
after Juan’s death, Mario Francisco Chavez-Torres turned 27 years old. A month later he 
would suffer headaches, dizziness, and vomiting at Eloy Detention Center while the 
medical staff ignored his symptoms.798 Mario’s sick call from solitary confinement was 
ignored for four days. When a nurse finally responded, it took her one hour to get to 
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Mario, whose cell was a two-minute walk from the medical office. Once she got to his 
cell, she said she was not qualified to assess him and she was “only a pill pusher.” There 
is no evidence that a doctor ever saw Mario.799 A week later he collapsed in the shower. 
On December 13, 2006, Mario was found unconscious in an isolation cell after an 
“unwitnessed seizure” had left him brain dead. His official cause of death is listed as a 
ruptured arteriovenous malformation midbrain.800 Eloy Detention Center continued to 
stay open for business. An ICE memo investigating Mario’s death concluded he “should 
have been referred for outside treatment and that Eloy failed to protect [Mario]’s health, 
safety, and welfare.”801 A later DHS investigation found that Eloy Detention Center had 
“failed on multiple levels to perform basic supervision and provide for the safety and 
welfare of ICE detainees.”802 
 The brutality of noncitizen detention at Eloy continued away from public scrutiny 
or legal remedy. Five days after Mario’s death, Felix Franklin Rodriguez-Torres called 
his mother, Maria, in Queens from Eloy Detention Center. Felix, a construction worker 
who loved to play soccer, told her that he had been sick from coughing and fever. He had 
developed swelling in his neck that his sister had noticed some time before “most likely a 
sign that cancer was blocking his lymph system.” Felix promised to call his mom again 
on Christmas. He never did. Two days after Christmas, Felix was taken to the emergency 
room at Maricopa Medical Center in Phoenix. He had laid “pleading for medical help on 
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the floor of his cell, unable to move.” The mass in his neck had tripled in size and 
obstructed his breathing. He was too far gone for chemotherapy since his cancer had gone 
undiagnosed and untreated. He was placed on life support. On January 12, 2007, the 
hospital gave notice to CCA that Felix had a week to live. The deportation officer refused 
to tell his family where he was hospitalized. The officer offered to release Felix to his 
family if they paid for a plane ticket to New York. But Felix was too sick to travel. A 
nurse had secretly lent Felix her phone so he could call his family. His parents finally 
came to his bedside once they heard from him. Felix’s face lit up when he saw them. 
They spoke to him for a few hours before the visit was cut off by detention guards. The 
next morning, Felix was in a coma. On January 18, his family took him off life support. 
Felix died of a cancer that was treatable in a “vast majority of cases.” He was 36. His 
mother later lamented, “I never want another immigrant to feel this pain.”803 Two months 
after Felix’s death, Eloy underwent its annual review. It was assigned a final rating of 
“acceptable.”804   
 It would be inaccurate to say that the detention center was completed closed to 
public scrutiny. Four months after Felix’s death and a month after the annual review, the 
then editor of the Eloy Enterprise, Lindsey Gemme, visited Eloy Detention Center for the 
first time. Perhaps there was hope the town newspaper would finally shed light on the 
happenings inside the detention center for the community and the world to see. Yet, 
Gemme would not be the journalist to do so. After thanking CCA for “their time and 
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hospitality,” Gemme details her introduction to the “prison system and its inner 
workings.” As she notes, prison is not just a place where “the rest of society hopes to lock 
away our undesirables and throw away the key” but also a place meant to “rehabilitate, 
teach, and maybe even heal people who have maybe made a few mistakes.” Perhaps 
someone should have informed Gemme that the detention center was not meant to be a 
prison since people are held there while their “administrative proceedings” are being 
adjudicated. But then again, considering the visual markers of barbed wire, locked doors, 
and armed security, she described what she saw. Regardless, perhaps such subtleties are 
meaningless anyway in a “prison town.” Gemme found that detainees “were friendly, 
talkative, and not scary at all,” despite the barbed wire fencing. She highlighted that she 
believes “in forgiveness and second chances. Sometimes third and fourth chances.” She 
ended by hoping that the women she met can “get ‘back to a normal life’ in their new one 
as soon as they possibly can.”805 If only serving time at Eloy gave hope to that possibility. 
A few months later, CCA’s Anytown Scholarship funded three Pinal County high school 
students to attend a leadership development camp. As a CCA official noted, “As one of 
the largest employers in Pinal County, it is vital for us to invest in our host 
communities.”806 As people kept losing their lives at Eloy Detention Center, money kept 
being circulated and there was little indication the community would raise any objections. 
 This was particularly true as time passed and the incarcerating entity and job 
provider became even more embedded in the community. On Valentine’s Day 2008, 
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there was a company barbeque at Eloy Detention Center in celebration of CCA turning 
25. John Ferguson, then president and CEO of CCA, attributed the company’s success to 
their “dedication in providing a safe and secure environment for the inmates in our care, 
our employees and the communities we serve.”807 At the annual inspection of the facility 
later that month, EDC would again be given a rating of “acceptable.”808 Five months 
later, Nail Yoursef Dawood died at Eloy Detention Center. His official cause of death is 
listed as “natural/coronary artery vasculitis.” Nail was 23 days away from turning 42. 
Less than three months later, Emmanuel Owusu committed suicide while held at Eloy. 
Emannuel was a 62-year-old barber who had lived as a permanent resident for 33 years 
mostly in Chicago. He was a diabetic with high blood pressure. He had been detained for 
two years at Eloy. He was found hanging weeks after he had lost his last appeal. He died 
at Casa Grande Regional Hospital from “complications of acute cerebrovascular 
accident.”809 Updating its national detentions standards from 2000, ICE issued 
performance-based national detention standards in 2008. As one work notes, “Both the 
original standards for civil detention and subsequent revisions largely replicate the ACA 
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jail detention standards for pretrial criminal defendants. ICE made no modifications to 
tailor correctional standards to fit the unique legal, medical, and cultural requirements of 
foreign-born, administratively held detainees. And where its standards were modified, the 
standard of care was diminished.”810 Regardless, as another work points out, these 
standards are “not legally enforceable because, unless they face criminal prosecution as 
well as deportation, detained immigrants are covered by administrative law, but not the 
constitutional protections that accompany criminal procedures.”811  
 As Eloy Detention Center continued to stay open, the rural community continued 
to seemingly benefit despite the graveyard being created at the edge of town. In its 
February 2010 annual review, Eloy Detention Center got a final rating of “superior.” In 
July 2010, representatives from the detention center donated “notebooks, pencils, paper, 
rulers, glue and much more” to the Eloy Elementary School District “just in time for the 
start of the new school year.”812 In November, veterans employed at Eloy Detention 
Center received a “special commemorative pin that pays homage to their bravery and 
commitment to the country.”813 The annual review in February of 2011 stated that Eloy 
Detention Center met all standards. Yet, whatever guidelines this fiction denoted, it did 
not mean an end to the reality of deaths. On October 5, 2011, Pablo Gracida-Conte 
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submitted a call slip while held at Eloy Detention Center that said, “Can you please help 
me?” Pablo had had no appetite for three weeks and threw up whenever he did manage to 
eat. A second call slip read, “my stomach hurts, unable to eat well, will vomit after 
eating. Pain in stomach.”814 Pablo only spoke his native dialect of Mixtec. He likely had 
someone write the call slips for him in English. At 3:30 p.m. three days later, a nurse at 
the clinic tried to use a Spanish interpreter but noted that “something was definitely lost 
when trying to communicate over a speaker phone.” The nurse recalls that “all he wanted 
to talk about were tortillas saying tortillas and meant were the only things that didn’t hurt 
his stomach.” The nurse recorded that Pablo was a “thin male, appears older than stated 
age.”815 At 10 a.m. on October 14, Pablo stated he had “not felt well for two months.” He 
had no appetite and a level of pain that did not “let him sleep.”816 On October 22, Pablo 
was sent to medical for suffering shortness of breath. The nurse practitioner stated, “I’m 
not going to see him.” Instead, he instructed to “increase fluids, continue his medications 
and refer to the primary [midlevel practitioner] for follow-up next week.”817 The next 
day, Pablo submitted another sick call in English that he wanted to stop taking the 
medications because the pills made him feel bad, they gave him heartburn, and made him 
feel dizzy.818 On October 24, Pablo stated that he had not “been eating for two months 
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and was even unable to recall his last meal.” He stated he “was going to court tomorrow 
and just wanted to go home.”819 At 7 p.m. the next day Pablo was admitted to Casa 
Grande Regional Medical Center. Three days later, he was airlifted to the University 
Medical Center in Tucson. In likely one of his last words, at 12:57 a.m. on October 30, he 
noted that he “can’t take a deep breath.”820 At 4:42 a.m. Pablo passed away. The Medical 
Compliance Review repeatedly noted that various individuals “failed.”821 A few months 
later in early 2012, DHS conducted a performance-based national detention standards 
inspection at Eloy Detention Center. Eloy received a final rating of “Meets Standards.”822 
In 2011, CCA reported a net income of $162 million.823 
 One might perhaps think that once deaths in a single detention center had risen to 
double digits, something would have been done. Yet, in a seemingly natural indication of 
how this nation has long cast off individuals deemed the “other” nothing was in fact 
done. A community had jobs, a company made money, and the detention center stayed 
open. On January 12, 2012, Manuel Cota-Domingo turned 34 years old. We can only 
guess whether he made plans then for his travels north. Regardless, by early December of 
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that year, he had made his way to Sasabe, Arizona.824 On December 12, he was at Eloy 
Detention Center. That morning, he was offered a phone call and he called his father, 
Mateo. Manuel had been carrying a “bag of meds” that was taken from him once he got 
to Eloy because it was “non-allowable property.”825 The next day, Manuel signed a form 
indicating he wanted to tell the consulate he was detained.826 For the next 10 days, 
Manuel would suffer a series of medical symptoms. They started with congestion and a 
cough. Manuel verbally denied he had any serious medical conditions. As a registered 
nurse later claimed, “some detainees are afraid to disclose medical conditions because 
they fear it will either cause them to be held in detention longer, or speed up their 
removal.”827 His cellmate later noted that Manuel was “worried he would have to pay for 
medical care which he could not afford.” So, he suffered in silence.  
A week after being brought to Eloy Detention Center, Manuel was medically 
cleared “to be removed” and tentatively scheduled for removal via ICE Air the day after 
Christmas.828 At 11 p.m. on December 19, his cellmate heard Manuel having “very 
labored breathing.” His cellmate banged on the cell door and yelled “CO” and “sick.” A 
corrections officer responded at 2 a.m.829 Manuel was finally evaluated by a registered 
                                               
824 DHS Report of Investigation, Case Number 201302544, Detainee Death Review: Manuel 
COTA-Domingo, p. 2. 
 
825 DHS Report, Manuel Cota-Domingo, p. 6. 
 
826 DHS Report, Manuel Cota-Domingo, p. 11. 
 
827 DHS Report, Manuel Cota-Domingo, p. 12. 
 
828 DHS Report, Manuel Cota-Domingo, p. 13. 
 
829 DHS Report, Manuel Cota-Domingo, p. 14. “CO” refers to corrections officer. 
 268 
nurse at 4:30 a.m.830 Manuel talked about “his family and seemed distressed about not 
being able to reach them.” The nurse thought he was having “an anxiety attack.”831 After 
5 a.m. it was recommended that Manuel be taken to the hospital.832 But no ambulance 
was called. Instead, Manuel was restrained in irons and then driven to Florence Anthem 
Hospital in Florence in a van. On the way, neither of the two correctional officers spoke 
Spanish. One commented on how bad Manuel’s breath smelled. They noted that his 
“breathing became noticeably more labored during the trip” and he had “started out 
sitting upright, but gradually slouched down in his seat until he was laying down.”833 
Hours after arriving at the hospital, he was shocked with a defibrillator.834 Manuel 
remained unresponsive the next day. On December 22, he was transferred to St. Joseph’s 
Hospital in Phoenix.835 57 minutes after midnight on December 23, 2012 Manuel was 
declared dead.836 The later Medical Compliance Review found that Eloy Detention 
Center was not fully compliant with ICE standards for medical care.837 Yet, the detention 
center remained open. 
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 Perhaps it would be inaccurate to say nothing was ever done after lives were lost. 
In their final days alive, Elsa Guadalupe-Gonzales and Jorge Garcia-Maldanado lived 
almost parallel lives. Although by different means, they both found themselves at Eloy 
Detention Center in March 2013. Elsa was 24. Jorge had just turned 40. They both had 
significant others and children. Elsa was assigned to Bravo housing unit Pod 200, Cell 
206. Jorge was assigned to Echo housing unit Pod 200, Cell 208. After being booked, 
they were both allowed to take their shoes inside the facility as “allowable property.” 
They were both deemed to be in good mental health during initial intakes. They were 
both given a pamphlet on managing stress.838 Three days apart, they both met with their 
assigned deportation officers. Elsa’s officer later said that “he did not specifically 
remember” her. Jorge’s officer later said that “he did not have any recollection” of 
him.839 The attendance log indicates they both went to Christian religious services several 
times although with no overlapping dates. The Chaplain who was interviewed later said 
she did not “specifically remember” either of them.840 Perhaps the circumstances of their 
deaths were different but their lives ended the same way. On April 28, Elsa waited for 
others in her unit to leave for dinner. She then “shut her cell door while still inside, and 
smiled through the window in her cell, at the detainees in the dayroom.”841 As Margaret 
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Regan describes, “Elsa sat down on the lower bunk and pulled the laces out of her 
sneakers. She knotted them together into a circle, looped the string around the trop bed 
frame, and tied it. Finally she climbed up onto the bottom bunk, circled the noose around 
her neck, and stepped into the air.”842 She was found hanging from the top bunk with her 
shoelaces around her neck.843 Two days later, Jorge placed a towel to cover the cell 
door’s window. He was found hanging from the top bunk with shoestring around his 
neck.844 On May 10, 2013, Eloy Detention Center employees received an email stating 
that “all shoelaces have been taken from all detainees and are now considered 
contraband.”845 Finally then, something was done about the deaths at the detention center. 
 By this point, rather than the deaths connected to its detention center, the City of 
Eloy had gained prominence among the noncitizen detention circles and the summer of 
2014 provided an opportunity to showcase themselves as a well-connected prison city. 
Central American refugees were overwhelming the border. There was a need for a place 
to house the mothers and children. All eyes were on CCA to take the lead. CCA had a 
place in Dilley, Texas they called the “South Texas Family Residential Center.” If 
opened it would be the largest ICE facility in the country. But contracts would have to be 
written and negotiated, a process that takes time. So, the City of Eloy stepped in to save 
the day and avoid bureaucratic delays. As Lauren-Brooke Eisen explains, “DHS wanted a 
facility built quickly, and they turned to CCA. In an odd contractual arrangement the 
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most knowledgeable contract attorney would be hard pressed to explain, the federal 
government did not engage in a public bidding process but amended an 
Intergovernmental Service Agreement between the City of Eloy, Arizona and ICE to 
house up to 2,400 detainees at the South Texas Family Detention Facility.”846 On 
September 25, 2014, the town newspaper carried the headline, “City takes on $290M deal 
with ICE.” The deal had two agreements: one between ICE and Eloy and another 
between Eloy and CCA. At the request of CCA, the City of Eloy agreed to modify the 
terms of its Intergovernmental Service Agreement with ICE. But the council had “dug in 
its heels and held out for twice the fee that CCA had offered.” CCA offered 25 cents per 
day per detainee. The City Council wanted a $1 a day per detainee. They settled for 50 
cents per detainee. Eloy would net $438,000 per year from the family detention center in 
Dilley. Money was the only point of contention. No efforts were made to reform 
standards of care. The city did not reference the conditions inside its own detention 
center. As City Manager Harvey Krauss stated, “This is a business deal for the city – it is 
not about immigration.”847 Krauss is part of what surrounding cities have come to label as 
Eloy’s “A team.” According to current City Council Member Andrew Rodriguez, when 
other cities find out about Krauss there is notable envy. Rodriguez brags that Krauss has 
“been with the city for a while, he was the city planner, and then he became the city 
manager… Eloy was always straight and narrow… we didn’t want that no more… we 
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1, 6. 
 272 
wanted the best of the best.”848 Before the vote, Mayor Joseph Nagy stated, “It’s the 
council’s opinion that we should participate in some of the rewards of working with CCA 
and the government.”849 After the vote, Nagy noted, “The citizens won.”850 Indeed, it 
would then matter little who lost. 
Of course, the money coming in to the City of Eloy had no impact on the rising 
death toll. In fiscal year 2015-16, the city adopted a tentative budget of more than $39 
million. In 2015, the city received $108,000 in pass through revenue for Eloy Detention 
Center and $215,000 in pass through revenue for Dilley.851 Despite the large sums 
circulated around, nothing changed inside the detention center. For Elisa Deniz this 
would mean unbearable heartache. Elisa last saw her son, José de Jesús Deniz-Sahagun, 
when they celebrated his birthday on May 13, 2015 at the family home in Jalisco, 
Mexico. The occasion was bittersweet as José was heading north to join his three young 
children in Las Vegas. Two days later, José encountered border patrol agents in Douglas, 
Arizona. He was “hysterical and visibly emotional” and “expressed fear that someone 
was going to kill him.”852 On May 17, José was taken to Banner University Medical 
Center in Tucson after “twice jumping from a concrete bench in a Border Patrol hold 
room and landing on his head.” He was later discharged into USBP custody and listed as 
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“stable.”853 Once he was booked into Eloy on May 18 he told a registered nurse during 
his intake that he was taken to the hospital the day before after “throwing himself off a 
table to try to kill himself. He stated he wanted to break his neck and die because his life 
was threatened, and he would rather kill himself than allow someone else to do it.” The 
registered nurse later said José at that time was not “suicidal, symptomatic, or urgent,” 
and described him as appearing “stable.”854 He spoke to his sister on the phone one 
time.855 She never heard from him again. 
 The story of José de Jesús depicts in raw terms the brutality and state violence 
that has become the modern noncitizen detention regime. His story tells the systematic 
way in which the evolution of administrative caging has left entire groups of people, 
namely noncitizens of color, on the bare plane of unfettered state discretion. The details 
are important because within them the violence comes alive. On May 19, José de Jesús 
reacted to his incarceration on four separate occasions. Each time he was met with force. 
Around 9:30 a.m., two CCA employees attempted to interview him. José refused to 
answer any questions and insisted his attorney be present. When the employees gave up 
and returned him to his cell, José attempted to run out the main door. An officer pointed 
pepper spray at him and ordered him to face the wall and place his hands behind his back. 
José complied. After being handcuffed, José again attempted for the door. Two officers 
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then took him down and later described the take-down maneuver as “one of the easiest he 
has seen in his ten years in corrections.” The officers described José as “completely 
uncompliant, uncooperative, and aggressive” during the incident.856 Camera footage of 
the incident remains less than useful because “there was bright sunlight… obscuring clear 
view” and “some of the incident took place in a blind spot.”857 While José is on the floor, 
handheld video footage shows him surrounded by staff and “he is crying out and 
screaming.” José refused to comply with the medical exam and repeatedly stated, “This is 
brutality. I need my lawyer.” A registered nurse later recalled that he was “verbally 
combative, agitated, not making sense, and demanding his lawyer be called.” She was 
only able to determine that he had “no visible signs of bleeding.” José was again held 
face-down on the floor in the medical unit to “control his movements.” José screams in 
English and Spanish, “Help me,” “Call my lawyer,” “This is brutality.”858 
 After 14 minutes at the clinic, José was placed in a wheelchair to be taken back to 
his cell. José refused to cooperate and tried to slide out of the wheelchair. A CCA 
employee applied a pressure point technique to the base of his neck for five seconds and a 
second pressure point to his hypoglossal nerve for two seconds. Upon release of the 
pressure points, José stopped resisting. Four officers, one holding each of his limbs, 
carried him face down back to his cell. José was sobbing.859 José was then placed on 
suicide watch and had to be moved to a different location. A “five person cell extraction 
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team was assembled.” José was taken by a gurney without issue. However, once he got to 
the new cell, he refused to get off the stretcher and the staff had to carry him inside.860 On 
May 20, José saw a doctor who wrote that José was “embarrassed about the events of 
yesterday” and that he has already written CCA staff an apology letter. A later report 
found that because he was on suicide watch, José did not have access to “implements 
necessary to write an apology letter,” there is no evidence they were given and no 
apology letter was ever found.861 The doctor then changed José’s status from suicide 
watch to mental health observation because “he believed the detainee was no longer a 
danger to himself.”862 At 5:28 p.m. a medical emergency was called after an officer 
checked in on José.863 Ten minutes later 911 was called.864 Paramedics got to José at 5:52 
p.m.865 José was pronounced dead at 6:09 p.m. The autopsy found an orange sock stuck 
in his esophagus had caused him to asphyxiate.866 A later interview noted that the “nurses 
seemed preoccupied with taking the detainee’s blood pressure instead of initiating the 
‘ABCs’ of CPR: Airway, Breathing, and Circulation… the nurses seemed to have limited 
awareness of the contents of the emergency bag.”867 The Security and Healthcare Review 
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later found that Eloy Detention Center “did not fully comply” with ICE standards for 
medical care, significant self-harm and suicide prevention and intervention, special 
management units, and use of force and restraints.868 The Review further noted that even 
though there have been five suicides since 2005, Eloy Detention Center has not yet 
developed a suicide prevention plan.869 Perhaps the change of policy behind shoelaces 
did not in fact amount to having a suicide prevention plan. 
 In a telling counterstory, Juan Miguel Cornejo, who was held at Eloy at the same 
time, has a different take on how José de Jesús’s life ended and what came next. Cornejo 
explains, “The month I entered Eloy, was when they killed Mr. José de Jesús Salgun and 
well I felt, impotent. I felt, I saw everyone and no one did anything. It caused a lot of 
anger. I asked for support from the organization Puente where I was able to get many 
papers, much documentation, and in conjunction with them I asked them to help me in 
organizing a strike. They helped me and the strike took place on the 13th of June. Close to 
250 people were outside demanding that they respect our human rights and that the death 
of José de Jesús be clarified.”870 The claim that people held inside were on a hunger 
strike was disputed by ICE officials.871 Regardless, in response to his efforts at 
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organizing a protest, Cornejo was locked in solitary confinement. Cornejo explains, “they 
realized I was the one that organized the event and they put me in the hole, disciplinary 
segregation, for a month and a week. I couldn’t see my family, couldn’t receive calls, 
make calls, couldn’t buy food, they treated me poorly. Afterwards they let me out… and 
about a month after they again put me in the hole… I was there in total close to three 
months and a half, four months, in the hole.”872 Detention officials are notorious for the 
use of solitary confinement, in particular for indiscriminate or retaliatory purposes. 
Federal data released in 2013 showed that on any given day about 300 noncitizens are 
held in solitary confinement at the largest detention facilities across the country. About 
half are held in solitary for 15 days or more.873 Undoubtedly, Cornejo is not alone in his 
experience. One recent work noted, “Isolation is frequently used in an arbitrary and 
inconsistent manner, as a weapon to retaliate against those who speak out, to single out 
members of the LGBTQ community, and as a substitute for mental health treatment. 
Consistently, the reasons why immigrants are confined appear to involve abuse of power 
and unfettered discretion as well as discriminatory attitudes toward vulnerable 
populations.”874 
                                               
872 Juan Miguel Cornejo, interview with Leah Sarat, September 26, 2016, transcript, Stories of 
Immigrant Detention, transcriptions by Stacey Gama and Berenice Pelayo, translated by Berenice 
Pelayo. The “hole” refers to solitary confinement, which are isolation cells. 
 
873 Ian Urbina and Catherine Rentz, “Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks,” The 
New York Times, March 23, 2013. 
 
874 Azadeh Shahshahani and Ayah Natasha El-Sergany, “Challenging the Practice of Solitary 
Confinement in Immigration Detention in Georgia and Beyond,” City University of New York 
Law Review 16:2 (Summer 2013), 249. 
 278 
 During our interview, Jesus Ruiz, now serving as the Assistant Chief of Security 
reflected on well-run procedures he oversees at Eloy Detention Center. If one is 
contemplating working in corrections, Ruiz says “Eloy is a great place to start” and can 
serve as a “great stepping stone.” Although people start out with some hesitation about 
working in a prison because of the supposed danger involved, many say after the training 
that it was “not as bad as I thought it was.” Ruiz insists, “We run a smooth operation – 
the detainee population tends to respect the staff officer in charge.”875 Ruiz reflected on 
the logic behind the supposed deference. He reasoned, “I never felt [threatened]. There’s 
always a potential for dangerous situation… I don’t see a lot of danger. I know… born in 
Mexico… if I got in trouble before becoming a U.S. citizen, I could have ended up in a 
place like this. Why would I get in trouble before my hearing… most of the population 
agrees with that.”876 When pressed on how he became a U.S. citizen, Ruiz responded 
matter-of-factly, “I applied.” Bearing that sentiment in mind, Ruiz offered words of 
advice for future immigrants, “Being a Mexican national we all chose our paths… choose 
the right path.”877 Ruiz is looking forward to the facility expanding as there will be more 
opportunity for jobs.  
 Meanwhile, Council Member Andrew Rodriguez is currently attending Rio 
Salado College for public administration and pursuing plans to continue developing Eloy 
as part of the council. Of the current city council, Rodriguez notes, “we all have a vision, 
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each one of us have a vision but we have a vision for the betterment of Eloy. We see the 
street needs to be fixed, let’s do it now. We see the water lines are busting, let’s not just 
fix that little piece, let’s fix that whole mile. There’s a problem, let’s look into it and fix 
it… we all have our goal… to make Eloy a city that we all love… and we want 
everybody to come to Eloy.”878 
Raquel Calderon de Hildago spent Thanksgiving 2016 at Eloy Detention Center. 
The 36-year-old noncitizen had no criminal history. She had been suffering a series of 
seizures that went untreated. That weekend, she was “rushed to the hospital by 
ambulance,” before dying at the Banner Casa Grande Medical Center.879 An autopsy later 
found that Raquel had died of blood clots in her right lung that had traveled from her leg 
upward after a leg injury. One story reported that it “remains unclear whether Calderon’s 
death was preventable.”880 Perhaps clarity could come from rumblings inside the 
detention center. Those rumblings seem to indicate that Raquel fell to the ground as she 
suffered seizures and was in great pain. The guards ignored her, thought she was faking 
it, and yelled at her to get back up. When she didn’t they finally called for medical help. 
The medical cart was locked in a room some distance away. People had repeatedly 
expressed concerns to the guards that the medical cart should not be locked in cases of 
emergencies. They had been ignored. The medical cart was finally brought and Raquel 
was transported to the hospital suffering continual seizures along the way. Whether she 
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was “rushed” there does not seem as relevant. By then it was too late. The day after 
Raquel died, the room with the medical cart was unlocked. 
 Charles Bowden once wrote, “We can only endure the place that kills by 
pretending the place will not kill us.”881 Since its punitive turn in the early 1980s, the 
historical devolution of noncitizen detention policy and its consequences today, in 
particular at a place like Eloy Detention Center, bears witness to the way in which 
unadulterated state violence has and continues to literally and figuratively kill people. 
Justifying the policy of de facto and prolonged detentions is a purported goal of 
deterrence. As that goal is played out in reality, however, it exposes those caught within 
the trap to legal state violence. This violence is tolerated, as evidenced by its continued 
perpetuation and expansion, with pretensions that the cloak of citizenship will spare those 
not directly affected. Yet, as the mass incarceration crisis has shown, such a cloak is 
hardly sufficient. The devolution of noncitizen detention policy demonstrates that when 
the state is allowed to arbitrarily draw boundaries between those who are deserving of 
legal protections and deserve to be shielded from state violence and those who are not, 
there is little doubt about how the story ends. Eloy Detention Center, an example of the 
culmination of this state project that began at the turn of the twentieth century, should 
compel the reevaluation of the entire project of the carceral state. No longer is it 
sufficient to merely discuss reformations of the noncitizen detention regime. No longer is 
it sufficient to pretend that noncitizen detention has no relevance or implications for all 
members of the community. Understanding the historical devolution of noncitizen 
detention should compel the community to reevaluate taken-for-granted positions that 
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some among us deserve to be kept in cages at all. Because for now, violence keeps 
claiming victims and victory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In March 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a 5-3 decision that noncitizens in 
detention do not have “the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their 
detention,” reversing a previous Ninth Circuit ruling that granted people a hearing every 
six months.882 Essentially, the Court affirmed that those in detention must remain there 
without a bond hearing (that could allow them to be released on parole after paying an 
oftentimes large sum of money) until their cases are resolved either by the grant of 
immigration relief or an order of deportation. The opinion is neither remarkable nor 
surprising. What is noteworthy, however, is Justice Breyer’s dissent. Breyer argues,  
No one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has anyone to my knowledge 
successfully claimed, that persons held within the United States are totally 
without constitutional protection. Whatever the fiction, would the Constitution 
leave the Government free to starve, beat, or lash those held within our 
boundaries? If not, then, whatever the fiction, how can the Constitution authorize 
the Government to imprison arbitrarily those who, whatever we might pretend, 
are in reality right here in the United States? The answer is that the Constitution 
does not authorize arbitrary detention. And the reason that is so is simple: 
Freedom from arbitrary detention is as ancient and important a right as any found 
within the Constitution’s boundaries.883 
 
Leaving aside the fact that when such protections were purportedly included in the 
Constitution, millions of people were treated as property within the borders of the United 
States (since Breyer explicitly discounts the days of slavery), Breyer’s reasoning is still 
perplexing.  
Whatever protections the Constitution may or may not offer has consistently 
remained theoretical as the United States has been arbitrarily detaining people for much 
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of the twentieth and certainly, into the twenty-first century. This arbitrary detention has 
certainly also involved both citizens and noncitizens. Perhaps some historical context 
could help. Convict labor and convict leasing, for instance, demonstrate that the 
government and private entities have in fact been “free to starve, beat, or lash those held 
within our boundaries.”884 Whatever its supposed justifications may have been, 
Korematsu v. US demonstrated that the Court believed the Constitution did in fact 
“authorize the Government to imprison arbitrarily” those within its borders, both citizens 
and noncitizens.885 The Red Scares and the continuing War on Terrorism demonstrate 
that arbitrary arrest, detention, and deportation have run rampant over the course of the 
twentieth century. If anything, what the holding in Jennings v. Rodriguez affirms is that 
purported constitutional protections were and are, in fact, the fiction. 
This fiction is so clearly demonstrated by the historical devolution of noncitizen 
detention policy in the United States. The era of exclusionary detentions began with Ellis 
Island. After the official federalization of immigration enforcement in 1891 along with 
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Supreme Court decisions that removed noncitizen detention from purported constitutional 
protections due to proceedings being deemed “civil” and deportation “not punishment,” 
the stage was set for the expansion of detentions throughout the twentieth century. With 
Angel Island on the West Coast as well as detention facilities across the country, the 
government enforced immigration laws based on exclusionary motivations. In the middle 
of the century, official detention policy created a narrative against de facto detentions and 
purportedly turned toward parole. During this time, however, detention numbers and 
facilities expanded throughout the Southwest, particularly in Arizona where counties and 
cities continued to collect revenue for housing federal prisoners. As facilities became 
overcrowded with the concurrent war on drugs, counties turned first to bond measures but 
then, to the federal government, which dispersed significant sums of money through law 
enforcement block grants. When detention policy again changed starting in 1981, the 
stage was set for policy and reality to finally meld together as both became premised on 
state violence. 
While detention policy transformed over the course of the century, from 
exclusionary motivations to rhetoric about humane enforcement to finally deterrence, 
those experiencing it were continually subjected to its violent reality. From the voices of 
the detained, from Ellis to Angel to Eloy and the web of detention spaces across the 
country, we can ascertain the ways in which despite whatever the official policy was, 
their experiences of noncitizen detention were and remain horrific. Certain enduring 
themes – such as dismal conditions, overcrowding, sense of isolation and hopelessness, 
and deaths – transcend space and time. What is new to this era is that such shared 
experiences became the official policy. No longer needing the pretext of exclusionary 
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rationales nor the fiction of humane policies, the state consolidated its official detention 
policy with a purported rationale of deterrence. Deterrence meant using the force of the 
state, through a jurisdictional mélange of public institutions and private entities operating 
the growing leviathan of detention spaces, to break the will of those deemed as asking for 
permission to enter or remain in the country. So, in other words, official policy is now 
state violence. 
Noncitizen detention was and continues to remain a remarkable power exercised 
by the state. The justification for detention can range from explicit motivations such as 
ensuring noncitizens appear for their hearings or guaranteeing they will not commit 
crimes (since they are locked behind bars) to implicit impulses such as ensuring 
noncitizens in detention cannot compete with those on the outside for jobs and resources. 
Yet, as legal scholar Peter Schuck once noted, “the detention authority is more than a 
programmatic resource, ancillary to the power to exclude and deport. Detention is also an 
awesome power in its own right.”886 Using this awesome power, the United States today 
incarcerates at least 34,000 noncitizens a day and around 400,000 noncitizens every 
year.887 Scholars have noted how noncitizens represent one of the fastest growing 
segments of the jail and prison populations in the United States.888 Media outlets have 
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echoed the sentiment.889 As noncitizen detention continues to make national headlines, 
two main considerations should compel our evaluation of not only the detention regime 
but the future of the carceral state.  
First, a policy versus reality framework should be applied to all rights-based 
discourses, particularly as it relates to incarcerated populations. This is significant 
because applying theoretical rights-based policy models in practice to understand reality 
through individual experiences should lead us to reevaluate the entire discourse of rights 
themselves. One recent work is useful to illustrate the problems faced when scholars 
apply such frameworks. Consider Naomi Paik’s Rightlessness. While negating the 
existence of “inalienable rights,” as an idea that “remains a fiction,” Paik nevertheless 
seems to assume that “fundamental rights” are in fact not a fiction.890 For instance, Paik 
notes that prisoners at Guantánamo have been denied “access to legal redress, even to 
habeas corpus, that fundamental right of each prisoner to know the specific reason for his 
or her detention.”891 If, as Paik argues, such fundamental rights in fact do exist both in 
theory and practice, then they need to be subjected to further historical and legal analysis, 
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which she fails to do. This is especially problematic in light of Paik’s contention that 
rightlessness is “a condition that emerges when efforts to protect the rights of some 
depend on disregarding the rights of others.” The “some” are in Paik’s argument “the 
rightful.” As Paik notes, “The rightful–as worthy, deserving subjects–enjoy the protection 
of rights only because other, rightless subjects are so devalued that they are excluded 
from those protections.”892 So, fundamentally, Paik’s argument rests on what rights the 
“rightful” purportedly have that are then juxtaposed against the “rightless” who do not 
have such rights. If fundamental rights are assumed to fall within such rights of the 
“rightful,” then further discussion is crucial. In particular, as it pertains to constitutional 
law (and leaving aside for this discussion which rights are or are not considered 
fundamental), fundamental rights raise certain standards of review. These standards vary 
widely which creates a range of problems when fundamental rights are so blindly 
invoked within frameworks of analysis. 
Unlike the perhaps taken-for-granted position that fundamental rights always 
trigger the highest standard of review, that is laws passed that restrict fundamental rights 
will be subjected to strict scrutiny and upheld only if it furthers a compelling government 
interest and is narrowly tailored, this is hardly actually true in practice. As legal scholar 
Adam Winkler persuasively argues,  
Fundamental rights do not trigger strict scrutiny, at least not all of the time. In 
fact, strict scrutiny–a standard of review that asks if a challenged law is the least 
restrictive means of achieving compelling government objectives–is actually 
applied quite rarely in fundamental rights cases. Some fundamental rights trigger 
intermediate scrutiny, while others are protected only by reasonableness or 
rational basis review. Other fundamental rights are governed by categorical rules, 
with no formal “scrutiny” or standard of review whatsoever. In fact, only a small 
subset of fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny–and even among those strict 
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scrutiny is applied only occasionally. In short, the notion that government 
restrictions on fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny review is 
fundamentally wrong.893  
 
Winkler aptly concludes that “laws infringing upon fundamental rights are subject to 
strict scrutiny, but only some of those rights, only some of the time, and only when 
challenged by some people.”894 As it pertains to the legal implication of applying a 
fundamental rights framework then, policy and reality are highly incongruent. So, 
reasoning that prisoners held at U.S. prison camps are “rightless” because they are 
deprived of “fundamental rights” when such rights may or may not legally be applicable 
to them questions the entire framework of how rights are applied, litigated, and protected 
in the first place. Moreover, considering the fundamental rights applicable through the 
ambiguities of standards of review leaves open the question of who among the supposed 
“rightful” can in fact claim such rights as well and whether such a group actually even 
exists. What such analyses should reveal is the obscurities of whether whatever 
theoretically is deemed as “fundamental rights,” like Paik’s assessment of inalienable 
rights, are fictitious in practice. 
The above analysis of constitutional law and fundamental rights brings up the 
issue of standards of review themselves, which further questions the use of rights-based 
frameworks by scholars. Notably, the various standards of review are not applied equally 
within the same purported category of discriminatory laws. Consider what happens when 
courts have decided the constitutionality of laws that discriminate based on alienage, that 
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is, invoking the question of how to handle challenges to the Fifth Amendment’s equal 
protection guarantee for laws that differentiate between citizens and noncitizens. Courts 
have sometimes applied strict scrutiny for these cases.895 In the late 1970s, however, 
certain alienage-based discriminatory laws passed by the federal governments were given 
only rational basis review (the lowest among the standards of review).896 This was also 
true in 1982 for the Texas law that denied public education to children of undocumented 
persons, which was struck down as unconstitutional under rational basis review.897 So, if 
there is little consistency in how standards of review themselves are applicable to various 
laws that discriminate based on alienage, there is further doubt about the usefulness of 
invoking rights-based frameworks to challenge state action.  
This is particularly true in the post-9/11 era when the United States has been able 
to use existing and new laws directed at noncitizens to arrest and detain en masse. As 
legal scholar Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia argues, the “government has re-characterized 
many of the 9/11 policies as general immigration enforcement tools, forgetting the 
context under which such policies arose and the individuals that continue to suffer as a 
consequence.”898 Analyzing the Igbal case, which heightened the pleading requirements 
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for plaintiffs seeking relief, the author argues that “far from creating a new standard in 
the immigration realm, the Igbal decision perpetuates a longstanding ‘Business As Usual’ 
standard that permits the federal government to create and sustain laws that selectively 
discriminate against foreign nationals during times of national security, with minimal 
accountability.”899 American history in the twentieth century is littered with examples. 
Legal scholar Dawinder S. Sidhu picks up on the consequences of this decision, which is 
argued as “one of the most infamous and harmful to American jurisprudence and 
individual rights of this generation.” Drawing a parallel to Korematsu, Sidhu positions 
that Igbal “as a practical consequence, will provide the government with greater latitude 
to institute security programs and policies that are discriminatory, and conversely, will 
increase the burden on alleged victims of those programs and policies to seek redress for 
violations of their constitutional rights.”900 Sidhu’s analysis is accurate assuming, of 
course, such rights exist in the first place. If rights-based arguments must grapple with 
both the flexibility in standards of review for fundamental rights and the randomly 
applied standards of review themselves, then the purview of legal state power could 
potentially be limitless. This should then compel an examination of the usefulness of such 
a framework in the first place. Thus, in evaluating the noncitizen detention regime, 
scholars should avoid using rights-based arguments to question the legitimacy of the 
institution and the state power involved. There must be a different approach. 
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This leads to the second main contention evoked by the historical devolution of 
noncitizen detention policy, which is that any conversation about purported reform or a 
way forward should principally conclude with abolition in a post-carceral world. That is, 
rather than justifying caging a few on behalf of protecting the liberty of the many, the 
argument should rest on caging none at all. Yet, this requires certain conversations that 
seem to be outside the scope of consideration for most. As scholar Naomi Murakawa 
argues, the  
twenty-first century carceral apparatuses do not suffer any overwhelming 
credibility problem. If the American public evaluates judges negatively, it is for 
sentencing too leniently, not too aggressively… a majority of Americans have a 
great deal of confidence in the police, and most see police officers as fair… When 
twenty-first-century students learn about carceral practices, they tend to propose a 
number of possible reforms: hire more African American police officers; reinstate 
judicial discretion; limit police discretion; train police. Like federal lawmakers, 
they search for ways to improve the administration of justice for fairness and 
predictability.901  
 
This can be applied to immigration enforcement as well, as state laws like SB1070 
continue to legally racially profile through the “show your papers” provision that was 
upheld by the Supreme Court and the consequences of the twin 1996 laws AEDPA and 
IIRIRA that demand certain noncitizens be held in mandatory detention.  
Precisely for these reasons, conversations about noncitizen detention should aim 
to make the institution suffer a “credibility problem” as a starting point. In facilitating 
that pivotal credibility problem, scholars should no longer contend that detention should 
be “civil” or used as the “exception.” Continuing to do so would likely repeat mistakes of 
the past. As Murakawa aptly argues, “This history of liberal law-and-order matters 
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because the same proposals for better administration, proffered with the same good 
intentions, are likely to reproduce the same monstrous outcomes in the twenty-first 
century.”902 To avoid the perpetuation of a system that from its inception had been 
experienced as violence by those subjected to it, the way forward should be eradication of 
the noncitizen detention regime altogether without exception. 
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